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This work intends to analyze the Councils of State as political actors. Councils of State 
are peculiar unelected bodies that present a double, “amphibious” nature. As advisory 
boards of the government on legislation, they belong to the executive. However, as 
highest courts responsible for the judicial review of administrative acts, they are also 
part of the judiciary.  
Adopting a strategic approach to the analysis of the relations between the legislature and 
the judiciary, the research investigates the interaction between government and the 
Council of State in the Italian case. The first question that I intend to answer is if the 
interaction between the two institutions in the process of implementation of primary 
laws produces different outcomes, according to the political circumstances. More 
precisely, I analyze the extent to which the level of government ideological 
heterogeneity and the size of alternation affect the probability to activate the Council of 
State as Advisor. 
Second, I try to answer if the political factors that determine the activation of the 
Council of State in Italy also play a role in influencing the institutional characteristics of 
courts that review administrative acts in other countries. Following the game theoretical 
framework adopted for the Italian case, I examine the characteristics of courts that 
review administrative acts in fifteen countries, showing the correlation between courts’ 
institutional features and the prevailing political conditions (taking into consideration 
the post-Second World War period through the end of the 1990s).  
The Councils of State: ancient institutions with a considerable role in the political 
system 
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Although, as emphasized by law scholars, commentators and the same political actors, 
Councils of State play a relevant role in the political system, little is known about these 
institutions, which have ancient origins.  
In the first chapter, I reconstruct the origins of the Councils of State across European 
countries, which, in the cases of Spain and of the Netherlands, date back to the age of 
Charles V. Their evolution as consultative bodies follows the formation and the changes 
in characteristics of the executives. The development of their judicial function is also a 
consequence of the expansion of the different interests represented by the governments. 
This fact is highlighted in particular with reference to the Italian case, which is 
investigated more in depth, through a diachronic analysis. In chapter II, indeed, the 
evolution of the Italian Council of State is analyzed paying attention to the prevailing 
political conditions of the various ages, from the Kingdom of Savoy until the 
Republican Regime. The current characteristics of the Councils of State of Italy and of 
France are compared and some considerations on their different roles are drawn on the 
light of the political variables and of the different characteristics of the two political 
systems.  
The Italian Council of State in the process of implementation of primary laws 
Especially in recent years, the Council of State of Italy has been accused of being 
among the subjects responsible for the late implementation of primary laws. In chapter 
III, I report some relevant testimonies of political actors and commentators that, from 
the time of the Bicameral Commission to nowadays, have criticized the role of the 
Council of State as Advisor (its ex ante control on regulations) and as Court. I contend 
that the criticism against the institution is higher in potential and actual phases of policy 
change. Although the capacity of the Council of State of delaying the adoption of 
regulations is highly criticized and it is periodically discussed also in the public debate, 
measures of the timing for the adoption of the decrees that derive from primary laws 
(“decreti attuativi”) have still not been provided. In chapter III, I compare the timing for 
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the adoption of regulations, or rather, the administrative acts submitted to the ex ante 
control of the Council of State, and the timing for the adoption of “general 
administrative acts”, which are not sent to the Council of State for its ex ante control. As 
argued by several law scholars, general administrative acts are increasingly used by the 
governments instead of regulations, in order to avoid the preventive scrutiny of the 
Council of State. I find that between 1988 and 2014 the timing for the implementation 
of administrative acts, measured as the number of days that separates the adoption of 
law and the adoption of the decrees, is significantly higher for regulations. The analysis 
concerns five policy areas (economy, education, interior, defense and justice). 
The strategic interaction between government and the Council of State (1988-2014) 
After reviewing the most relevant contributions to the analysis of the legislative-judicial 
interaction that follow the strategic approach (Chapter IV), I describe the interaction 
between the Italian Council of State and national governments, according to a game 
theoretical framework. The Council of State is described as a “policy” conserver court 
(Steunenberg 1997; Ferejohn and Weingast 1992). Since it follows a procedurally based 
jurisprudence, the Council of State prefers to maintain the status quo of the existing 
administrative acts. Substantive policy preferences might also play an important role in 
Council of State’s behavior, but they tend to oppose policy change. Moreover, following 
Thies (2001) and Martin and Varberg (2005), the Council of State is conceived as a 
“guardian of the law” that limits ministerial discretion.  
I use some simple spatial models in order to explain the political circumstances under 
which governments should be more prone to activate the Council of State as Advisor. In 
particular, for great levels of government ideological heterogeneity, I expect that at least 
one government party may benefit from the activation of a policy-conserver court as 
Advisor, in order to prevent the risk of “ministerial drift” during the process of 
regulations’ adoption. In addition, I expect that, for high levels of government 
ideological heterogeneity, government parties should be more interested in knowing the 
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preferences of the Council of State as Court, in order to anticipate its decisions. Instead, 
for high level of alternation, governments may be less prone to activate the Council of 
State as Advisor, both in its quality of “guardian of the law” and in order to know its 
preferences as Court. In fact, in case of high size of alternation, the Council of State as 
Court could at least choose the ideal point of the most conserver member of the 
coalition, if it does not want to be overruled.  
I test my hypotheses employing a dataset of 1.140 observations, which includes 
regulations and general administrative acts adopted by eighteen Italian governments in 
five policy areas from 1988 to 2014. I provide spatial measures of the political 
explanatory variables, deriving parties positions from expert surveys and calculating the 
variables according to Tsebelis (2004), and non-spatial measures, based on the number 
of government parties and their turnover. The results confirm that the activation of the 
Council of State as Advisor is positively related with the level of government 
heterogeneity. On the contrary, higher values of alternation seem to have a negative 
impact on the probability to activate the Council of State as Advisor in the 
implementation of primary laws. 
Implications of the findings of the Italian case  
I try to verify if the political conditions have implications for other countries. On the 
basis of the quality of information available, I map the presence of institutions external 
to government responsible for the ex ante control on administrative acts in 15 European 
countries. In Italy such control, in the case of regulations, is provided by the Council of 
State. In the other countries, a preventive external control on administrative acts may be 
absent (as in Germany, Austria, Portugal, Ireland, Denmark and Spain). Alternatively, it 
can be exercised by administrative courts (Sweden and Finland), by the Councils of 
State (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, the Netherlands) or by committees of the 
legislatives (U.K.). I describe the characteristics of courts that review administrative 
acts in these countries, taking into account if they belong to a separate system of courts 
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inside the judiciary, if they can be activated as Advisors of government on the drafting 
of administrative acts and, in the case of the Councils of State, considering if the 
consultative and the judicial functions are exercised separately or on a unitary basis.  
I attribute scores to courts according to the level of separation between consultative and 
judicial functions. The lowest levels mean complete overlapping between the functions, 
whereas the highest scores refer to the absence of overlapping between the functions. I 
verify the presence of correlations between courts scores and the prevailing political 
conditions in each country. The data show the presence of negative correlations between 
government heterogeneity and courts scores. In other words, we notice courts in which 
consultative and judicial functions tend to overlap where the government heterogeneity 
presents higher values. Alternation is positively correlated with the scores on courts 
functions: courts with no consultative functions or in which consultative and judicial 
functions are provided separately are present in countries that experience high level of 
government alternation. Such results suggest that the strategic interactions between 
legislatures and the courts that review administrative acts depends on political 
conditions and have an impact on the characteristics of these courts.  
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CHAPTER I 
Origins and main developments of the Councils of State in the 
European countries 
1.1 Origins of the consultative function of the Councils of State 
Councils of State have their “ancestors” in the Medieval courts (curia regis) of 
European countries. When kingdoms used to have a feudal organization, the 
prerogatives of the monarchs were limited. In such contexts, courts charged with 
helping sovereigns in their offices were generally itinerant (they used to follow the 
monarchs in their changes of residencies) and their composition was variable: they 
could include knights, representatives of the clergy, servants, executive agents, as well 
as barons and vassals who had business with the king (Tilley, 2010). When the 
monarchies started to pursue expansionary policies and to consolidate their territories, 
the increase in volume and in complication of governmental affairs (finance, 
administration, justice, control of the peripheral territories) determined a process of 
specialization of the royal courts. Courts started to have permanent members, with 
technical knowledge, specialized in the functions of government. These organs- in 
France the Conseil du Roi of the XIII Century- evolved, following the transition from 
feudal to always more powerful, until absolute, monarchies. When the monarchies 
became absolute or near absolute, kings were at the same time legislators, head of the 
executives and sovereign judges. In these contexts, the courts (the councils) were 
organized in specific sections according to the different affairs and they were conceived 
as instruments to legitimize royal authority. In the extremely vast empire of Charles V, 
the councils (for the first time named “Councils of State”) were often composed by the 
great nobles and they were used to coordinate governments of the distant regions of the 
reign, as the Netherlands. In countries in which the councils originated as imitations of 
!14
the French Conseil d’Etat, founded by Napoleon in 1799, as Italy and Greece, such 
bodies gave a “consultative” legitimacy to the monarchies, that were still far from being 
“representative”. 
1.1.1 Origins of the French Conseil d'Etat 
The roots of the French Conseil d'Etat can be found in the Conseil du Roi, an institution 
that originated from the curia regis (the court) of the Capetian dynasty. Under the 
dynasty of the Capetians, that ruled between 987 until 1328 with fourteen successive 
kings, the monarchy of France went from being a mere lordship to a consolidated 
kingship. The role and nature of the advisory bodies evolved, following the 
transformation of the monarchy. At the end of the X century, France was organized in 
semi-independent kingdoms and, since the monarchy didn't have a permanent seat, the 
sovereigns used to travel along the territories of their domain, moving their headquarter. 
The councilors of curia regis used to met in assemblies without a permanent location. 
Councilors were mostly non-functionaries men, as the great vassals that belonged to the 
court as of right, minor nobles and representatives of the clergy. The court included also 
a smaller council, which was charged with following the king and that was consulted 
especially for current affairs. The prerogatives of councilors were ill-defined and their 
influence over kings' decisions unclear. A process of specialization of the court occurred 
starting from the XIII century, in consequence of the acquisition of territorial control 
over several duchies and counties that took place during the XII century and that 
strengthened French monarchy. Besides current affairs, kings had to face new issues. 
They had to make decisions in political matters, to administer justice and to supervise 
financial affairs in the new territories. The multiplicity of new affairs and the necessity 
to simplify the composition of the full court led to the formation of a new central 
government political organ: the Conseil du Roi (XIII-XIV century). In such council, 
professional members trusted by the king started to be appointed in addition to the great 
vassals. The council was organized into three branches: the Court of Finance (Le 
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Chambre des Enquetes), the Judicial Court (the Parlement) and the Council proper (the 
Conseil). Members of the three branches were called king's councilors and they were 
assisted by masters of petition (maître des requêtes), charged with making reports on the 
affairs submitted to the council; they used to met in plenary and sometimes in restricted 
assemblies. Although Parliament councilors were competent for the judicial function, 
the king still had the power to decide in last instance on litigations on government acts. 
Between the XIII and the XVII Century, the Conseil gained increasing power at the 
expense of the other branches. This process happened in conjunction with the 
consolidation of royal authority, that lead to the emergence of the absolute monarchy of 
Louis XIV. Compared to the other bodies, Conseil members eventually gained a sort of 
superior status. Although there was a formal division of labor between the three bodies, 
the competences of the Conseil tended to overlap with the tasks of the other branches 
and to prevail over them. As direct organ of the will of the king, the Conseil claimed for 
itself the right to correct and revoke the decisions of Chambre des Enquetes and 
Parlement. During the 16th Century, it began to exercise a judicial competence, claiming 
notice of all cases that concerned the government. Before king Louis XIV definitely 
stated the prevalence of the decisions of the Conseil, its prerogatives were repeatedly 
questioned by the States- General and the Parlement, whose protests culminated in the 
Frond of 1648 (Brissaud and Garner, 1915). In the XVII Century, the Conseil was 
reformed by Richelieu and Louis XIV. Its affairs were organized keeping separate the 
political government and the administration of justice; several sections that used to 
address the king with not binding advices were established. Among these sections, the 
most numerous was the Privy Council, a court of justice, whose decisions were rendered 
in the name of the king. Relevant acts of the entire Conseil were deliberated in plenary 
sessions held with the Privy Council. The whole Conseil extensively contributed to the 
legislation of the monarch and to the application of the laws. In this regard, it 
represented the closest “ancestor” of the Conseil d'Etat founded by Napoleon in 1799, 
which was fully invested with the dual task of participating in the drafting of the most 
important governmental texts and of settling disputes related to public administration. 
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Under the Consulate and the First Empire (1799-1814) the Council gave a crucial 
contribution to the formulation of the Napoleonic codes. It became responsible for 
drawing up legislation, interpreting bills, formulating administrative regulations and 
answering questions of administrative nature from departments and municipalities. 
Under the Restoration, its role as consultative body became less relevant. Present-day 
structure of the Conseil d'Etat goes back to the French Third Republic. At that time the 
Council was also settled at Palais-Royal (1875).  
1.1.2 The Council of State of Emperor Charles V: the Spanish Consejo de Estado 
The roots of the Spanish Consejo de Estado can be found in the system of government 
councils that consolidated in the period of residency of Charles V in Spain (1522-1529). 
Such system was not entirely created by the emperor, but it had some anticipations 
under the reign of the “Catholic Monarchs” Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of 
Castile (1479-1504). When Isabella became queen of Castile, her reign was in chaotic 
political conditions. One of her major concerns was the power of the nobility, that 
threatened the stability of the kingdom. To strengthen the monarchy, Isabella started a 
process of centralization, that involved the creation of permanent government councils 
under her direct control. In particular, to reduce the overgrown powers of the nobility, 
the queen reformed the existing council of the monarchy, the Consejo Real. The 
reformed royal council, the Council of Castile, started to act as the central organ of the 
government. Organized into five departments dealing with foreign affairs, justice, 
finances, the Santa Hermandad  and affairs concerning the kingdom of Aragon, the 1
council acquired also judicial competences. The aristocrats were excluded from its 
composition in favor of trusted legal experts. When Charles V became ruler of the 
Spanish Empire, he maintained only the judicial function of the Council of Castile and 
he built a system of government councils with distinct competences. Besides the 
 The Santa Hermandad was a municipal league of armed individuals established by the monarchs, a 1
sort of permanent police force supported by the municipal councils to protect persons and property 
against the violence of the nobles (Gerli, 2013, 219) and of bandits.
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councils with judicial functions only (as the Council of Aragon, the Council of Castile 
and the Council of the Indies), further councils were created, performing executive- 
advisory tasks, as the Council of Finance, the Council of the Crusade, the Council of 
State (Consejo de Estado). The Consejo de Estado was an executive body of advisors 
very close to the monarch, that used to discuss the administration of the lordships in the 
Americas, the German empire, Hungary, the Low countries, Italy, North Africa and 
Spain (Espinosa, 2008, 142). It used to have a subsection, the Consejo de estado y 
guerra, whose main task was to advise the monarch on war campaigns. Under the reign 
of his son, Philip II, the Consejo de Estado became the main advisory body for the 
political affairs of the empire and it was supported by a network of other councils 
responsible for the administration of the territories of Aragon, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and the Indies (Lesaffer 2009, 331).  
Successive evolutions of the council date back to the XIX Century, when, with the 
Spanish Constitution of 1812, the Consejo de Estado was established as the controlling 
body of the power of the monarch, who needed the approval of the council to 
promulgate some acts. From the first years of the XX Century, it became a consultative 
body of the executive.  
1.1.3 Charles V and the Low Countries’ Raad van State 
The Councils of State of present-day Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have 
their antecedent in the governmental council (Raad van State) established by Charles V 
in the Low Countries in 1531. The Low Countries were highly fragmented territories, 
composed by seventeen provinces, covering the current Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and part of the northern France. As ruler of the Low Countries 
(1515-1555), Charles V started a process of centralization, that aimed at organizing the 
provinces into a unitary state and at strengthening the administrative apparatus of 
central government. Because of his long absences from the Low countries, the emperor 
used to delegate the government of the territories to a permanently resident Governors-
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General (his sister Mary of Hungary and then his daughter Margaret of Parma). The 
foundation of the Raad van State was instrumental in fulfilling the centralizing process 
of the emperor. Composed by the high nobles of the Low Countries, members of the 
clergy and a number of lawyers, the main task of the Council was to advise the 
Governor-General in matters of foreign affairs, defense and public order (Van Gelderen 
1992). In addition to the Raad van State, two collateral councils were created: the Privy 
Council and the Council for Finance, the first with administrative and judicial functions, 
the second competent for central fiscal administration (Blom and Lamberts, 1999, 119). 
During the regency of Charles V, the Governors-General had to face the discontent 
created by the politics of centralization and with the increasing tensions caused by the 
repression of the Protestants. In this context, the Raad van State, as board of advisors of 
the Governor- General, played a delicate role. Charles V appointed to the Council 
mostly Dutch high nobles in order to obtain their cooperation. In fact, during his reign, 
he could rely on the loyalty of the moderate members of the Council, such as William of 
Orange. The moderate members of the Council, although opposing the prosecution of 
the Protestants, made several conciliation efforts with central government and tried to 
soften the ordinances against heresy of the emperor. Such “balancing role” of the Dutch 
nobles inside Raad van State ended when Philip II succeeded to Charles V. Philip II 
appointed several Spanish councilors, weakening the role of the Netherlandish nobles in 
the government. He tightened the oppression against the Protestants, rejecting any 
requests for moderation and imposing a strict implementation of the ordinances to 
punish heresy. This led to the resignation of prominent members of the Council, 
amongst which Prince William of Orange and Count Egmont. The institution was 
marginalized. With the annexation of the Netherlands to France, in 1810 the Raad van 
State disappeared: the country fell under the French rule, which had its own Conseil 
d'Etat. When the Kingdom of the Netherlands was established, the 1814 Constitution 
restored the Raad van State and it established that the monarch had to consult the 
Council for all royal bills and decrees. The Raad van State was presided by the king 
himself, that appointed councilors from all provinces. The 1848 Constitution introduced 
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the principle of ministerial responsibility and transferred the power of the King to the 
whole government. The Raad van State became advisor of the government and its 
members became almost jurists.   
1.1.4 Origins of the Greek Council of State (Συµβουλιο της Επικρατειας) 
A Council of State was first established in Greece in 1833, under the absolute monarchy 
of king Otto. King Otto, son of King Ludwig I of Bavaria, was the sovereign that the 
Great Powers (France, Great Britain and Russia) imposed to Greece, at the 1832 
Convention of London, after the Greek War of Independence. As Bavarian, the king was 
strongly influenced by German and French administrative traditions. He never accepted 
the liberal institutions adopted by the Greek provisional governments after the rebellion 
against the Ottoman Empire. Conversely, he monopolized the government and the 
administration with bavarian officials, without conceding a constitution. The king 
founded a Council of State, emulating the French Conseil d'Etat, The Council, however, 
was composed by Greeks to compensate the lack of local experience of the foreign 
administrators. In such autocratic regime, without any representative body nor 
assembly, the Council of State, as a consultative organ, played an important political 
role, contributing to the transition to the constitutional monarchy. When the large-scale 
resentment among the population brought to the conspiracy against the absolute 
monarch and to the 3rd September 1843 revolt, the Council of State participated to it. 
This constituted the most important moment in the first ten-year history of the Council. 
The Council drowned up a series of provisions that the king was forced to adopt 
through decree: the imposition of a new council of ministers and the convocation of the 
National Assembly to adopt a constitution . Essentially, the Council of State gave 2
formal legitimacy to the claims of the revolution supporters. However, since the Council 
was considered as an organ associated with absolute monarchy, in the 1844 Constitution 
 Information from the Greek Observer of the 5th September 1843, mentioned by the Colonial Gazette, 2
in Agnew (1843)
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it was abolished. In the 1864 Constitution, a Council of State with functions of project 
of laws revision was reintroduced. It was thought, on the basis of the suggestions of the 
monarch, George I, as a sort of “mitigated Senate”, a kind of substitute of an upper 
chamber. But its existence was short: it was abolished again by the chamber of deputies, 
with a large majority, in 1865 (Finlay 2014). The Council of State was then re-
established with the 1911 Constitution revision, according to which it assumed the 
functions of consultant for legislative proposals and for draft regulatory decrees, and of 
court of appeal for administrative cases. However, this Council never became operative, 
since the administrative acts required by the Constitution to make the Council active 
were never approved. The Council of State was finally founded on the provisions of the 
1927 Constitution and it began to operate in 1929. 
1.1.5 “Consilium nobiscum residens”: origins of  the Council of State of Italy 
The earliest “ancestor” of the Italian Council of State can be identified with the 
Consilium nobiscum residens of counts and dukes of Savoy of the XIII Century. This 
council was composed of aristocrats that used to advise counts and dukes in political 
and judicial affairs. From the Consilium, in the XIV Century emerged a consultative 
organ that included also a function of financial control, the Curia principis. Such bodies 
constituted an evolution of the medieval courts, but they still reflected a feudal system 
of political organization: the aristocrats, chosen as councilors, used to exercise an 
important influence in the territories of the reign, a proper central government did not 
exist and the monarch was the first guarantor of subjects' rights. Significant evolutions 
of these bodies occurred during the Napoleonic domination of Italy (1796-1815), when 
the Conseil d'Etat founded by the absolute monarch in 1799 became a role model. The 
Napoleonic institution exercised a direct influence in Italy. As several parts of Italy had 
become French, some nobles and intellectuals participated to the French Conseil d'Etat 
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as auditors (among these, Cesare Balbo in 1807 ). First, the competences the French 3
Conseil d'Etat were extended to the Italian territories annexed to the French Empire: 
Piedmont (1800), duchy of Parma and Piacenza (1802), Liguria (1805), Tuscany (1808), 
Umbria and Lazio (1808). Subsequently, autonomous Councils of State were 
established in the Napoleonic kingdom of Italy (1805-1814) and in other Italian 
kingdoms not directly annexed to the French empire, but still under the influence of 
Napoleon. The Council of State of the Napoleonic kingdom of Italy was instituted by 
royal decree in 1805 and it was occasionally chaired by the same Napoleon. Such 
council was charged to advise the emperor in the organization of the public 
administration through the adoption of specific organic laws and and through the 
implementation of an increasing control of the central state over the peripheral 
territories. Councils of State were created in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies under the 
regency of Giuseppe Bonaparte (1806), in the Pontifical States (1848), in the Duchy of 
Parma and Piacenza (1814) and successively, in years between 1845 and 1865, a 
Council of State used to work in Tuscany . The Council of State of the kingdom of 4
Savoy, which represents the closer “ancestor” of present-day Italian Council of State, 
was founded by king Charles Albert in 1831. When he inherited the throne, Charles 
Albert had to face contrasting developments: from one side, he needed to strengthen his 
credibility amongst the most traditional segments of the monarchy, affirming the 
conservative order emerged after the Congress of Vienna; from the other, he had to deal 
with the raising claims for the concession of liberal institutions and for changes in the 
authoritarian organization of the reign, ideals that he himself had supported in his 
 In a 1831 note addressed to Charles Albert, in the months that precede the institution of the Council of 3
State in Italy, Cesare Balbo describes the French Conseil d'Etat as the main instrument of government 
of Napoleon and he reassures the monarch that the institution was far from limiting king's 
prerogatives and it was compatible with a strong (“pure”) monarchy (Casana Testore, 1995).
 The Council of State of the Two Sicilies was reformed by Gioacchino Murat in 1808 and then 4
abolished in 1815, after the Congress of Vienna. The Council of State of the Duchies of Parma and 
Piacenza was founded by Marie-Louise of Austria and it was removed in 1865, when administrative 
litigation was temporarily abolished in Italy. In Tuscany the Council of State started to work after the 
Restoration and it used to exercise consultative functions and judicial prerogatives in matters of 
waters and roads. The Council of State of the Pontifical States (1840-1870) had consultative and 
judicial functions and its judgements were not subject to the approval of the monarch (Pezzana, 2011, 
34).
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youth . In this context, the foundation of the Council of State represented a sort of 5
compromise: the monarchy, still far from being constitutional, became “consultative”. 
The opinions of “remarkable individuals, devoted to the monarchy and dedicated to the 
study of political sciences”  were supposed to give the monarch a greater legitimacy, 6
making his decisions less arbitrary in the eyes of the subjects. Actually, the 1831 
Council of State could not limit the absolute power of the king. According to Santi 
Romano (1932), a prominent Italian jurist that chaired the Council of State between 
1928 and 1944, in the early years of its functioning, the Council of State rather played a 
political role. As a consultative body of the king, the Council worked in parallel to the 
ministries and eventually it balanced their power. The consultative activity of the 
Council covered all activities of the State except for foreign policy and war. It was 
charged with examining all proposals of legislation and regulation, the general budget 
of the State and taxation. It supported the implementation of the conservative program 
of the monarch, focused on administrative reforms of local administrations that included 
the introduction of organs of central control on the peripheral territories (Intendenze 
Generali), and on a process of legislative unification, that led to the creation of civil, 
commercial, military and penal codes. When the increasing competences and the 
process of specialization of government brought to the growth of ministerial tasks, the 
relation of the ministries with the Council and the role of the Council itself changed. 
Possibly in order to reduce its political role, the ministries started to submit to the 
Council minor files and technical questions, retaining for themselves the most important 
decisions. This fact gradually determined a change in the consultative character of the 
Council, that switched from “political” to “technical- administrative”. If the ministries 
partly reached their goal of weakening the political role of Council, they also laid the 
 Charles Albert had a liberal education. He was aware of the conspiracy of the young liberal aristocrats 5
that brought to the Revolt of he May 1821. When King Victor Emmanuel abdicated because of such 
revolt, Charles Albert, acting as regent, granted the liberal constitution of Spain. The constitution was 
then disowned by King Charles Felix. 
 From the preamble of the 1831 royal decree of Racconigi, in which King Charles Albert announced 6
the purposes for his reign https://www.giustizia-amministrativa.it/cdsintra/wcm/idc/groups/public/
documents/document/mdax/nze2/~edisp/intra_033968.pdf (p. 215)
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basis for the successive consolidation of the institution, that, from an organ of political 
consultancy of the monarch, became a technical advisor of the whole government. Its 
apparent lack of political power preserved the existence of the Council, when the 1848 
Albertine Statute affirmed the new constitutional regime (Wright, 1994, 30).  
1.2 Origins of the judicial function of the Councils of State 
In countries where Councils of State act also as supreme administrative courts, 
administrative justice has basically developed inside public administration, in the 
framework of the executive power. These countries present a “dual legal system”, in 
which administrative courts run parallel to civil justice tribunals and they rule on the 
legality of administrative action. The idea at the basis of the “purest” model of dual 
justice, the French system, was that ordinary justice was inadequate to know and to 
judge affairs in which public administration does exercise a discretionary power. Not 
only. According to the ideals of the French Revolution and of its rigid conception of the 
separation of powers, the activities of the administrative authorities, pursuing the 
“public interests”, had to be protected from the interferences of ordinary courts. The 
control over their acts had to be exercised by the Administration itself. Such principles 
were embodied in the model of the “judge-administrator”, according to which the 
Council of State was the definitive arbiter for the affairs involving the acts of 
bureaucrats. This conception was reinforced and implemented under the reign of 
Napoleon. It must be noticed that, in France, both the concept of public interest and of 
the necessity of a separate administrative justice consolidated under an authoritarian 
regime, where the administrative structures and the territorial articulations of the State 
were already present and they were strengthened by the centralizing program of 
Napoleon (Wright, 1994). In this context, administrative justice was strongly dependent 
from the executive power: although the Conseil d'Etat was vested with a proper judicial 
function since 1799, its judgements became formally autonomous from the approval of 
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the Head of State only in 1872. The success and the adoption of the Napoleonic model 
by the other countries is a fact, but the way in which it was implemented is far from 
being homogeneous and in line with the pure French model. The Napoleonic model of 
administrative justice was implemented in contexts that differed significantly from 
France, for political and administrative aspects. In Italy, when the judicial function was 
attributed to the Council of State (1859), the country had already known liberal 
institutions and the different models of administrative justice of pre-unitary states. 
Moreover, since the articulations of the State and of public administration were still 
weak and in construction, the Council of State was far from representing the head of a 
centralized system of public administration. The country experimented in fact also a 
short window of a unified-monistic model of justice (1865-1889), on the basis of the 
Belgian system. In Greece, where the Council of State was abolished several times 
before being definitively embedded in the Constitution, the institution consolidated first 
of all as the archetypal judge for recourses for excess of power, as the guardian of the 
principle of the rule of law. The concept of popular sovereignty embedded in the Greek 
Constitution (1975) focused in fact on the jurisdictional control over the legality of the 
administrative action, more than on the non-interference of the ordinary judges over 
public administration activities. Independent Belgium (1831) did not adopt a separate 
system for administrative justice until 1946, and the organization and functioning of the 
Belgian Council of State were regulated only in 1973. Luxembourg followed the 
monistic model of Belgium, to which it used to be administratively annexed, until 1856, 
when King William III imposed the foundation of a Council of State. Such Council, 
vested also with a judicial function, was supposed to act as a sort of second chamber, to 
balance the prerogatives of the Parliament. However, the judicial function of the 
Council of State of Luxembourg was recently questioned and finally abolished (1997), 
after a sentence of the European Court of Human Rights denouncing its lack of 
independence form the executive power. The Council of State of the Netherlands, 
entitled to act as a court since 1861, was strongly dependent by the monarch, being 
presided by the king himself and its decisions being adopted by the Crown. However, 
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different from the French model, the Council entered a context which was characterized 
by the presence of several specialized administrative authorities and tribunals. 
1.2.1 The Conseil d'Etat as the evolution of the “administrator-judge” in France 
Administrative justice in France origins from the exclusion of the ordinary judges from 
the administrative contentious. The conflict between ordinary tribunals and the Conseil 
du Roi already existed at the time of the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV (paragraph 
1.1). The necessity to preserve the “public interest” from the interference of the judges 
was an element at the basis of the narrow interpretation of the separation of powers’ 
principle by the French Revolution. The independence of the judiciary did not receive 
the same consideration. The administrative contentious started to develop in its modern 
form with the law of 16-24 August 1790. The possibilities of ordinary tribunals of 
bordering on the administrative domain were particularly feared by the Revolution 
supporters, hostile to the power of justices of the regular courts, politically 
unaccountable and immovable. The law of 16-24 August 1790 separated judicial and 
administrative functions, insulating the administration from the supervision of ordinary 
courts. More specifically, the law forbade ordinary courts from interfere in the activities 
of the administrative authorities and prevented them from prosecuting State officials for 
acts carried out in the exercise of their functions. The administrative action became 
subject to the specific control exercised by the Administration itself. This led to the 
configuration of a system in which the judge is known as the “administrator-judge”. In 
this system, in case of a dispute with Administration, an individual could only appeal to 
the immediate supervisor of the decision maker and, eventually, to the competent 
Minister, who was both, judge and party. The sentiment of hostility toward the ordinary 
magistrates was shared also by Napoleon, that, in 1799, restored the Conseil du Roi, 
under the name of Conseil d'Etat. Napoleon conceived the Conseil d'Etat as a part of 
the hierarchical chain of command. The Conseil consolidated as an integral part of an 
already powerful State. The law February 17, 1800 on local administration established 
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an administrative justice system based on two levels: the Conseils des préfecture and 
the Conseil d'Etat. This law followed an authoritarian logic and it was inspired to the 
principles of uniformity, hierarchy and centralization. The historians define this 
institutional model “administrative monarchy”. Administrative monarchy was a system 
of government in which a highly centralized public administration, composed of a new 
class of bourgeois officials, substituted representative and constitutionally autonomous 
political organs (Aimo, 1990, 39). Inside this framework, an integrated system of 
administrative justice was created. The members of the Conseil d'Etat were appointed 
and removed by the First Consul, becoming as a consequence more permeable to the 
prerogatives of the executive power and of administration. Although the Conseil d'Etat 
since 1799 used to be the supreme court for the acts of the public administration, it had 
to wait until the foundation of the Third Republic to develop a proper judicial function, 
autonomous from the executive. Until 1871, under the regency of Napoleon III, the 
judgements of the Conseil d'Etat necessitated to be embedded in a decree of the Head of 
State to became effective (“retained justice”). The law of May 24, 1872 marked the 
transition from retained to delegated justice. On this basis, the Conseil d'Etat was 
recognized as an autonomous judicial authority and the last word on judicial decisions 
was no longer left to the Head of State. The same law introduced the Tribunal des 
conflict, which was responsible for resolving conflict of powers between the 
administrative and the civil courts. In 1953 the tribunaux administratifs substituted the 
conseils des préfecture. The tribunaux administratifs received a broad competence, 
becoming judges in the administrative disputes of first resort, while the Conseil d'Etat 
retained jurisdiction of first and last instance only in most important cases and it became 
appellate judge. The law December 31, 1987 completed the administrative justice 
organization, introducing the cours administratives d'appel to which most of the appeal 
competences was transferred. The Conseil d'Etat became the supreme administrative 
judge, court of cassation for the new appellate courts.   
1.2.2 The development of administrative justice in Italy: between pre-unitarian judicial 
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traditions and the transposition of the French model 
Italy inherited both the Napoleonic tradition and the juridical practices of the pre-
unitary states. This fact had to some extent complicated the development of a proper 
model of administrative justice. Pre-unitary states presented different judicial traditions. 
The French system of jurisdiction, based on two level of judgement- the local level of 
the conseils des préfecture and the central level of the Conseil d'Etat- was implemented 
in the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy (1805-1814), in the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza, 
in the Pontifical State (1848) and in the Kingdom of Savoy (1842). In Tuscany, instead, 
administrative law was based on the unitary jurisdiction of the ordinary judge for 
subjective rights. The Albertine Statute of 1848 did not mention the judicial function of 
the Council of State. The parliamentary debate in years between 1850-1857 did not 
reach an agreement on a reform of the institution and also the law-proposals of the 
Interior minister, Urbano Rattazzi, based on suggestions of the same Council of State, 
were not approved. The government took advantage of the extraordinary power that it 
was conferred to it, because of the Second War of Independence, to approve a reform of 
the Council in 1859. Such reform introduced the figure of the President of the Council 
of State, which substituted the king, and it attributed to the Council a judicial function. 
The first level of judgement was provided by the Government Councils, administrative 
courts of first instance that replaced the Intendenza Councils, and that used to operate as 
part of the prefectures. Through the institution of the III judicial section, the Council of 
State became the court of appeal against the decisions of Government Councils. 
Although its judicial activity used to have a certain level of autonomy , still the Council 7
was fully embodied inside the executive power. A list of competences was attributed to 
both Government Councils and the Council of State: public law disputes concerning 
property and taxation, civil rights litigations involving procurement contracts, 
administrative law disputes on road classification, public water, boarders of the 
 Unlike the judgements of the Conseil d'Etat up to 1871, the sentences of the Council of State adopted 7
between 1859 and 1965 did not necessitate of royal decrees to become effective.
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municipalities (Sandulli 2011). In all other affairs that implied the authority of public 
administration, individuals did not have proper rights, but only “interests”. After 1861 
Italy unification, in 1865 the Parliament approved a package of legislation on the 
initiative of the government, concerning administrative unification. This package 
included several reforms, as the organization of the provinces and the municipalities, 
public safety, public health, public works, and, relevant for this work, the administrative 
contentious. The 1865 legislation abolished the administrative contentious. It attributed 
disputes between individuals and public administration to the ordinary courts, while it 
left “affairs” to the competence of non-contentious administrative authorities. 
“Disputes” were used to indicate cases in which individuals had civil or political rights 
in front of the administration. Vice versa, “affairs” involved individuals’ mere interests 
(interessi legittimi). Such reform was inspired by liberal principles and it intended to 
better safeguard the independence of the judges, emulating the model of the 1831 
Belgian constitution . However, since its beginning, the system showed evident limits: 8
ordinary judges could not annul or modify unlawful administrative acts, but they could 
only dis-apply them; the legal protection of subjective legal positions, the interests, 
remained de facto uncovered. In 1889, a second package of legislation on administrative 
unification, pursued by the President of the Council of Ministries, Francesco Crispi, was 
approved. As a result of a movement that claimed adequate protection for “interests”, 
the IV judicial section of the Council of State was instituted. In 1907, the V judicial 
section of the Council of State was added. Since the distinction between rights and 
interests, which used to separate the jurisdiction of the Council of state from that of the 
ordinary courts, presented particular difficulties, especially in cases involving civil 
  Belgium obtained the independence from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830, after the 8 8
Belgian Revolution. Its Constitution of 1831 was at that time considered as the most modern and 
democratic in Europe.
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service, in 1923 the “exclusive jurisdiction” (giurisdizione esclusiva)  of the Council of 9
State was established (Rava, 1942). The exclusive jurisdiction of the Council attributed 
jurisdiction over rights to the administrative courts in a series of affairs enumerated by 
the law. Such affairs were subtracted to the competence of the ordinary judges. As a 
consequence of this change, an important increase in the work-load of the Council  of 
State occurred and in 1948 the VI judicial section was added, in order to speed up the 
solution of the appeals. The decentralization of the organs and functions of 
administrative justice dates back to the 1970s. After the Constitutional Court, in a series 
of judgments, declared unconstitutional the administrative justice organs of pre- 
democratic legislation , the Parliament approved the law n. 1043/1971 which instituted 10
the Regional Administrative Tribunals of first instance (T.A.R.), which started to work 
effectively in 1974. The Council of State became the appellate court against the 
judgements of Regional Administrative Tribunals.  
1.2.3 The foundation of the Council of State in independent Belgium 
In present-day Belgium, a Council of State with judicial prerogatives was introduced 
only in the half of the XX Century. In years preceding independence, Belgium saw the 
presence of Councils of State because of the affiliation, first, to the empire of Charles V, 
then to the First French Republic of Napoleon and, finally, to the United Kingdom of 
the Netherlands under the King William I. In 1830, the Belgian Revolution culminated 
in the secession of the Belgian provinces and Belgium formed and autonomous 
kingdom. Not surprisingly, the 1831 Constitution did not included a Council of State. 
 According to the Italian legal system, administrative courts should judge the legitimacy of acts that 9
potentially infringe legitimate interests, while the protection of subjective rights lie with the ordinary 
courts. The exclusive jurisdiction of administrative court is an exception to this rule. According to it, 
administrative courts can have jurisdiction over individuals' subjective rights towards public 
administration in a series of matters enumerated by the law. The list of the matters in which 
administrative courts have exclusive jurisdiction constantly increased. One of the most important 
expansion of the exclusive jurisdiction occurred between the 1970s and 1990s and it concerned the 
sectors of public services, housing, urban planning. 
  Consigli di prefettura and giunte provinciali amministrative (rulings n. 30/1967 and n. 33/1968, in 10
Righettini 1998, 97)
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This because of the discouraging historical precedents (the reminiscence of the 
institution as an “instrument of power” ) and because of the reluctance of the 11
components of the Constituent Assembly to organize administrative justice within the 
framework of the executive power. The founders initially opted for a monistic system of 
legal protection, in which judges of the ordinary courts and tribunals were authorized at 
settling administrative disputes. Such jurisdiction was exclusive if the disputes 
pertained to civil rights. However, for disputes involving political rights, the 
Constitution had included the possibility to form specific administrative courts also. 
This disposal was used by the legislator when, in the half of the XX Century, the 
monistic system was questioned. The increase of the activities of the state determined 
the growth of disputes between citizens and public administration, but the civil courts 
seemed to be reluctant to review governmental actions. Civil courts for several decades 
had developed a restrictive interpretation of their jurisdiction and declared themselves to 
have no competence to judge the administration in the exercise of public authority. After 
years of extensive debate, a Council of State was created in 1946, acting both as the 
highest administrative court and as an advisory body of government for legislation. Its 
organization and functioning were disciplined by organic laws in 1973. In 1993 the 
institution of the Council was incorporated in the Constitution.  
1.2.4 Begin and end of the judicial function of the Council of State of Luxembourg 
In years between 1831 and 1839 Luxembourg was administratively attached to 
Belgium. After the Treaty of London of 1839, the Gran Duchy of Luxembourg was 
formed, constituting an autonomous and sovereign state in personal union to the King of 
the Netherlands. Its Constitution of 1848, which emulated that of Belgium, did not 
mention the Council of State. A Council of State responsible for issuing opinions on all 
government bills and for settling administrative litigations was introduced by the 
 As reported in the “history of the institution”, available at http://www.raadvst-consetat.be/?11
page=about_history&lang=en
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constitutional reform imposed by King William III in 1856. The Council was untouched 
by the 1868 Constitution, that modified the existing text in a liberal sense, and by the 
revisions of 1919. The 1989 Constitution underlined the independence of the Council of 
State from the government, especially in its judicial function. However, in 1996, after 
the Procola ruling  of the European court of Human Rights, the impartiality of the 12
litigation section of the Council was questioned. A reform of 1997 abolished such 
section and attributed the judicial function to administrative tribunals and to an 
Administrative Court of appeal.  
1.2.5 The development of the judicial function of the Raad van State   
The Council of State of the Netherlands started to develop a judicial function in the 
second half of the XIX Century. After a parliamentary debate about wether the Raad 
van State should have been responsible for deciding administrative disputes, a 1861 
organic law attributed to the Council a function of advise to the King to solve cases of 
conflicts between administrative organs. This led to the creation of a section of the 
Council that used to act similarly to an administrative court, but its decisions were 
adopted by the Crown: the section used to hear the parties and to propose draft decisions 
in form of royal decrees. The Constitution of 1887 allowed the Council of State to act as 
a proper administrative court, but such previsions were implemented only with the 
legislation of the 1960s and 1970s. Various special administrative courts were 
introduced, but with limited jurisdictions, based on the provisions of specific statutes. 
The right to appeal against any decree of the executive was definitely introduced in 
1976 with the AROB Act (Administratieve Rechtspraak Overheidsbeschikkingen, 
Administrative Jurisdiction on Public Authorities' Decrees). This act granted the right to 
appeal to the newly constituted judicial section of the Raad van State if no other special 
 The agricultural association Procola questioned the impartiality of the members of the litigation 12
section of the Council of State in front of the European Court of Human Rights. The members of 
litigation section that judged on an affair concerning milk quotas had previously issued their opinions 
on the same case. 
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administrative court was available for an appeal. This produced a huge expansion of the 
work-load of the Council, that led to an important increase in the number of councilors 
and of their staff.  
1.2.6 The development of the judicial function of the Council of State of Greece: the 
supreme administrative court as a guardian of the rule of law 
The abolition of the Council of State in 1844 interrupted the first attempts to create an 
administrative justice sector, started in 1833 . In years between 1844 and 1911, a 13
system of unitary jurisdiction was introduced. The jurisdictional control over public 
administration actions was assigned to the ordinary courts, except for some affairs 
enumerated by the law. The Constitution of 1911 introduced for the first time the 
annulment jurisdiction of the Council of State. However, such provision became 
operative only in the late 1920s, during the Second Hellenic Republic. The Republican 
Constitution of 1927 aimed at improving the protection of civil rights and freedoms. To 
broaden the constitutional protection of civil rights, a series of reforms concerning the 
judiciary was approved. In particular, with the the law n. 3713/1929, the Council of 
State became operative as Supreme Administrative Court, competent for the judicial 
review of administrative acts. The aim of the institution was to assure the principle of 
the rule of law, according to which the exercise of public authority must be based on 
legal provisions. The most important competence of the Council of State was the 
receiving of applications of annulment of individual or normative administrative acts . 14
To each section of the Council was attributed a particular jurisdiction. The first section 
was the last resort for all cases regarding civil employees, the second had appellate 
jurisdiction in all cases heard before lower administrative courts and general jurisdiction 
 A first rudimental system of administrative justice was provided in 1833 by two institutions: the 13
“Controller and Auditor General”, an administrative body that used to provide administrative 
jurisdiction on certain administrative litigations, and the Council of State, which had some limited 
capabilities of jurisdictional nature. 
 Information available on the official website of the Greek Council of State  14
 http://www.ste.gr/FL/history_en.htm
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in affairs concerning local governments, the third had annulling jurisdiction in certain 
fields of public administration and the General Assembly had jurisdiction in all petitions 
for annulment of illegal administrative acts (Stassinopoulos, 1960). The expansion of 
government activity and the increase of the recourses to the Council of State determined 
the changes in the organization of the judicial function formulated in the Constitution of 
1975 (confirmed in the amendments of 1986 and 2001). First, the competences to annul 
administrative acts were attributed mainly to administrative courts of second instance, 
and the Council of State became the court of appeal against the judgements of these 
courts. Second, a number of administrative-law disputes were assigned to the substantial 
review  of administrative courts, the Council of State becoming a court of revision. In 15
particular, the Council of State became competent for substantive judicial review of 
recourses of civil servants against decisions on disciplinary measures of demotion and 
dismissal.  
 In annulment disputes, the court may reject an application or annul the administrative act, binding the 15
public administration to decide in compliance with the court ruling. Vice versa, in substantive 
disputes, the court may resolve the dispute altering the unlawful administrative act. 
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CHAPTER II 
Political conditions at the basis of the role of the Councils of State. 
The evolution of the Council of State of Italy and recent 
developments of the Conseil d'Etat in France 
Introduction 
What differentiates Councils of State from other institutional bodies inside the executive 
and from the other courts of the judiciary is their “amphibious” nature: the fact that they 
are, at the same time, governments’ consultants and judges for the acts of public 
administration. As supreme judges for the administrative disputes, Councils of State can 
exercise a sort of “credible threat” to governments: if governments do not follow their 
opinions on secondary legislation acts, Councils of State as Courts could declare the 
acts approved by the governments void. When they act as consultants, Councils of 
States should be able to exercise a direct influence on their governmental- counterpart. I 
contend, however, that the intensity of such “threat” should vary from country to 
country, on the basis of political conditions. The interaction between governments and 
Councils of State can be characterized by different levels of cooperation and conflict. 
This fact is reflected in their consultative activity, in which they can present different 
“styles”. The consultative function, which consists in the ex ante control on 
governments acts, can be exercised as if Councils were already acting as judges or 
“censors”, or, vice versa, as if Councils were more oriented to the results of government 
activity. The influence that Councils exercise can be more oriented to the juridical 
accuracy of the acts or more political. In the first case, the threat of annulment is in the 
position to prevail and the “language” that the Council use is juridical. In the second 
case, the Council is more similar to a co-decision-maker, interested in approving the act. 
I argue that the possibility for the Councils to exercise credible threats to governments 
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varies according to governments' strength and according to political conditions. The 
characteristics of the political system can induce the Councils of State to exercise their 
functions of consultants and of judges “in a unitary way”, or, on the contrary, to 
substantially separate them, in favor of a more cooperative attitude with governments. 
In the chapter, I review first the main steps in the development of the Italian Council of 
State. Since its very origins, I try to focus on the political conditions that have 
characterized changes in the functions of the institutions. Then I compare more recent 
developments of the Councils of State of Italy and France. I argue that the different 
prerogatives accorded to the governments of the two countries may be at the basis of the 
development of a more political attitude of the Conseil d'Etat, opposed to the more 
juridical (and judicial) character of the Italian Council of State.  
2.1. Political conditions at the basis of the evolution of the Council of State of Italy  
The diachronic analysis of the development of Council of State's functions seems to 
suggest that different political conditions have affected the characteristics of the 
institution. Government's emancipation from the monarch has determined first the focus 
of the Council of State on administrative, more than on political, activity. The necessity 
to give a unitary interpretation of administrative activity represents the fil rouge of the 
so called Liberal Period, characterized by frequent changes in government, and in which 
the consultative prerogatives of the Council of State were reinforced. The need to 
represent the interests of more heterogeneous government coalitions has contributed to 
the introduction of the judicial function of the Council of State by Crispi. The roots of a 
more political use of the consultative function of the Council seems to date back to the 
Giolittian era, an age of deep policy change. In the Republican regime the political 
conditions has brought the Council of State to exercise its consultative and judicial 
prerogatives in a unitary way and to develop mostly its character of “censor of the 
legality” of secondary legislation acts.  
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2.1.1 When the executive power starts to be exercised by the ministries, the Council of 
State becomes a consultant for the administrative activity 
In years between 1831 and 1848, when the King of Savoy still represented a unified 
expression of the powers of the State, the Council of State used to exercise extensive 
consultative prerogatives, participating to the legislative and administrative affairs as 
the highest political consultant of the monarch. The start of the constitutional regime, 
marked by the concession of the Albertine Statute of 1848 , led to a discontinuity in the 16
role of the institution. The emerging role of Parliament and of the Ministers determined 
a gradual conversion of the Council of State, which passed from being an organ of 
political consultancy of the monarch to be an advisor for the administrative activity of 
the ministries. The Statute introduced the two Chambers of Parliament and it transferred 
to them a series of prerogatives, before of competence of the Council (as the analysis of 
State budget or taxes assessment). The Statute established also the principle of 
ministerial responsibility . According to such principle, the government needed to 17
enjoy the majority support of the Parliament, and the ministers, which became 
responsible for their acts in front of the Parliament, necessitated to increase their control 
on the subordinated administrative structures. A process of unification of the political 
and administrative responsibilities inside the ministries was enacted in 1853, with the 
reform of central administration and general accounts sought by Cavour. Such reform 
intended to overcome the old model of ministerial organization, based on the separation 
between political directives and administrative-economic activities. In the old model of 
ministerial organization, specialized agencies (aziende), separated from the ministries, 
were entrusted with the implementation of the political directives and with the 
 The Council of State was mentioned only in two points of the Statute: one specifying that Senators 16
could have been selected  among councillors with at least five years experience (Article 33), the other 
stating that the institution had to be reorganized through ordinary legislation (Article 83). 
 Some commentators observed that, in establishing the principle of ministerial responsibility, Article 17
67 of the Albertine Statute did not specify if Ministers were responsible to the King or to the 
Chambers. However, according to the interpretation of the article claimed by Cavour and as the 
importance of the Chambers grew over the years, it became an established consuetude that ministers 
were legally and politically responsible to the Chambers.
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management of economic-financial aspects . With the reform of 1853, political and 18
administrative activities were unified inside each ministerial structure. The ministers 
became responsible also for the execution of the political directives. They were put at 
the head of a hierarchic structure, in which the internal administrative apparatus was 
conceived as a “machine” (Melis, 2014, 38) that had to achieve the political inputs, in a 
sort of continuum between political power and administration. As the responsibility for 
political and administrative action began to be distributed among the ministries, “third 
bodies” within the framework of the executive power, characterized by some 
independence, were gradually charged with controlling their acts: the re-organized 
Council of State (1859), the Court of Audit (1862)  and the Ragioneria Generale dello 19
Stato (1869) . In the idea of Cavour, the control of ministerial acts by independent 20
officials was a necessary condition to make the control of the Parliament over the 
government effective. More in general, the control on the acts of the ministerial 
structures intended to ensure a certain uniformity of the administrative activity. This 
principle was confirmed in the reform of the Council of State of 1859.  
2.1.2 With the Rattazzi reform, the Council of State acts as a guarantor of uniformity 
and of continuity of the administrative activity 
The first legislative reorganization of the Council of State was included in the package 
 The “mixed-model” of ministerial organization, composed by eight ministries and nine agencies 18
(aziende) used to work in the Kingdom of Sardinia since 1817. The agencies could serve more than 
one ministry. For example, the agency of Intern was accountable to the Ministries of Intern, of Justice, 
of Public Education and of Public Works. The Ministry of Finance used to rely on three agencies: the 
agencies of finance, of taxation, of “Real Casa” (Aimo, 2002, 29). 
 The creation of the Court of Audit was part of the reforms pursued by Urbano Rattazzi in 1859 and it 19
was created on the basis of the Belgian and Dutch models. The Court of Audit is one of the oldest 
institution of independent Belgium and it was incorporated in the Constitution of 1831. In the 
Netherlands, the evolution of the Court presents some similarities with that of the Italian Council of 
State: the 1814 Constitution conceived the Court of Audit as an organ subordinated to the king. But 
when the ministers became accountable to the Parliament (1848), the Court ceased to be in service of 
the monarch only and it became accountable to the Parliament for the acts of the whole government. 
 The foundation of Ragioneria Generale dello Stato follows the concentration of the initiative of the 20
spending process in the Ministry of Finance. The institution was introduced in 1869 with the 
accounting law of the minister Cambray-Digny.
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of administrative reforms pursued by the minister of the Interior Urbano Rattazzi, two 
years before Italian unification. The annexation of Lombardy, after the Second War of 
Independence, made of the “administrative question” a primary issue and it accelerated 
the process of administrative unification. Profiting from the extraordinary powers 
attributed to the government, Rattazzi, in 1859, enacted a series of legislative decrees to 
carry out a process of homologation of the administrative systems and of local 
administrations . The legislation of 1859 brought several changes to the organization of 21
the Council of State. First, it introduced the figure of the President of the Council of 
State, which came to replace the King. The institution was configured as a consultative 
body of the whole government and it became responsible for preserving the coherence 
and the continuity of the administrative action. In particular, in the words of Rattazzi, 
the Council of State had to temper “the large latitude that frequent changes in 
government might cover in different and, sometimes opposite, directions” and to ensure 
the consistency of the administrative principles (Calandra, 1978, 38). In addition, the 
legislation of 1859 transferred to the third section of the Council of State a judicial 
prerogative in a limited number of affairs, before of competence of the Chamber of 
Accounts (Camera dei Conti ). In particular, the Council of State retained the 22
competence of judge of first and last instance on interpretation of government loans 
contracts, cases of pensions' payment by the State, other affairs concerning “mines and 
quarries” and it became judge of second instance against the decisions of Government 
councils. Government- or prefectural- councils started to operate at the level of 
prefectures, replacing the Intendenza councils of the Kingdom of Savoy. Composed by 
public officials and chaired by the governor of the prefecture, also these bodies were 
competent for a number of affairs established by the law (direct taxation and duties, 
 The reform covered the organization of municipal and prefectural administrations, the suppression of 21
the Chamber of Account and the institution of the Court of Audit, the competition and the 
competences of the Council of State, the regulation of the judiciary, public safety, public education, 
public health system and public works.
 Since the administrative contentious initially concerned almost exclusively economic and financial 22
affairs, in the Kingdom of Sardinia the competence for this type of judgment was originally attributed 
to the Chamber of Accounts (royal decrees of 1842 and 1847). 
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public concessions, public contracts, land registry, municipal and national roads, public 
waters, payment of salaries of municipal employees). All other disputes were left to the 
competence of the ordinary judiciary. The attribution to the Councils of judicial 
prerogatives in a strict number of affairs was achieved by Rattazzi in a peculiar context, 
in which he had obtained extraordinary powers. However, Rattazzi's position was 
already a compromise with a different argument, which was rising, and few years later 
became majoritarian in the Historical Right. Prominent members of the political group, 
such as Mancini, Minghetti and Peruzzi were in favor of a “monistic” system, in which 
citizens could claim protection before the ordinary judge only for civil and political 
rights (as property rights and electoral rights) connected to administrative acts. Vice 
versa, if an illegitimate administrative act was related not to a right, but to a citizen's 
private interest, the protection of such interest had to be invoked before the same 
government or before the King, through hierarchic petitions. Such position, which 
substantially was a conservative interpretation of the rights of the citizens in front of the 
executive power, prevailed in the reform of 1865. 
2.1.3 To achieve the process of administrative unification, the Historical Right 
attributes to the executive power several affairs that used to pertain to the 
administrative tribunals 
In 1865, the second government La Marmora, expression of the Historical Right 
(Destra Storica) took forward the process of administrative unification started by 
Rattazzi. Political urgency, due to the relocation of the capital to Florence, allowed to 
put to the vote collectively all measures of the law No. 2248/1865 on administrative 
unification, avoiding the parliamentary debate. Alternative regionalist or even self-
government oriented projects were defeated and, according to the historian Piero Aimo 
(2002, 37), the provisions- which concerned municipal and prefectural organization, 
public works, public safety, public health and the administrative system- designed a 
highly centralized administrative model, substantially “hierarchic and authoritarian”. 
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Two annexes to the law No. 2248/1865 concerned the organization of administrative 
justice. Annex “D” attributed to the Council of State the right to judge all conflicts of 
adjudicatory jurisdiction between administrative authority and ordinary judges. Annex 
“E” abolished the administrative tribunals of pre-unitary States and it devolved the 
competence to examine administrative disputes involving citizens' subjective rights  to 23
the ordinary judges. In stating this, Annex “E” established that all affairs in which 
administrative acts were connected to citizens' private interests could not find the 
protection of a judicial body. Violations of legitimate interests could be censured only 
through hierarchic petitions directed to the executive power. This measure was 
presented by its supporters as a “liberal revolution”, since it was inspired to the monistic 
system of justice introduced in Belgium in 1831 . It is difficult however to argue that 24
this reform was a real turning-point. Some authors underline how, in Italy and also in 
Belgium, these provisions mostly limited the jurisdiction of ordinary courts on the basis 
of a strict interpretation of the principle of separation of powers. Merusi (2015) 
emphasizes how Italian ordinary judges did not increase their power: ordinary judges 
could became aware of the content of administrative acts only incidenter, when 
assessing the violation of a right, and they could not annul, but merely dis-apply the 
illegitimate act. Moreover, it is well documented how, in case of conflicts of 
adjudicatory jurisdiction, the Council of State tended to decide in favor of the 
administrative authority, delegating the decisions on administrative complaints to the 
executive power. In this respect, the reform of 1865 proved to be far from a “liberal 
revolution”: the ordinary judiciary possibly was not prepared to absorb the 
 “Subjective rights” are basic rights, substantially civil and political rights. The distinction between 23
“subjective rights” and “legitimate interest”, that characterizes Italian administrative law, originates 
from the division of the adjudicatory jurisdiction between ordinary and administrative judges, that the 
reform of 1865 started to define. According to such division, the holder of a subjective right can claim 
its protection before ordinary judges, while the holder of a legitimate interest has to apply to the 
administrative judge (at the time of the reform of 1865, to the administrative authority). Such 
distinction has become less stringent, since, through the years, the protection of a series of subjective 
rights has been devolved to the administrative judge (Pizzorusso 1992).
 After independence, Belgium abolished the “hated” administrative jurisdiction dating from French 24
and Dutch dominations, and it devolved the control of administrative acts to ordinary courts, 
incorporating such measure in the Constitution of 1831.
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administrative disputes and public administration continued to be a “world apart”, 
whose acts were not supposed to be known by the judges. It is reasonable to think that, 
attributing the controversies to the public authority, the Council of State intended to 
preserve, again, the uniformity in the interpretation of government's acts. In the first 
thirty years after unification, the ordinary judiciary had not yet assumed a bureaucratic 
organization and several problems involved lower level tribunals in particular. While the 
highest-ranking magistrates used to belong to the same political élite, sharing its values 
and in some cases assuming the role of deputies and ministries, judges of lower courts 
were less qualified and with no chances to became part of the highest judiciary 
(Guarnieri, 1995). Central government could hardly expect ordinary judges of lower 
courts to comply with its directives. In addition, the organization of the judiciary 
through preture, tribunals and Courts of Appeal, had to wait until 1923 for the definitive 
unification of the Sections of the Supreme Court of Rome (Corte di Cassazione), that 
could guarantee the uniformity of interpretation and of the supremacy of central laws. 
Although the political group of the Historical Right was organized into regional 
factions, as the Associazione liberale permanente of Piedmont and the most 
conservative consorteria of Tuscany headed by Peruzzi, the interests they represented 
were substantially homogeneous: they were expression of the aristocrats, of the 
landowners and of the bourgeoisie of Northern and Central Italy. Their project of 
administrative unification and also their conception of administrative justice tended to 
reflect such conservative interests . Coherently, they intended the Council of State as 25
an “agency of administrative unification”, more than a body that could guarantee 
citizens' rights and interests. After the so called “parliamentary revolution” of 1876 and 
the advent of the Historical Left to power, the political functions of the Council of State 
were adapted to the emergence of new political instances. 
 Although they tended to declare themselves in favor of laissez-faire principles, at government they 25
often defended fiscal conservatism and interventionist measures of political economy. In the name of 
political urgency, they approved reforms, as the administrative centralization, in contrast to liberal 
ideals. The historian Romanelli (1995) has described the absence of coherence of the liberal Right as 
the dilemma of the “impossible command”, according to which the liberal state might restrict the 
sphere of autonomy of civil society and use “illiberal” means to create the conditions for the exercise 
of freedom. 
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2.1.4 The Crispi reform of 1889. The Council of State becomes a guarantor of the 
interests of the heterogeneous coalitions of the Historical Left 
With the system established in 1865, the prerogatives accorded to ordinary judges in 
matters of administrative disputes turned out to be very limited. The control on 
administrative activity was concentrated inside the ministerial structures. In case of a 
petition, the act adopted by the subordinated organ of a ministry was verified by the 
vertex of the structure itself, following a hierarchic logic. The resolution of the conflicts 
between administration and citizens was devolved to the discretionary power of the 
(changing) ministers , that, without checks outside the executive branch, became 26
substantially unaccountable (Sambataro, 1977, 69). Such situation started to become 
unsustainable when parliamentary equilibria changed and the Historical Left came into 
power, in 1876. Left coalition was more heterogeneous than the Right: it used to include 
members of the Historical Left that opposed Cavour in the Piedmontese parliament, 
Mazzini's followers, other deputies that, although reconciled with the monarchy, were 
attached to democratic principles, Garibaldi's followers, other political groups that were 
against the highly centralized administrative system implemented by the Historical 
Right, southern regionalists hostile to the economic interests of Northern Italy 
(Saladino, 1966, 214). In addition, it must be noticed how, after the completion of 
unification, in 1870, the labels “Left” and “Right”, which used to distinguish the two 
political aggregation in the pre-unitary phase, ceased to represent marked differences in 
policies and ideals. Democratic and republican values, conventionally attributed to the 
Left, were translated into concrete acts only partially and not necessarily with the 
opposition of the Right. The political differences between Left and Right became less 
 To give an example of the new ministerial turnover and of the higher complexity of cabinet 26
composition that occurred with the government of the Historical Left, we can look at the organization 
of the Ministry of Finance: the II cabinet La Marmora (Historical Right) in 15 months of government 
had one Minister of Finance (Quintino Sella). The I Crispi cabinet (Historical Left) in 20 months of 
government had four Ministers of the Treasury (Agostino Magliani, Costantino Perazzi, Bonaventura 
Gerardi, Sidney Sonnino) and three ministers of Finance (Agostino Magliani, Bernardino Grimaldi, 
Bonaventura Gerardi). 
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clear, to the extent that the most important reforms  were approved through agreements 27
between moderates members of the two blocs, determining the phenomenon of 
trasformismo. In the 1880s, majority coalitions were configured as loose 
conglomerations of local and personal groups. The increasing influence of such groups 
on ministerial activity undermined governments' stability, since each minister was 
forced to any compromise to get parliamentary support. As result of the prevalence of 
specific interests, the ministers tended to adopt systematically illegitimate 
administrative acts. Gaetano Mosca argued that the configuration of the political system 
obliged the ministers to succumb to favoritisms to the advantage of influential groups 
and to the detriment of the others . The author suggested that ministers' “autocracy” 28
could be defeated establishing independent administrative tribunals, headed by the 
Council of State (1884, 219-220). The need for a reform that allowed to better represent 
and regulate the different interests inside public administration grew quickly and it was 
supported in particular by a movement headed by Silvio Spaventa, a leader of the Right 
at the opposition, who highly criticized the logic and the consequences of trasformismo. 
The slogan of his movement was “justice in the administration” and it denounced 
partisan interferences into public administration, pushing for integrations to the system 
established in 1865. A leading role in approving the reform of 1889 was played by the 
President of the Council of Ministers, Francesco Crispi. Crispi became President in 
1887. He was a supporter of the centrality of the executive power and an admirer of the 
German chancellorship. With the reform of 1889, which established the new 
administrative courts (Giunte Provinciali Amministrative) and which added the IV 
 As the introduction of a uniform penal code, compulsory elementary education, the abolition of the 27
grist tax, a more democratic electoral law, accident insurance for workers. 
 “(...) il Ministero è obbligato a largire dei favori. I quali non sono quasi mai, né furono mai forse, 28
direttamente pecuniari, ma, senza scendere al vile metallo, vi è nell'amministrazione dello Stato, nelle 
mille cose di cui un Ministro dispone, tanto da contentare ogni più smodata ambizione o brama di 
lucro. Vi sono mille e mille posti, che si possono togliere all'anzianità ed al merito e dare siccome 
l'interesse del portafogli detta, vi sono mille contratti ed appalti che lo Stato può concludere a patti 
più o meno onerosi, che può aggiudicare all'uno anziché all'altro, (…), una strada od una ferrovia 
possono farsi o non farsi, passare di qua o di là. E ciò senza parlare delle onorificenze, dei privilegi, 
dei sussidi, delle esenzioni più o meno larvate del servizio militare, del pagamento d'imposte, etc., che 
i deputati non si vergognano a chiedere né i ministri a dare (...)”, Mosca (1884, 195). http://
documenti.camera.it/bpr/11606_testo.pdf
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section of the Council of State, Crispi appointed Spaventa at the head of the new section 
of the Council. The competence devolved in 1865 to ordinary judges on disputes 
involving subjective rights was left intact. The reform added that citizens who had a 
legitimate interest in an administrative act could contest the act in front of Giunte 
Provinciali Amministrative and, in appeal, in front of the Council of State. It is 
interesting to note that, in the system pursued by Crispi, administrative courts remained 
again in the sphere of the executive power. For what concern the Council of State, the 
nature of the IV section and of its decisions were not immediately recognized as 
judicial  (the law of 1889 never uses the words “jurisdiction” nor “sentence”, but 29
“competence” and “decision”). The authors of the reform, more than establishing a 
proper jurisdictional organ, intended to create a “deliberative body” within central 
administration, which had to keep administrative action inside the limits of legality and 
justice. The control on government administrative activity and the eventual annulment 
of administrative acts (which now became a prerogative of the Council) were provided 
by an institution that was conceived, again, as part of the executive power. The 
appointment of the presidents of the sections and of the councillors were managed by 
the government (by the Ministry of the Interior), who could select the councillors from 
personnel that belonged to specific categories (as ordinary judges and judges from the 
Court of Audit, professors of law, long-serving functionaries, ministerial officials), but 
with no other specific limitations. For what concerns the Giunte Provinciali 
Amministrative (GPA), these bodies were introduced in order to control local 
governments. They were based on the model of the Prussian Bezirksausschuss, an organ 
that resulted from the union of the District Council and of the District Administrative 
Court and that included two professional officials qualified for administrative and 
judicial service and four non-professional members chosen by the Province Committee. 
Similarly, the GPA was presided by the prefect and was composed by both, prefectural 
 The judicial nature of the IV section of the Council of State started to be substantially recognized by 29
the positions taken by the Sections of the Supreme Court of Rome, on the basis of the new law on 
conflicts of 1877. This law attributed the competence to regulate conflicts of jurisdiction between the 
judicial authority and administrative authority, which used to be of the Council of State, to the 
Supreme Court of Rome. 
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councillors, with a technical-administrative competence, and members chosen by the 
Province Council.  
2.1.5 The Giolittian era: the judicial nature of the Council of State and the “political” 
use of the consultative function 
Years between 1900 and 1914 that preceded the first World War are defined as the “era 
of Giovanni Giolitti”. These years are of particular interest for the changes that occurred 
in the relations between politics and public administration and that concerned also the 
role of the Council of State. This age conventionally starts with the formation of 
Zanardelli government, in which Giolitti hold the strategic portfolio of the Interior and 
then covers the various coalition governments presided by Giolitti (1903-1905, 
1906-1909, 1911-1914). Fundamental political and social reforms were approved during 
this phase, as the extension of the suffrage (1913), the achievement of an open system 
of labor relations, the introduction of a rudimental system of welfare. The State 
developed several new functions: between 1905 and 1912 railways, telephone networks 
and life insurances were nationalized. The social and territorial transformations due to 
the take off of modern industry created the need for new public policies, which deeply 
affected the configuration of public administration. Cassese and Melis (1990) refer to 
such phase as an “administrative revolution in government”. The increase of ministerial 
tasks was reflected by the expansion of the bureaucratic structures, which passed from 
the 24 general directions of 1882 to the 40 of 1907. The personnel of the State had a 6-
fold raise between 1881 and 1911 and the geographical composition of the 
administration changed too, since public officials started to be recruited also from the 
Southern Regions of Italy (Melis 1996). In a speech of 1909, Santi Romano argued that 
the ministers were starting to have a “social responsibility” in addition to the juridical 
and political ones, underlying the fact that the relation between citizens and government 
was becoming always more direct. The growing social demands were managed also 
through the creation of new positions inside the public sector. Graduates in law from 
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Southern Regions became the majority of the candidates in the competitions for Civil 
Service and they were employed into the Ministerial offices, contributing to the 
prevalence of the culture of administrative law inside the ministerial apparatus. 
Especially after the extension of the suffrage of 1913, the lower middle class employed 
into the offices of the central State, mostly based in Rome, became an important 
constituency. The administrative procedure, increasingly representative of the multiple 
interests, started to get slower and it became a remarkable instrument, for the 
government, to treat the most divisive issues in the implementation phase. The 
bureaucratization of the administrative personnel was achieved at detriment of the 
technical expertise . The technical personnel (as engineers and statisticians) was 30
employed in the so called “parallel administrations” . As underlined by several 31
scholars, parallel administrations’ organization was the exact opposite of the 
bureaucratic ministerial model: it was characterized by the use of technical, non- 
bureaucratic expertise, essential internal rules, employment relationship of private law. 
In addition, the new administrations had some financial independence and their activity 
was subject to lesser controls by the Court of Audit. A sort of double channel for 
implementation was established: from one side, the traditional, hierarchic ministerial 
structures, where conflictual issues could rely on the control of a legal bureaucracy; 
from the other, new institutes and agencies charged with dealing with the emerging 
economic issues, with a more efficient decision-making. The Council of State was 
reorganized coherently with the new issues with which government had to deal. From 
one side, in 1907 the judicial character of the institution was definitely confirmed, with 
 An emblematic example is given by the new regulations precluded the technicians of Genio civile, a 30
grand corp of the State which supervised public work projects, to reach the vertex of the structure, in 
favor of officials with an administrative career. Similar regulations were applied in all other 
ministries, in which the applicants for top positions had to be public and administrative law experts. 
 Parallel administrations, established in reaction to the excessive rigidity of the bureaucratic ministerial 31
apparatus, were special offices connected the ministries, with an autonomous management, charged 
with coordinating specific public policies. Example of such administrations were the new public 
agency for State Railways and the Magistrato delle Acque for the management of water bodies of 
North-eastern Italy, connected to the Ministry for Public Works; the General Commission for 
emigration, which depended on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the National Institute for life 
insurances (Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni, Ina).
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the introduction of the fifth judicial section. The new section intended to reduce the 
backlog accumulated, especially in matters of public employment, a field in which the 
Council of State produced a relevant jurisprudence . From the other, the government 32
made a new use of the consultative function of the Council of State. A substantial 
innovation of the Giolittian era consisted in the appointment to the Council- 
increasingly composed by old exponents of bureaucratic careers and of university 
professors of law- of expert officials of the Ministries (especially of the Ministry of 
Interior) still in the middle of their careers . The new members of the Council, trusted 33
by Giolitti, after a short phase of full activity inside the institution, then tended to be 
employed into the cabinet with high positions, as directors-general, cabinet secretaries, 
chairmen of various committees. In this phase, the formal consultative activity of the 
Council of State (the preventive control on government acts) was substantially reduced 
in favor of the individual missions and offices of the new councilors inside the cabinet. 
This fact, which caused repeated complaints from the same Presidency of the 
institution, intended to make the new administrative élite of the Council to some extent 
co-responsible for government activity. Giolitti, previous member of the Council of 
State and with a vast knowledge of the internal logic of the administration , made a 34
“political” use of the consultative function of the Council of State and tried to align the 
interests of the high ministerial bureaucracy with those of the government. In addition, 
 The first organic regulation of public employment that was approved in 1908, according to the 32
commentators was in a strict continuity with the jurisprudence elaborated by the Council of State. The 
law from one side attributed to public employees rights and wages that were not available for private 
employees. From the other, it aimed at preventing civil service from unionizing. 
 Melis (1999) quotes the examples of Ottavio Serena, ex prefect appointed when he was 52 years old, 33
Attilio Brunialti, prominent constitutionalist appointed at the age of 44, Raffaele Perla 38 years old 
magistrate and Carlo Schanzer, 33 years old, future general director and minister. 
 The political career of Giolitti is preceded by a long cursus honorum inside public administration. The 34
impressive number of positions that he held inside public administration allowed him to develop a 
deep knowledge of the administrative apparatus. Volunteer in the Ministry of Justice at 20 years old, 
Giolitti became public official in the cabinet of the minister Miglietti in 1864. He quickly won a 
public competition to become magistrate, he participated to the cabinet of several other ministers, he 
was the Private Secretary of Quintino Sella, for whom he reorganized and unified the tax system; 
between 1873 and 1876 he was councilor of the minister Minghetti and then general director at the 
Ministry of Finance with Depretis. In 1877 he became Secretary-General of the Court of Audit and in 
1882 he was appointed to the Council of State, where he stayed for 12 years (Melis, 2011).   
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Giolitti made a “partisan” use of the Giunte Provinciali Amministrative (GPA). He did 
not hesitate to use the control of legitimacy provided by GPA to dissolve municipal 
Councils, when the political forces resulting from local elections were in opposition to 
the political majorities of central government .  35
2.1.6 The symbolic-legitimizing role of the Council of State in the fascist regime 
The fascist regime did not alter the functions of the Council of State. The proclaimed 
“fascistization” of the apparatus did not take place in the institution, nor in the 
ministerial administration. The Council of State was conceived as a body of juridical 
consultancy, that did not interfere with the Grand Council of Fascism, nor, for what 
concerned the judicial activity, with the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State. Its 
judicial function was partially re-organized, but in continuity with the disposals of the 
Giolittian era. The De Stefani reform of public administration attributed exclusive 
competence to the judicial sections of the Council of State in matter of public 
employment (1923). Such reform established that the administrative judge, on this 
issue, was competent for disputes concerning both, legitimate interests and subjective 
rights, excluding the intervention of the ordinary judge. But more than being expression 
of the instances of the fascist regime, the reform answered to the necessity to rationalize 
the organization of administrative justice, as a consequence of the previous reform of 
1907. According to several authors (amongst them Righettini 1998 and Lochak 1994) 
the institution in this age exercised some, limited autonomy in its jurisprudence. In 
particular, it was able to intervene in the interpretation of the antisemitic legislation 
inside public administration, to some extent mitigating its effects. The consultative 
function of the Council continued to exist, but it was undermined. The executive power, 
after to the so called leggi fascistissime of years 1925-1926, which attributed large part 
of the legislative function to the government, saw a strong extension of its prerogatives 
 He refused to limit central government discretion in the procedure of dissolution of municipal Councils, 35
going against the suggestions also of the minister Sonnino (Aimo 2002, 94).
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to the detriment of Parliament, which was levered out. The President of the Council of 
State appointed by Mussolini in 1928, the prominent jurist Santi Romano , tried to 36
advocated a more important role for the institution, suggesting to extend the 
consultative function of the Council to the control and coordination of government 
legislative activity . The suggestions of the President of the Council of State did not 37
find in Mussolini a receptive interlocutor. The most important contribution of the 
Council to the legislation of the regime concerned the drafting of consolidation acts 
(testi unici). For the rest, its opinion remained mandatory only on acts of secondary 
legislation. The competence to provide mandatory opinions on legislation on a series of 
affairs was attributed to the Grand Council of Fascism. At the same time, it has been 
noticed how the government made an extensive use of the decree-laws, right to avoid 
the mandatory control of the Council of State and of the Court of Audit on secondary 
legislation acts, as the Law No. 100/1926 had established (Calandra 1978, 308). 
Similarly to what happened in the Giolittian age, the consultative function of the 
Council of State was “fractionalized”: individual members of the Council participated to 
the consultative technical bodies established among the ministries. A practice that was 
criticized by the same President Santi Romano, since it risked to threaten the unity of 
the interpretation of the Council, weakening the whole institution. The Council of State 
was not involved, instead, nor as juridical consultant, nor as administrative judge, in the 
process of “entification” (entificazione) of large policy sectors, as pensions, social 
assistance, life insurances, agriculture, industry and others, which represented the 
 Santi Romano, before being appointed to the Council of State as its president (a position that he held 36
from 1928 to 1943) had a brilliant academic career. He represented the only case of a president of the 
Council that did not have a previous cursus honorum inside the administration. Together with other 
jurists, he was a theorist of the “Administrative State”. According to Romano, it was a duty of the 
jurists to continue their work also inside the fascist regime. Also in absence of a parliamentary 
government, the rule of law continued to exist as “Administrative State” and the jurists had to 
contribute to its functioning and regulation. 
 In a letter attached to the report for the activity of the Council of State for the years 1931-1935, the 37
President Santi Romano suggested Mussolini to increase the consultative prerogatives of the Council 
of State, without succeeding: “se l'eccellenza vostra volesse affidare al nostro istituto più ampie 
funzioni, noi le assumeremmo con spirito di responsabilità, con fede fervente, e innanzitutto con 
l'orgoglio di contribuire con tutte le nostre forze al compimento della missione alla quale la patria è 
stata da voi chiamata”. 
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continuation of the “parallel administrations” of the Giolittian era. First of all, the 
institution played an important symbolic role for the legitimation of the fascist regime. 
Solemn ceremonies were organized in occasion of the opening of the works of the 
institute in 1924, for the start of the presidency of Santi Romano in 1928 and for the 
centenary of the Council of State in 1931. According to Santi Romano, also in the 
fascist regime, public administration could have been representative of the traditional 
values of the rule of law, in virtue of its acts and of its proper jurisdiction. Legal rules 
could have prevailed on the pure expression of the political will. The ideology of 
“neutrality”, the super- partes character of the institution became instrumental in 
offering to the regime a symbolic legal legitimacy. 
2.1.7 The unitarian character of the functions of the Council of State in the Republican 
regime 
The Italian Constitution of 1948 equated the protection of subjective rights and 
legitimate interests, putting an end to the disparities of the system of 1889. Article 103 
established that the Council of State and the other organs of administrative justice have 
jurisdiction on legitimate interests and, in the affairs enumerated by the law, on 
subjective rights. As for the Court of Audit, the Constitution guaranteed the 
independence of the Council of State from the government and this fact possibly 
constituted the most significant innovation of the new political era. Approving a 
proposal voted by the same General Assembly of the Council of State, the Constituents 
decided to preserve the institution in the Republican regime and not to separate its 
consultative and judicial functions. Article 100 of the Constitution defined the Council 
of State as a body of “juridical and administrative consultancy” and, at the same time, of 
“promotion of justice inside the administration”. The consultative function of the 
Council of State in the Republican regime was perfected by the Law No. 400/1988 on 
the organization of the Presidency of the Councils of the Ministers. In substantial 
continuity with fascism, the control of the Council was putted on secondary legislation 
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acts (regulations) and on certain types of government bills (consolidation acts: testi 
unici). However, the law of 1988 made this control mandatory. An integration to the law 
No. 400/1988, dating to 1997, introduced a further consultative section into the Council, 
called “section for the analysis of normative acts”, which reduced the number of the 
days, from 90 to 45, to provide mandatory opinions on the drafts submitted by the 
government. Governments voluntarily tend to ask the opinion of the Council also on 
primary legislation drafts when such legislation has a relevant content for the regulation 
of public sector (e.g. public procurement) . The republican regime has also maintained 38
the institute, which derives from the monarchic age, of the extraordinary appeals before 
the President of the Republic, according to which the President can adjudicate upon 
appeals concerning definitive decisions by administrative bodies and the content of the 
Presidential decree consists in a transposition of the advice of the Council of State. The 
judicial prerogatives of the Council of State in the years of the democracy has tended to 
increase: since the number of affairs on which the Council has exclusive jurisdiction can 
be established through ordinary law, the list of subjective rights that the legislator 
devolved to the protection of the administrative judge (and that subtracted from the 
ordinary one) has consistently increased, as a result of the pressure of the various 
stakeholders. However, also some signals of conflicts between the government and the 
Council of State have occurred and some governments have tried to reduce the 
influence of the institution. One reform in particular has affected the competences of the 
institution: the legislative decree No. 29/1993, attributed to the employment contracts of 
the public sector the same legal basis of those in private sector. As a consequence, the 
competence on disputes concerning public employment contracts was devolved to the 
ordinary judge. Such reform, approved in years in which private sector collective 
 The Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport has submitted to the Council of State the draft legislative 38
decree on the new code of public procurement, based on the Law no. 11/2016. All legislative decrees 
implementing the recent, comprehensive reform of public administration (Law no. 124/2015, the so-
called “Madia” law) have been submitted to the Council of State. The opinions on the decrees have 
been provided by a dedicated commission, instituted by the President of the Council. All documents 
are publicly available:  
 https:/ /www.giustizia-amministrativa.i t /cdsintra/cdsintra/Notiziasingola/index.html?
p=NSIGA_4074993 
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bargaining arrangements were introduced also in a number of European countries to 
improve the efficiency of public administration and to rationalize the costs of public 
work, found the strong opposition of the Council of State. Moreover, the tendency by 
the governments to “fractionalize” or to “individualize” the consultative function of the 
Council of State, internalizing single members of the Councils at the vertex of 
ministerial structures- a practice that have its roots in the Giolittian and then also in the 
fascist era- occurs also in the Republican regime. The phenomenon of the extra-
judiciary offices of the councilors, appointed as cabinet secretaries, juridical 
consultants, heads of legislative offices, recently strongly criticized also by journalists 
and newspaper commentators, remains an instrument that governments tends to use, 
with varying intensity. In addition, as a signal of the fact that governments are not 
always prone to submit their regulations to the ex ante control of the Council of State, a 
tendency to evade such control, adopting general administrative acts in place of 
regulations, has constantly developed. This “stratagem” has been reported by several 
jurists as a concerning phenomenon of growing importance that could threaten the 
uniformity of law. The same Council of State has sanctioned this attitude through its 
doctrine and jurisprudence.  
2.2 Present-day consultative functions of The Council of State and of the Conseil d'Etat: 
inputs for a comparative analysis 
Several jurists and prominent members of the Council of State, in coherence with what 
the Constitution establishes, have repeatedly underlined the unitary configuration and 
the complementarity of the functions of the Italian Council of State. For instance, 
Gabriele Pescatore, President of the Council of State between 1980 and 1986 and then 
judge of the Italian Constitutional Court, argued that the consultative and judicial 
functions of the Council of State are managed on a unified basis (Pajno 1999, 65). 
Pasquale De Lise, former President of the Council of State, in his inaugural speech of 
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2010 affirmed that, ensuring the legitimacy of the acts of the executive, the consultative 
function would aim at preventing the administrative contentious. The same Council of 
State, in official documents, describes its ex ante control on government acts as a sort of 
anticipation of the orientations of the institution in case disputes should occur (Council 
of State, Section I, March 6th, 1997). The idea that derives from these statements is that 
the Italian Council of State, when provides its control on secondary legislation acts, 
behaves as if it was (already) a judge. Its opinions tend to be inspired by the principles 
of a consolidated jurisprudence, that the same Council of State has established. The 
jurisprudence of the Council, since the age of Rattazzi and of the Historical Right, aims 
at preserving the continuity of administrative action and the uniformity of the 
interpretations of government activity. The contemporary evolution of the French 
Conseil d'Etat, on the contrary, seems to reveal different characteristics with respect to 
the consultative function of the institution. In particular I contend that the introduction 
of the semi-presidential system, which has definitely strengthened the role of the 
government, has attracted the consultative function of the Conseil in a more political 
sphere and it has induced the institution to develop a more cooperative attitude with 
government. Striking signals of conflict between the Conseil and French government 
dates back to the phase immediately preceding the introduction of the direct election of 
the President of the Republic, in 1962, when the government was headed by Charles De 
Gaulle. In that occasion, the General Assembly of the Conseil d'Etat, declared 
illegitimate the procedure by which the government intended to introduce the direct 
election of the President of the Republic. The opinion of the Conseil, usually secret and 
directed only to the government, was given to the press. Charles De Gaulle in a first 
moment threatened to deeply reform the Conseil. Then such project was abandoned, but 
the opinion of the Conseil was not followed. The enshrining of the consultative function 
of the Conseil occurred with the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. The new 
Constitution extended the prerogatives of the institution as consultant and, most 
importantly, it recognized constitutional dignity to this function only. While the 
consultative function of the Conseil is quoted in several parts of the fundamental law, 
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the role of the institution as supreme administrative judge is not even mentioned. The 
predominance of the consultative function over the judicial one is underlined also by the 
same members of the institution, that, contrary to the Italian colleagues, have they 
themselves promoted reforms aimed at reducing the workload connected to the 
contentious, devolving it to other administrative tribunals. The creation of the further 
level of jurisdiction of the Administrative Courts of Appeal in 1987 (which were added 
to the Administrative tribunals created in 1953) was an answer to the problem of 
administrative justice's overload and it allowed the Conseil to focus only on the most 
important, high politics' related decisions (Meny 1994). While the Italian Council of 
State has constantly defended the unitary character of consultative and judicial 
functions, the French Conseil d'Etat has promoted their separation, in favor of the first 
one. In addition, it has to be noticed how several French councilors are alumni of the 
Ecole National d'Administration (ENA) and, since their educational background is not 
juridical but more generalist, they do not seek to join the Conseil with the idea of 
becoming judges. On the contrary, they are more attracted by the tasks and the affairs 
that the consultative function of the institute can offer and by the subsequent careers 
that a position inside the Conseil may open into politics or in the private sector. Until 
1958, the consultative prerogatives of the Conseil concerned mainly government 
secondary legislation. The Constitution of the V Republic of 1958 has radically changed 
such state of affairs, attributing to the institute competence also in matters of primary 
legislation, a result that the Italian Council of State occasionally tries to achieve, but 
without succeeding. According to the French Constitution, government bills are adopted 
by the Council of the Ministers, after the opinion of the Conseil. Such procedure is 
considerably relevant, if we take into account that in the semi-presidential system 
established in 1958 the high majority of primary legislation has became of competence 
of government, to the detriment of Parliament. The same procedure applies also to 
secondary legislation acts (regulations and governmental decrees to be approved “en 
Conseil d'Etat”) that derive from a delegation or from other primary legislation 
approved by the Parliament. If Italian governments tend to employ even “stratagems”, 
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adopting specific acts- the general administrative acts- in place of regulations to avoid 
the ex ante control of the Council of State, their French counterparts do not seem to be 
equally concerned of the “threats” of annulment of the Conseil. In fact, both French 
government and the Conseil are aware that a too drastic opposition of the Conseil to the 
content of an act of government would be easily evaded by the government itself. In 
particular, government could evade the critiques of the Conseil, by modifying primary 
legislation from which a contested decree derives: new primary legislation may be 
adopted ad hoc, in order to make a regulation ex ante considered illegitimate less 
vulnerable to defeat in case of a legal dispute (Page 2010, 1026). Also for this reason, 
the attitude of the Conseil, when it exercises its consultative prerogative, tends to be 
cooperative. Formally presided by the Prime Minister, more than being a “censor”, the 
Conseil tends to be a “codecision- maker”, aware of the political feasibility of its 
proposals (Many and Gueraudin 1994). The opinions of the Conseil generally are not 
radical in their conclusions and they consist in a sort of analysis of costs and benefits of 
government's decisions. The rapporteurs that the Conseil designates for the ex ante 
analysis of a government proposal, in some cases is consulted by the same government 
since the first elaboration of the project. In these cases, a strong cooperation between 
the two institutions occurs. The practice of the extra-judicial offices is extensive also in 
France, where councilors can go on administrative leave to hold positions at the head of 
central administrations, of technical consultant of the ministries, of cabinet secretaries. 
Differently from Italy- and further signal of the more political character of the 
consultative function of the institution- several prominent politicians, before being 
directly involved in the policy-making have been serving at Palais-Royal . In general, 39
the awareness of the political role that this institution plays for the political and 
institutional equilibria clearly emerges both from public debates and from the studies on 
the activity of the Conseil (Amirante, 1994).  
 Some prominent examples are Georges Pompidou, former Prime Minister and President of the 39
Republic, who was a member of the Conseil d'Etat. Michel Debré, Laurent Fabius, Edouard Balladur 
have served at the Conseil before being prime ministers. 
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CHAPTER III 
The ex ante control of the Council of State of Italy on 
regulations 
Introduction 
The Council of State was born as an advisory board of the government. Nowadays, with 
the ex ante control on secondary legislation and with the ex post judicial control on 
administrative acts, it participates to the descending phase of the political process, 
contributing to the implementation and to the interpretation of the administrative acts. 
However, looking through the articles of the editorialists and of the commentators, and 
considering the declarations of the same political actors, it is  possible to affirm without 
fear of contradiction that the institution has ceased to be the “indispensable prompter of 
the government” (“insostituibile suggeritore del governo”)- a definition that the 
historian Guido Melis has used to describe the Council of State of Liberal Italy. In this 
chapter, I try to show how the Council of State has progressively gained consistent 
independence and how it tends to act, first of all, as a “self-serving” actor, more than as 
an advisor of the government. As a result of the difficulties in producing significant 
policy change and as a consequence of government instability, the institution would 
have no incentives in being co-responsible for governments' policy goals. On the 
contrary, the Council would act in primis as a “censor”, that takes advantage from the 
cumbersome nature of the legislative decision-making and of the implementation 
process. In the following section, I report testimonies of the fact that the efficacy and 
the efficiency of Regional Administrative Tribunals and of the Council of State tend to 
be contested in occasion of potential or actual phases of policy change. Then I provide 
some evidence of the capacity of the Council of State of delaying the process of 
regulations' adoption and I report data on the highly-contested phenomenon of the extra-
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judicial offices of the councilors. 
3.1 The Council of State of Italy: a self-serving institution? 
Signals of considerable aversion to the role of the Council of State and with the 
functioning of administrative justice occur periodically in the Italian Second Republic. 
The double nature, consultative and judicial, of the Council of State was questioned 
during the works of the Third parliamentary Bicameral Commission, established to 
reform the Italian constitution in 1997 . In particular, one of the subcommittees in 40
which the commission was organized, the Committee for the “System of Guarantees”, 
discussed a comprehensive reform of the judiciary, which involved also issues of 
administrative justice. Committee members evaluated the hypothesis of unifying 
administrative and ordinary jurisdictions, but then the proposal, opposed by the same 
magistrates, was abandoned. Committee members agreed instead on the fact that judges 
should not exercise both, advisory and judicial tasks, a circumstance that clearly 
concerned (and still concerns) the Council of State. In this regard, it was proposed to 
establish a separate administrative court, with judicial functions only, while the Council 
of State would have exercised mere consultative tasks . As is known, the final draft of 41
the Bicameral Commission got sunk in Parliament. However, its proposals were 
prominently featured in the press and debated by journalists and commentators. The role 
of the Council of State was subject to serious criticism in the debate that followed the 
working sessions of the committee for the system of guarantees. One of the major 
 The commission, composed of 35 senators and 35 deputies appointed in proportion to the strength of 40
their parliamentary groups, proposed several modifications to the second part of the Constitution. If 
approved, these amendments would have significantly affected the governance of the political system. 
The main changes concerned the form of government, in particular a direct elected presidency, the end 
of bicameralism, a greater role for sub-national levels of government. The modifications concerned 
also the organization of the judiciary (the ordinary judiciary and the Constitutional Court). However, 
as is known, the final bill of the commission got sunk in Parliament.
 Parliamentary Commission on Constitutional Reform, Report on the Committee of the System of 41
Guarantees by the deputy Marco Boato: http://www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/rifcost/comitati/
sg0507rs.htm 
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Italian newspapers started a lengthy dispute, publishing an editorial entitled “Council of 
State to throw out” (“Consiglio di Stato da buttare”). In this article it was claimed that 
the Council of State and the Regional Administrative Tribunals should have been 
abolished, since the downturn that they were causing to the certainty of administrative 
acts with their jurisprudence was damaging the proper functioning of public 
administration. Moreover, the editorialist accused the consultative function of the 
Council of State of delaying government decision-making and Council of State's 
members of bargaining their opinions to preserve their privileges of “caste” . To this 42
editorial, besides several members of the Council of State , reacted the economist 43
Paolo Baratta, Minister for Public Works and for the Environment under the “technical” 
Dini cabinet and former minister in other previous governments. In his letter, Baratta 
first underlined the pervasive presence of Council of State members at the head of the 
ministerial structures (as heads of cabinet and heads of legislative offices). Then he 
observed how, contrary to what he expected , even for acts that would have required 44
only few days of work, with the ex ante control of the Council of State the procedure 
used to get lost in months, often several months. The procedure to adopt a regulation is 
described as follows: “the first draft is drawn up after exhausting negotiations between 
the ministries. Then the draft is sent to the Council of State. The President of the 
 The editorial of Eugenio Scalfari: http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/42
1997/02/09/consiglio-di-stato-da-buttare.html?ref=search 
In an article that followed the first editorial, Scalfari describes the Council of State as a “lobby” 
mixed-up with public administration:  
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1997/02/16/che-serve-questo-consiglio-di-
stato.html 
 Among the others: the letter in response to the editorial of Eugenio Scalfari by the President of the 43
Council of State, Renato Laschena:  
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1997/02/11/chi-giudica-il-palazzo-sia-
autonomo.html?ref=search 
The letter of a prominent member of the Council of State, Antonio Catricalà, former President of the 
Antitrust Authority, former Undersecretary of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, former Vice 
Minister for Economic Development. Catricalà criticizes the proposal of converting the Council of 
State into a mere government advisor. He defends the convenience of a unified jurisdiction, to be 
developed by both, consultative and judicial sections, in order to diminish the risk of censures by the 
same Council of State: http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1997/07/20/
consiglio-di-stato-riforma-ambigua.html?ref=search
 The expectation of the Minister was that the presence of Council of State's members at the head of 44
ministerial structures would have fasten the procedure to adopt regulations. 
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Council receives the draft and then he send it to one of the three consultative sections, 
which attribute the draft to a rapporteur. If the analysis of the rapporteur to the section is 
not sufficient, the draft will be discussed by the General Assembly, which meets once a 
month. The opinion approved by the Assembly will be drawn up by the rapporteur and 
then it will be sent to the administration; if the opinion is interlocutory, the process 
starts all over again”. The fact that the time to issue opinions on regulations was 
reduced from 90 to 45 days by the law, in 1997, was vanished by the introduction of the 
institute of “non-mandatory terms” (“termini non perentori”). Non-mandatory terms 
imply that there are no consequences if the implementation act is not adopted within the 
time frame established by the law. According to Baratta, this simply made the time-limit 
to adopt regulations “a joke” . The problem of the slowdown in the implementation of 45
primary laws due to the ex ante control of the Council of State was raised more recently 
by the “technocratic” government of Mario Monti. This non-partisan government, 
which followed the collapse of Berlusconi IV cabinet and which was in office between 
November 2011 and April 2013, made some relevant policy changes under the pressure 
of the sovereign debt crisis . Monti government identified the law rates of approval of 46
implementation acts as a real problem and it started a systematic monitoring of the 
enactment of secondary legislation. A report published two months before government's 
end on the status of implementation of primary laws reported that, among the reasons 
for the the late implementation of several laws, some were external and independent 
from government's will. One of these was exactly the ex ante control of the Council of 
State on regulations . After Monti cabinet, an inconclusive general election left Italy 47
without effective government for two months. In the aftermath of a turbulent political 
 The letter of the Minister Paolo Baratta: http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/45
1997/02/14/la-congiura-del-silenzio.html?ref=search 
 In particular, it approved a pension reform, greatly postponed by the previous government, which 46
switched all workers into the contribution-based state pension and which, above all, extended working 
lives.
 The report by the Minister for Relations with Parliament and for the Implementation of Government 47
Program, Piero Giarda (the reference to the Council of State mentioned in the text is at page 10):  
 http://presidenza.governo.it/ufficio_statistica/documenti/rapporto_amministrativo.pdf
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impasse, a coalition government headed by Enrico Letta was formed, with the aim, first 
of all, of facing the deep economic recession. Few months later, in August 2013, the 
former President of the Council of the Ministers, Romano Prodi wrote an article 
directed to the government and which was published on several newspapers, with the 
unequivocal title: “Abolishing T.A.R. and the Council of State to avoid slowing down 
Italy's growth” (Abolire il Consiglio di Stato per non legare le gambe all'Italia ). In 48
this article, Prodi invoked the abolition of the Council of State and of Regional 
Administrative Tribunals in order to release resources to relaunch the Italian economy. 
By referring to a dialogue with an entrepreneur, Prodi described how these institutions 
would have gained a power that has no parallel in other countries. The unacceptable 
delay in the implementation of regulations; the absence of substantial limitations to the 
appeals of the individuals in matters of public procurements, public competitions, as in 
any decision with an economic impact; the effects of the appeals of blocking for years 
the infrastructure investments, as the public examinations called by the universities 
would have serious negative effects on country's economy. In particular, according to 
Prodi, these elements would contribute to create a situation of “eternal uncertainty”, that 
lead the investors to approach other countries in which such uncertainty does not exist.  
Signals of impatience with the activity of the Council of State has been expressed by 
the current President of the Council of Ministers, Matteo Renzi. Renzi, who has 
promised a sweeping overhaul of the electoral and constitutional systems, has made 
large use of targeted controversies against actors and praxis that would obstacle policy 
change. Amongst these, at the start of his office he initiated a dispute against the power 
of Council of State's members at the vertex of ministerial structures and he announced 
he would have banished them from the head of the legislative offices and of the 
ministerial cabinets. As “mandarins of the bureaucracy”, administrative judges are 
considered as the real supervisors of government legislative activity, able to affect 




decrees . Curiously, even a former member of the Council of State, Domenico 49
Cacopardo, described the section of the Council for the analysis of normative acts as a 
self-referential and unaccountable body, able to affect government activity. This 
councillor suggested the President Renzi to demobilize such section of the Council, if 
he intended to undertake a real course for change ...  50
3.2. The impact of the ex ante control of the Council of State on the timing for the 
adoption of administrative acts 
The testimonies reported denounce that the consultative function of the Council of State 
causes delays on regulations' adoption. This fact, however, has received few or no 
attention by the scholars. Although the adoption by the ministries or by the whole 
government of the administrative acts is fundamental for the effectiveness of the same 
laws (Italia, 2015), such process constitutes a sort of “black box”. To my knowledge, a 
measure of the delay produced by the ex ante control of the Council of State on 
regulations' adoption has never been provided. Therefore, I have attempted to quantify 
it, comparing the time needed by the Government to approve regulations and the time 
needed to approve "decreti non regolamentari" equivalent to regulations. Such decrees 
belong to the so called category of general administrative acts (GAA). GAA are 
addressed not to individual, but to plural beneficiaries, identifiable after their approval. 
Unlike regulations, they do not require the ex ante control of the Council of State to be 
enacted. Nevertheless, they have general effects and governments tend to use them as 
substitutes for regulations. Some examples of GAAs and regulations used as perfectly 
equivalent instruments are the following. The discipline of tax provisions concerning 





rivalutazione dei beni delle imprese") was regulated in 1991 through a GAA (ministerial 
decree February 14th, 1991 of the Ministry of Finance). In 2001, the same affair was 
issued through a regulation (ministerial decree April 13th, 2001 No. 162) that, unlike 
the previous act, was submitted to the ex ante control of the Council of State. The 
Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, approved in conjunction with the 
Ministries of Justice and of Economy and Finance, which enacts the Statute of the 
Institute for the assistance of the personnel of Prison Administration (Ente di assistenza 
per il personale dell'Amministrazione penitenziaria) was submitted to the ex ante 
control of the Council of State and it was adopted as a regulation in 1997 (D.P.C.M 
April 30th, 1997). However in 2008, a new version of the same Statute was re-enacted 
as a GAA, without the activation of the preventive control of the court (D.P.C.M. 
February 2nd, 2008). The ministerial decree November 24th, 1994 No. 687, adopted by 
the Ministry of the Interior, concerns the programs on the protection of collaborators 
with justice and their implementation. The decree, which derives from law March 15th, 
1991 No. 82 (decree-law January 15th 1991, No. 8) on the protection of collaborators 
with justice, was not submitted to the ex ante control of the Council of State and it was 
adopted as a GAA. When the same issue was re-regulated by the government through 
the law February 13th, 2001 No. 45 on the protection of witnesses and of collaborators 
of justice, the corresponding decree (D.M. April 23th, 2004 No. 161), unlike the 
previous one, was a regulation and it was submitted to the ex ante control of the Council 
of State. 
I have quantified and then compared the length of the processes necessary to adopt 
regulations and “GAA equivalent to regulations” counting the days that separate the 
date of approval of the laws and the date of adoption of the decrees in five policy areas: 
Economy and Finance, Education, Defense, Interior and Justice, in years between 1988 
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and 2014 . However, since secondary legislation acts derive in largest part from laws 51
approved by previous governments, I have considered first a subset of decrees, which 
derive from laws of incumbent governments only: in this case, I have provided the 
timing for the adoption of Ministerial Decrees in the policy sector “Economy”. Then, I 
have considered both, the acts descending from laws of incumbent and of previous 
governments. In this case I have reported the median value of the timing for the 
adoption of all the administrative acts in all policy sectors. 
3.2.1 The first measure: timing for the adoption of the “success stories” 
The first measure includes only the acts deriving from laws of incumbent governments. 
They represent, somehow, the “success stories”: they are the acts that governments 
intended to adopt and that managed to approve on time (before governments ended). 
Therefore, the measure does not take account of the delays in the procedure that may 
have postponed the approval of a regulation to a successive government.  
The “success stories” are actually a minority of the administrative acts. According to the 
data I collected, the highest number of decrees descending from laws of incumbent 
governments belong to the Economy and Finance policy sector, followed by Education 
policy sector. However, for the large majority, administrative acts do implement past 
primary legislation.  
As shown in Figure 1, “Economy” is the policy sector with the highest total number of 
acts approved (604 over 1.318, the 45.8% of the total). The non-inherited acts adopted 
by the Ministries of Economy and Finance constitute a 11.9% of the total number of 
acts approved between 1988 and 2014 in all policy sectors (158 over 1.318) and they 
 Data have been computed from the juridical database Leggi d'Italia. Regulations and GAA can take 51
the form of ministerial and inter-ministerial decrees (D.M.), of President of the Republic decrees 
(D.P.R.), of President of the Council of the Ministers decrees (D.P.C.M.). They have been collected 
from 1988, year of approval of the law No. 400/1988 on the on the reorganization of the Presidency of 
the Council of Ministers. This law made the ex ante control of the Council of State mandatory and not 
binding for all types of regulations (D.M., D.P.R., D.P.C.M.). The policy sectors Economy, Education, 
Defense, Interior and Justice have been chosen since the Constitutional Reform of 2001 left intact the 
prerogative of the corresponding ministers to adopt regulations (with no redistributions between 
central government and the Regions).
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represent the 26.1% of the total number of acts approved in the same period by the 
Ministries of Economy and Finance only (158 over 604). “Interior” policy sector 
follows Economy for what concerns the total number of acts approved: 220 over 1.318, 
the 16.6% of the total. The non-inherited acts adopted by the ministries of Interior 
represent the 3.1% of the total number of acts approved among 1988 and 2014 in all 
policy sectors (42 over 1.318) and the 18.7% of the total number of acts adopted in that 
policy area in the same period (42 over 219). 
Figure 1. Frequency distribution of administrative acts deriving from laws of 
incumbent and previous governments, per policy sectors 
Data: personal computations on information available on the juridical database Leggi d'Italia 
(1988-2014). Types of act: D.M., D.P.R., D.P.C.M.. Total number of acts: 1.318 
The policy sector “Education” enacts 208 acts over a total of 1.318, the 15.7%. The acts 
descending from laws of incumbent governments represent the 4.9% of the total number 
of acts approved between 1988 and 2014 (65 over 1.318), but they constitute the 31.2% 
of the acts approved in that policy sector only (65 over 208).  
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The policy sector “Justice” has approved 156 acts over the 1.318 total (11.8%). Its non-
inherited acts are 24, the 1.8% of the total number of acts adopted in all policy sectors 
and the 15.3% of the acts from justice sector (24 over 156) between 1988 and 2014. 
The policy sector “Defense” adopts 130 over 1.318 acts, the 9.8% of the total. The acts 
deriving from laws of incumbent governments represent the 1.6% of the total (22 over 
1.318) and they constitute the 16.9% (22 over 130) of the acts approved between 1988 
and 2014 in that policy sector only.   
I have chosen the policy sector “Economy” to compare the timing for the adoption of 
regulations and GAA, since it is the only one that provides a quite significant proportion 
of acts deriving from laws of incumbent governments. According to the data, the 
average number of days to adopt an administrative act which has been submitted to the 
Council of State for its ex ante control- a regulation- is 308.4 (almost 10.2 months). 
Vice versa, on average, it takes 179.3 days (almost 5.9 months) if the act has "skipped" 
the control of the Council of State, and in this case the decree is a general administrative 
act, GAA.  
Since a specific category of acts: the Ministerial Decrees (D.M.) is predominant among 
the non-inherited acts of the Economy policy sector (108 over 158 acts) , I have 52
focused the analysis on it to describe more in detail the timing for the adoption of 
regulations and GAAs (see Table 1).  
 Acts that modify the text of existing regulations or GAA were not included.52
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Table 1. Timing for the adoption of Ministerial Decrees in the policy sector 
“Economy”, per type of decree (Regulations and GAA) 
Data: personal computations on information available on the juridical database Leggi d'Italia 
(1988-2014). Types of act: D.M. 
The majority of ministerial decrees tends to be adopted between 6 months and one year 
from law's approval. The acts that governments manage to approve “on time” (before 
the government ends) are for 59% regulations and for 49% GAAs. However, general 
administrative acts and regulations have completely different behaviors: while the 
71.43% of GAA is approved within the first 6 months after law's adoption, the 66% of 
regulations is approved after the first 6 months and within 3 years after law's approval. 
More specifically, almost half of regulations (47,46%) takes one year to be approved, 
versus the 16,33% of GAA. Within the first month after the law's adoption, the 10.19% 
of the total number of decrees is enacted. This 10% is composed by GAA only: the 
22.45% of the total number of GAA is enacted within a month, while no regulation is 
approved within 30 days after law's adoption. These data seem to confirm that if 
governments intend to implement an act very quickly, they do not activate the control of 
the Council of State.  
Timing Regulations GAA Total (Regulations + GAA)
1 month (30 days) 0 22,45% 10,19%
2 months (60 days) 5,08% 10,20% 7,41%
6 months (180 days) 28,81% 38,78% 33,33%
1 year (365 days) 47,46% 16,33% 33,33%







3.2.2 The second measure: median value of the timing for the adoption of administrative 
acts, including those deriving from laws of  previous governments 
The second measure includes both, the acts deriving from laws of incumbent and of 
previous governments. It consists in the median value of the number of days that 
separate the dates of adoption of the laws and the date of adoption of the decrees 
(regulations and GAA). All types of decrees have been considered (D.M., D.P.R., 
D.P.C.M.), except those deriving from laws prior to 1988 (this to exclude acts 
descending from remote laws, that ensure the mere administrative continuity). The 
distribution of GAA and regulations per policy sector is represented on Figure 2: 
Figure 2. Frequency distribution of Regulations & GAA deriving from laws of 
incumbent and previous governments, per policy sectors 
Data: personal computations on information available on the juridical database Leggi d'Italia 
(1988-2014). Types of act: D.M., D.P.R., D.P.C.M., acts deriving from laws prior to 1988 
excluded. Total number of acts: 1.142 
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Several Italian law scholars report that governments would increasingly (and 
illegitimately) make use of general administrative acts in place of regulations in order to 
avoid the ex ante control of the Council of State. According to Cassese (1999), this 
tendency was present event during fascism: regulations were substituted with primary 
legislation to evade the control of the Council of State. In recent years, after the law No. 
400/1988 extended the control of the Council of State on all types of regulations, 
governments would tend to avoid the ex ante control of the institution adopting decrees 
with the form of general administrative acts. Such phenomenon has been defined 
“escape from regulation” (“fuga dal regolamento”) . An example of a general 53
administrative act used as an equivalent of a regulation is the ministerial decree August 
8th, 2009 which regulates the associations of the so-called volunteers observers for 
urban safety, better known as patrols (“ronde”). The decree, adopted by the Minister of 
the Interior, derives from law No. 94/2009, which regulates the involvement of groups 
of citizens to report to the police situations that can damage urban security. Such law 
was preceded by a strong political controversy, since the Minister that during national 
parliamentary election of 2008 largely campaigned for it (for the establishment of the 
Patrols of Padania) was a member of an anti-immigrants right-wing party and risks of 
violent degenerations were feared from many quarters. The decree clarified several 
aspects that the law had left open (as the fact that the associations cannot be expression 
of a political party, that they have to be non-profit and that they must be registered in 
the prefectures) and it was approved only 24 days after law's adoption. There are cases 
in which governments have announced in primary laws that they would have derogated 
 Among the others: Caringella (2011, 238), Lupo (2011), Tarli Barbieri (2011), Padula (2010), Cintioli 53
(2007), De Siervo (1991). Some of these scholars argue that the escape from regulation is more 
marked in the affairs in which the prerogative to adopt regulations has been transferred to the Regions 
by the Constitutional Reform of 2001. Adopting GAAs, central government would end with 
regulating also the affairs of competence of the Regions. This is not the case for the policy sectors I 
have considered. In Economy, Education, Justice, Defense, Interior policy sectors, the prerogative to 
adopt regulations has remained untouched by the 2001 reform and it is of full competence of central 
government. The same juridical doctrine has identified as a ratio for the escape from regulation also 
the attempt by the government of evading the obligations of the law No. 400/1988, which requires the 
acquisition of the opinion of the Council of State in order to adopt regulations (Albanesi, 2011, 
Moscarini 2008).
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from the procedure laid down by the law 400/1988 and that they wouldn't have 
submitted the administrative act to the ex ante control of the Council of State for 
“reasons of urgency”. It is the case, for instance, of the ministerial decree No. 233/1996, 
which derives from Law No. 563/1995 and which concerns urgent provisions for the 
further use of armed forces to control the maritime borders of an Italian Region 
(Regione Puglia). The law was approved in December 29th, 1995 and the decree, which 
was concerted between the Ministers of the Interior and of the Treasury and that 
authorized the institution of three reception centers for migrants, was enacted on 
January the 2nd, 1996. Another example of a general administrative act which derives 
from a measure considered of emergency is the decree December 21th , 2012. In this 
case, the “Milleproroghe decree” No. 225/2010 (law No. 10/2011) modified an existing 
law of 1992 concerning civil defense, and it introduced a new article in the law that 
allowed to adopt a general administrative act to manage a Guarantee Fund for 
companies affected by natural disasters. The general administrative act that derived 
from it  regulates on detail the access conditions and the management of the fund. There 
are also cases in which governments have modified an existing law to adopt a general 
administrative act on a issue previously addressed by a regulation. It is the case of the 
decree-law No. 174/2012, concerning urgent disposals on finance and local authorities, 
that modified the Consolidated Law (testo unico) on local governments of 2000. After 
such amendment, the standards to determine structural deficit of local authorities have 
started to be addressed by a general administrative act (ministerial decree February 18th, 
2013). But in the past the same subject matter was addressed by a regulation (ministerial 
decree June 10th , 2003 No. 217). Although law scholars report the use of general 
administrative acts in place of regulations as a pervasive and concerning phenomenon , 54
in the policy sectors I considered, such phenomenon seems to be quite circumscribed. 
Except for the policy sector Economy, in which GAAs constitute the 20.4%, in each 
policy sectors GAAs are under the 20% of the acts. They represent the 10.8% in the 
  Since the use of GAAs instead of regulations would introduce elements of uncertainty in the legal 54
system and it would make it less knowable. 
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policy sector Justice, the 5.1% in the policy sector Defense, the 9.2% in the policy 
sector Interior, the 18.8% in the policy sector Education. The Council of State has 
underlined how several GAAs approved by the government actually have a “normative” 
content and, therefore, they should be regulations (Council of State, decision No. 9, 
May 4th , 2012). It is not unusual that the Council of State, when addresses opinions on 
regulations' drafts, rejects the provision of eventual GAAs mentioned in the texts, 
recommending the government to adopt further regulations in their place. It is the case, 
for instance, of the D.P.R. September 14th , 2011, No. 222, concerning the discipline of 
National Scientific Qualification to become Associate or Full Professor. The first draft 
of the regulation was submitted to the Council of State on February 1st , 2011 and it 
received a first interlocutory opinion on February 25th , 2011 (00670/2011). In this 
interlocutory opinion, the Council of State criticized the content of some articles, it 
underlined that the agreement on the draft of some ministries and of CRUI (the 
Conference of Italian University Rectors) and CUN (the Italian National University 
Council) was lacking and it contested the “non-regulatory” nature of a decree envisaged 
by the same D.P.R.. In the successive opinion, issued on April 21th , 2011, the Council 
recognized that government had positively converted the decree in question into a 
further regulation. Another case is provided by the D.M. February 8th , 2013 No. 45 
concerning the criteria to institute and organize Graduate Schools. This D.M., which, as 
the previous D.P.R., derives from law December 30th , 2010 No. 240, known also as 
Gelmini Reform, had a longer and difficult iter. The Council of State expressed a first 
interlocutory opinion on it on November 24th, 2011 (No. 04820/2011). In this opinion, 
the Council of State suggested to rethink the draft and to make it more coherent with 
primary legislation. The second opinion was issued only on January 10th , 2013 (the 
draft was submitted to the Council of State on December 13th 2012). In the second 
opinion, the Council observed that the new draft was more coherent with primary 
legislation, but, among other remarks, it required the government to cancel, at Article 
6(2), the words “it can be modified with a ministerial decree with no-regulatory 
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nature” ; namely it was denying the possibility to adopt a GAA to modify specific 55
aspects of the regulation. This last case (the iter for the approval of the D.M. February 
8th , 2013 No. 45) is interesting also because emblematic of what can happen in terms of 
timing for the adoption of a regulation, when an interlocutory opinion of the Council of 
State interrupts the procedure of adoption of an act. The interlocutory opinion of the 
Council of State is an opinion which contains major/serious remarks on a regulations' 
draft. It is not binding, but the government can hardly ignore it (if it does it, it takes the 
risk of seeing the same act annulled, in case the Council should judge its legitimacy as 
Court). The first draft of the D.M. No. 45/2013 was submitted to the Council of State in 
the last days of government Berlusconi IV: the draft actually dated November 7th 2011; 
the Council of State declared that the act was received by its Secretariat only on 
November 14th 2011, one week later and two days before government Berlusconi IV 
ended. The Council of State therefore provided its first interlocutory opinion after ten 
days, on November 24th, 2011, when the successive government of Monti was in office. 
It was indeed the cabinet of Monti which had to submit a revised version of the draft to 
the Council. It did it almost one year later, on December 13th 2012. The same Monti 
government finally adopted the regulation on February 2013, two months before its end. 
 On a restricted dataset of 341 observations, which includes all the opinions provided by the Council of 55
State between December 2009 and December 2013, I've found several cases in which the Council has 
required the government to cancel references to GAA from the drafts or to convert them on 
regulations. These are the opinions: 04599/2009 on the D.P.R. No. 87/2010 concerning the re-
organization of the vocational institutes; 04597/2009 on the D.P.R. No. 88/2010 on the re-organization 
of the technical institutes; 04596/2009 on the D.P.R. No. 89/2010 on the reorganization of high 
schools (licei); 00190/2010 on the unification of the central commission for historical study (whose 
regulation was not adopted); 00008/2010 on the D.M. No. 81/2013 on teachers training; 03370/2008 
on the D.M. No. 30/2011 on the Fund for the victims of asbestos; 02699/2010 on D.M. No. 147/2010 
on motorcycles brakes; 01086/2011 on D.P.R. No. 151/2011 on fire prevention; 01215/2011 on the 
D.M. No. 146/2011 on a National Guarantee Fund; 02325/2011 on the D.P.C.M. No. 225/2011 on 
short-term administrative procedures in the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport;  03240/2011 on 
the D.M. No. 223/2011 on the employment contracts of development co-operation experts; 
02602/2011 on the legislative decree No. 20/2012 on army regulation; 03849/2011 on the D.M. No. 
32/2012 on the national index of civil registry; 04470/2011 on a ministerial draft implementing the 
directive 2008/63/CE regulating competition on the telecommunication sector;  04909/2011 on the 
D.M. No. 76/2012 on the criteria to evaluate the candidates and to attribute the National Academic 
Scientific Qualification; 0428/2010 on the D.P.R. No. 73/2013 on the re-organization of the bodies 
and entities of the Ministry of Environment; 00363/2013 on the amendment of the D.P.R. No. 
139/2010, which then was not adopted; 00552/2013 on the implementation of the legislative decree 
No. 39/2010 on statutory audit, which then was not adopted; 00943/2013 on the D.M. No. 165/2013 
on services of the telecommunication sector; 01278/2013 on the D.M. No. 57/2014 concerning 
funding to enterprises; 02681/2013 on the D.P.R. No. 61/2014 on civil courts organization.
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The interlocutory opinion of the Council of State, together with the establishment of a 
new government, have definitely delayed the adoption of the decree, which was part of 
the implementation of a complex primary law of a previous government. In this case, 
between the adoption of the law and the enactment of the ministerial decree 771 days 
(more than 2 years) elapsed. I have provided the median value of the days that separate 
the dates of adoption of primary laws and of the decrees that descend from them on all 
policy sectors included in my dataset (the mean value, more sensitive to extreme values, 
is shown in Appendix). This calculation include the decrees that derive from laws of 
previous governments, as it was the case of the D.M. No. 45/2013 and as it is the case 
of the majority of acts. When the decrees are regulations, the timing for their adoption 
tends to be much higher. Table 2 give a proxy of the time needed to adopt regulations 
and GAA. Data include administrative acts from laws of previous governments, that the 
incumbents have decided to enact. 
Table 2. Timing for the adoption of regulations and GAA, per policy sector  
In the cells: number of days that separate the date of adoption of the laws and the date 
of approval of the administrative acts. Median value.  
Data: personal computations on information available on the juridical database Leggi d’Italia 




GAA, per policy 
sector
Policy sectors number of days (N)
n u m b e r o f 
days (N)
Total number of 
acts (N)
Economy 678 430 252 111 541
Education 664 159 176 37 196
Defense 979,5 92 830 5 97
Interior 845 176 305 18 194
Justice 728 101 503 13 114
Total number of 
acts (N) / 958 / 184 1142
!73
In all policy sectors, the difference in terms of time needed to adopt the two types of 
acts is higher for regulations. In Economy policy sector, the procedure to adopt a 
regulation requires, according to the median value, almost 22 months: 14 months more 
than a GAA. Education policy sector behaves similarly: it takes almost 22 months to 
adopt a regulation, while a GAA is adopted in less than 6 months. In Defense policy 
sector GAA are actually rare, but they require 149.5 days less than regulations to be 
approved. In the policy sector Interior, it takes almost 10 months to adopt a GAA, while 
it takes  28 months to adopt a regulation. In Justice policy sector, the procedure to adopt 
a GAA is 7.5 months shorter than that required to enact a regulation. 
3.3 The extra-judicial offices of Council of State members (1988-2014) 
The phenomenon of the extra-judicial offices of Council of State's members is possibly 
the best known and most criticized aspect of the institution in both, academic and 
journalistic debates. The peculiar configuration of the institution, that belongs to the 
executive and to the judiciary, has traditionally induced governments to co-opt Council 
of State members in key administrative positions inside the ministries as heads of 
cabinet, heads of legislative office and legal advisers. Moreover, before such tradition 
was interrupted by the cabinet of Matteo Renzi, also the Department for the Juridical 
and Legislative Affairs of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (DAGL) used to 
be headed by a member of the Council of State. Extensive collections of data on extra-
judicial offices of the councilors have been provided by Righettini (1998) and, to a more 
limited extent, by Ponti (2001). Some commentators argue that, with their positions 
inside government and with their juridical expertise, Council of State's members would 
be “the real legislators”, together with the magistrates of the Court of Audit and with the 
members of Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (Mania and Panara 2014). The 
constitutionalist Roberto Bin (2013) claims that the magistrates of the Council of State, 
assuming and leaving offices within the government, would have enveloped the 
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political institutions with a “corporatist network” . The excessive proximity between 56
government and the Council of State would have created an “institutionalized short-
circuit”, that would threaten the same rule of law. This argument is supported also by 
the constitutionalist Michele Ainis, according to whom administrative justice is a sector 
in which the interests of the “controllers” and of the “controlled” are mixed up . Other 57
commentators have accused the Council of State of being a “caste”, whose members 
take advantage of their positions, accumulating public offices and the relative salaries . 58
Among these, there are the journalists Rizzo and Stella (2010), who have noticed that, 
since the magistrates of the Council of State in leave of absence earn two salaries, 
surely they have no incentives in reducing their extra-judicial offices. Moreover, 
according to the two journalists, the fact that a considerable proportion of Council of 
State members is in leave of absence would contribute to the backlog of the Council of 
State as court. I provide a short description of the extra-judicial offices of the 
councillors that served the governments between 1988 and 2014. In the prosecution of 
this work, I intend to investigate if any relation occurs between the presence of the 
councillors inside the ministries and the choice of governments to implement primary 
legislation through regulations or GAAs. The presence of Council of State's members 
within the governments that occurred between 1988 and 2014 is shown in Figure 3.  
I collected data on extra-judicial offices of Council of State's members that served 
governments in the policy sectors Economy, Education, Justice, Defense and Interior. 
Data do not include councilors’ positions among the Presidency of the Council of 
 A similar argument is reported in a 2015 opinion article (“Come battere la corruzione e come 56
costruire la nuove Europa) written by Eugenio Scalfari. The author underlines the negative effects of 
the conflict of interests of the councilors on public administration:  
http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2015/03/22/news/
come_battere_la_corruzione_e_come_costruire_la_nuova_europa-110173099/ 




 Among the others: a 2009 article from the column Palazzo (literary "the Palace") of the magazine 58
Espresso reports the benefits of the extra-judicial offices of the councilors: 
http://espresso.repubblica.it/palazzo/2009/10/08/news/consiglio-di-stato-e-di-casta-1.16244
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Ministers and among other policy areas. Hence, data can't provide a complete overview 
of the presence of the councilors temporarily “transferred” in government offices. They 
represent a partial measure- relative to 5 policy sectors- of the presence of the 
councilors among the 1988-2014 governments . 59
Figure 3. Distribution of extra-judicial offices, per government (1988-2014) 
Sum of the councilors that worked in the policy sectors: Economy, Education, Defense, 
Justice and Interior in each government.  
Data: personal computations from the journal “Consiglio di Stato: rassegna di giurisprudenza e 
dottrina”, from Righettini (1998) and from the Italian Administrative Justice website 
(www.giustizia-amministrativa.it) 
 For instance, the cabinet of Enrico Letta (April 28th , 2013 – February 22th , 2014), that, according to 59
the data, presents a limited number of councilors, had several councilors involved in other policy areas 
and, in particular, at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers: Filippo Patroni Griffi was 
Undersecretary of the Council Presidency; Carlo Deodato was Head of the Department for the 
Juridical and Legislative Affairs (DAGL); Roberto Garofoli was Secretary-General of the Council 
Presidency. In the Presidency were involved also several judges of Regional Administrative Tribunals. 
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Governments of the First Republic, from De Mita to Andreotti VII (1988 – 1992) had 
20 councilors overall (10 concentrated in Andreotti VII cabinet). The last two 
governments of the First Republic, Amato and Ciampi (1992-1994) had 15 councilors in 
total (Amato 8, Ciampi 7). The first governments of the Second Republic, Berlusconi 
cabinet and Dini cabinet (1994-1996) had 10 councilors, 5 for each cabinet. The center-
left governments, from Prodi I to Amato II (1996-2001) had the highest presence of 
Council of State members, in total 33 (11 in the cabinet of Amato II). The governments 
Berlusconi II and III (2001-2006) incorporated only 5 councilors. The second Prodi 
government (2006-2008) had 10 councilors. Berlusconi IV and Monti (2008-2013) had 
in total 10 councilors (4 into Berlusconi cabinet, 6 into Monti cabinet). Letta and Renzi 
(2013-2014) had in total 7 councilors.  
The distribution of Council of State members among policy sectors per government 
(Figure 4) allows to make further considerations. Except for De Mita cabinet, in which 
councilors from policy sector Education prevail, the majority of councilors in all 
governments belong to the policy sector Economy. In the First Republic, councilors are 
concentrated mainly in policy sectors Education and Economy. In the Second Republic, 
especially in center-left cabinets, councilors tend to cover more policy sectors: 4 in 
governments Prodi I, D'Alema I, D'Alema II and 3 in Amato II; 4 in Prodi II. In 
government Berlusconi IV, councilors cover 3 policy sectors; in Monti cabinet they 
cover all policy areas. In Letta and Renzi cabinets, they are spread, respectively, in 2 
and 3 policy sectors. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of extra-judicial offices among policy sectors, per 
government (1988-2014) 
Data: personal computations from the journal “Consiglio di Stato: rassegna di giurisprudenza e 




Table 3. Timing for the adoption of regulations and GAA, per policy sector  
In the cells: number of days that separate the date of adoption of the laws and the date 
of approval of the administrative acts. Mean value.  
Data: personal computations on information available on the juridical database Leggi d’Italia 




GAA, per policy 
sector
Policy sectors number of days (N)
n u m b e r o f 
days (N)
Total number of 
acts (N)
Economy 1149,5 430 565,30 111 541
Education 961,01 159 560,64 37 196
Defense 1349,17 92 1117,8 5 97
Interior 1215,42 176 877,55 18 194
Justice 1059,74 101 715,81 13 114
Total number of 
acts (N) / 958 / 184 1142
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CHAPTER IV 
Courts as political actors: the “strategic approach” 
Introduction  
Most juridical and some political science literature conceive courts as if they had the 
“last world” in politics. This argument rests on two main assumptions: first, it attributes 
the power of last world to courts, in virtue of the fact that courts are formally placed at 
the end of the policy process. Second, it conceives courts as institutions that can behave 
as super partes actors, unconstrained by the political reality.  
Strategic approaches to the study of judicial behavior provide a more realistic account 
of the relation between the legislative and the judiciary.  
First, they contend that legislative and judicial actors are reciprocally aware of their 
power. In this sense, actors are all political and strategic. Second, they do not assume 
that courts, when interpret legislation, have necessarily the last world. Strategic 
interaction presupposes the possibility of legislative responses to courts decisions. 
When courts interpret statutes, a legislative majority can overrule the policy outcome 
established by the court. When courts give constitutional interpretations, overriding 
their decisions requires supermajorities of the legislature. In these cases, legislative 
actors tend to anticipate courts actions.  
Political conditions affect the capacity of the legislative actors to overrule courts 
decisions. Adopting the point of view of courts, political conditions affect courts’ 
autonomy when they interpret legislation. Courts, in particular, can take advantage (they 
can gain independence) from the heterogeneous nature of government coalitions: 
several authors have found that the farther the ideal points of the legislative actors, the 
larger the set of the feasible judicial interpretations that political actors cannot overrule.  
In the following paragraphs, I provide a synthetic overview of some relevant 
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contributions to the study of the strategic interactions among courts and the legislatures. 
I contend that the strategic approach can be applied also to courts that review 
administrative acts. Although the process of adoption of administrative acts, as 
regulations, is understudied, these acts often determine the efficacy of legislation and 
they include important decisions delegated by primary laws to the executive. In 
particular, since these acts are concerted by the whole government or between the 
ministries, it is reasonable to think that administrative courts can take advantage from 
the ideological divisions of government to pursue their own preferences. 
4.1 What does explain judicial preferences? A focus on strategic theory of judicial 
behavior 
In virtue of their power not only to enforce, but, above all, to review and to potentially 
overrule legislation, courts are relevant objects of study for the political scientists. 
Courts are composed of individuals with specific preferences and proper utility 
functions (Zucchini 2013, 47) and, according to some approaches, they can be studied 
as “political” actors. Several researches that aim to explain judicial behavior concentrate 
on the U.S. Supreme Court. In particular, the dominant approaches developed by 
scholars include attitudinal, legal and strategic theories of judicial behavior. 
Attitudinal theories of judicial behavior argue that judicial decisions are explained by 
the political preferences justices bring on their cases (Posner, 2008). Judges are 
supposed to decide on the basis of their ideological values, and the political party of the 
President who appointed the judge is generally used as proxy for ideological 
preferences: justices appointed by Republican Presidents are expected to vote on 
average more conservatively than justices appointed by Democratic Presidents, who are 
expected to vote more liberally. The content analysis of judges speeches or newspaper 
editorials written in occasion of their appointment is another technique to infer justices 
preferences (Segal and Cover 1989). The key point of attitudinal approaches is that 
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judges have well-defined preferences of policy and they try to impose them through 
their interpretations. Several scholars have built on this theory, providing also 
specifications and improvements. Segal et al. (2000), for instance, argue that the impact 
of partisan appointment on justices decisions tends to have a limited duration. The 
authors studied the degree of concordance between presidential preferences and judicial 
decisions, considering supreme court judges votes in civil liberties and economic cases 
between 1937 and 1994 and they finally suggest that the influence of the appointment is 
present in the early years only and then it tends to decline over time.  
Such realpolitik vision of judicial behavior, that tends to compare judges to elected 
officials, is opposed by legal theories of judicial behavior. Legal theories argue that 
ideology has no role in explaining justices decisions. According to legal theory of 
judicial behavior, justices act like “single minded seekers of legal policy” (George and 
Epstein 1992, 325). They apply the law on the basis of pre-existing rules written in the 
Constitution and of previous judicial decisions. Using legal, politically neutral 
techniques of decision making (as. the logic of the precedent and the plain meaning 
rule ) justices would generate objective decisions.  60
The approach on which I’m going to focus is that of strategic theories of judicial 
behavior. The basic idea of strategic theories of judicial behavior is that, when justices 
make a decision, they are constrained by the preferences of the legislative actors : in 61
the words of Epstein et al. (2001, cited Varberg 2015, 179) judicial decisions must 
remain within “the tolerance intervals” of the political actors . Strategic calculations can 
reflect also justices sincere values and preferences. But basically, judges are not 
supposed to behave as unconstrained players, that follow their values and ideological 
attitudes only. According to strategic approaches, judges want to move substantive 
 the plain meaning rule is a statutory construction by which statutes have to be interpreted using the 60
ordinary meaning of the language. If the statute lacks of the definition of specific terms, words must 
be given their literal meaning. 
 or also of other actors, as the public (Baum 2006) or the electorate. In its classic analysis of the U.S. 61
Supreme Court, Robert Dahl (1957) argued that the Supreme Court is responsive to national 
majorities. For the author, Supreme Court justices are supposed to be a reflection of the electorate, in 
virtue of their appointment. 
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content of laws as close as possible to their preferences, but knowing that legislators 
may replace their most preferred decisions (Epstein and Knight, 1998). Therefore, if 
they want to gain their preferred outcomes, they must act strategically, taking into 
account other actors’ preferences. 
4.1.1 The strategic approach: courts statutory interpretations 
The interaction between courts and legislators has been investigated by several scholars 
according to game theoretical frameworks. Such frameworks aim to identify 
equilibrium- outcomes from the interdependent choices of justices and of the other 
political actors. Scholars have focused on two types of courts actions, to which 
legislative actors can respond or that can try to anticipate: statutory judicial review and 
constitutional judicial review. Through statutory judicial reviews, or statutory 
interpretations, courts can assess if acts of regulatory agencies (or acts of lower level of 
governments, rulings of lower courts) are compatible with existing laws. If a court 
establishes that an act of a regulatory agency is inconsistent with the existing 
legislation, legislative actors supported by a sufficient majority could approve new 
legislation, in order to override courts’ decision. They could approve new legislation, 
but not necessarily they are able to do it: courts might move the status quo in a position 
that legislative actors are unable to change. An important early finding suggested by 
Gely and Spiller (1990), in an article that focuses on statutory interpretation by the US 
Supreme Court, concerns exactly this point. The authors found that, in equilibrium, 
Congress tend to acquiesce to judicial decisions. This happens because rational justices, 
aware of the constraints imposed by the preferences of the legislative actors, when 
interpret a statute, shift legal status quo in the area between the ideal points of the House 
and the Senate. In such area, the legislative players are unable to overturn Courts’ policy 
outcome. Ferejohn and Shipan (1990) show that courts empowered to review agency 
actions take into account the preferences of the legislative players, shifting the 
equilibrium outcome in the direction of the median member of the Congress. Ferejohn 
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and Weingast (1992) sketch a “positive theory” of statutory interpretation which entails 
the inevitably political nature of courts interpretations: courts are conceived as actors 
that must take into account the capacity of legislative players to react to their actions. In 
the strategic setting proposed by the authors, a court interacts with the enacting and 
future legislatures, interpreting the statutory enactments of previous legislature in 
presence of the current one. According to their model, sophisticated legislators will tend 
to adapt to court’s jurisprudence in order to limit the ability of the future legislators to 
undermine their enactments, only in presence specific political conditions . Differently 62
from previous models of legislative-judicial interaction, in the setting imagined by 
Ferejohn and Weingast, court preferences do not necessarily coincide with substantive 
ideologies. Judges preferences can be thought as “procedurally induced values”: judges 
might prefer an interpretation to another because it better implements some notion of 
legislative intention. Therefore, a strategic court might act as politically sophisticated 
honest agent of the earlier legislature. In this case, the court will try to achieve the 
policy outcome politically viable, closest to that desired by the previous legislature. 
Otherwise, a strategic court can act as an unconstrained policy advocate, a court that 
has well-defined policy preferences and that seeks to impose them, but also in this case 
considering the viability of its interpretations. This account of courts preferences is used 
also by Steunenberg (1997), who analyzes strategic interactions between the Dutch 
Supreme Court and legislature on the issue of euthanasia. In the model proposed by the 
author, the court has to decide if giving a new interpretation of a statutory decision, to 
which the cabinet, that initiates almost all legislation, could react introducing a new bill 
that might override court’s interpretation. The court can act as a constrained policy 
advocate, trying to impose its policy preferences, or it can behave as a conserver, 
preferring to maintain the status quo as long as it is politically viable. The evidence 
 The authors consider a model in which Congress delegate the authority to oversee a policy issue to a 62
committee which is not necessarily representative of the current legislature. Legislatures rationally 
anticipate the conditions under which they can hope the court will act as an agent of the enacting (the 
previous) Congress, if the status quo, the committee and the court are on the same side of the chamber 
median. The presence of non representative committees with gatekeeping authority is a necessary 
condition for the policy outcome to depend on the preferences of the previous legislature (Ferejohn 
and Weingast, 1992, 278).
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found by the author suggests that the Dutch Supreme Court acted as a policy advocate 
on the issue of euthanasia and that it chose an interpretation close to its ideal point, that 
could not be changed by the legislature. The divergent opinions of political parties in 
governing coalitions prevented the legislature from finding an agreement to change the 
policy outcome reached by the court in the successive cabinets.  
4.1.2 The strategic approach: constitutional judicial review 
Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts can check the constitutionality of legislation 
passed by the legislature. This type of court action exercises a considerable power of 
threat to the legislative actors, since constitutional reviews, differently from statutory 
judicial reviews, cannot be overturned by simple legislation.  
For instance, to overrule constitutional decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
constitutional amendments are necessary and they require the support of two thirds of 
each house of the Congress and of at least three-fourths of the State Legislatures. 
Whether or not legislators coalitions are sufficiently large to amend the constitution 
determines courts autonomy in the exercise of judicial review. With regard to this, Gely 
and Spiller (1992) found that the set of “feasible constitutional outcomes”- the set of 
points in the policy space chosen by the Court that will not be reversed by the 
legislative actors- is larger when the ideal points of the legislative actors are far from 
each other (when the legislative actors are more divided). Santoni and Zucchini (2002) 
found that in Italy during the First Republic, the independence of Constitutional Court, 
measured in terms of number of sentences of constitutional illegitimacy, increases when 
governments are more divided (when the number and or the ideological distance of veto 
players increases). Other authors highlight that governments tend to restraint or to auto-
limit their legislative activity as indirect consequence of courts capacity to declare laws 
unconstitutional. Volcansek (2001) argues that Constitutional Courts can influence the 
legislative process directly, invalidating a law, but also indirectly, through the 
anticipated reactions of the legislators to courts moves. The author treats Constitutional 
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Courts as veto players (Tsebelis 1999) considering them as unitary actors, integral to the 
policy-making. Stone Sweet (1992, 2002), Tate and Vallinder (1995) and others have 
underlined the increasing importance of Constitutional Courts in the political process, 
considering this fact controversial. The studies in particular of Stone Sweet concentrate 
on the so-called “judicialization of politics” phenomenon. An implication of the 
judicialization of politics is that legislators are supposed to anticipate possible censures 
of their enactments by the courts. As Constitutional Courts increase their role in 
different policy areas, the discretion of legislators would be reduced, with the risk of the 
formation of a “government of judges” .  63
For Tsebelis (2002) such predictions would be exaggerated, since, most of the time, 
Constitutional Court’s ideal points are located inside the unanimity core of the other 
veto players, the set of policies that parties at government cannot agree to change. Since 
Constitutional Courts generally occupy the center of policy space, they would be 
absorbed by the existing veto players . Following Tsebelis (2002) and Gely and Spiller 64
(1990), Santoni and Zucchini (2006) provide a multi-stage game of the interactions 
between the legislative veto players and the Italian Constitutional Court, whose 
prediction is that legislative policy change is lowered by the presence of the Court. The 
authors do not consider the Constitutional Court as a proper veto player, since they 
assume that courts’ ideal point is inside veto players’ Pareto set.  
Other scholars underline that the judicialization of politics meets limits in endogenous 
and contextual variables. Hönnige (2010) underlines that courts composition and 
judges’ decision-making, although understudied in Constitutional Courts, are 
endogenous variables that can foster or limit judicialization. In an article of 2009, 
analyzing the consequences of the selection of Constitutional Courts judges in France 
 These considerations have normative implications. As in the weberian dilemma of the 63
“bureaucratization of politics”, these authors address the issue of the power of the unelected bodies 
(Vibert, 2007), not subject to direct public oversight. According to Stone Sweet (2000) the increasing 
role of Constitutional Courts would have serious consequences on parliamentary sovereignty, that in 
many countries is considered as threatened.
 According to the author, the only cases in which Constitutional Courts can be considered as additional 64
veto players are when the existing veto players are located in extreme policy positions or when new 
issues come under consideration (Tsebelis, 2002, 330)
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and Germany, the author found that when the pivotal judge is chosen by the 
governments, courts are more likely to reject oppositional proposals (abstract review 
procedures). Vanberg (2001) provides a game-theoretic model of the interactions 
between constitutional courts and the legislatures, which addresses legislative 
anticipation of judicial review and legislative reactions to judicial decisions. According 
to his results, the transparency of political environment would affect the way in which 
courts use their power. Legislative majorities would be more prone to evade (to not 
implement) constitutional court decisions  in “non-transparent” policy environments, 65
in which voters are not able to monitor legislative responses to judicial decisions. In 
non-transparent policy environments, evasion attempts by the legislatures do not 
become of public knowledge and do not result in a negative public backlash. In absence 
of this deterrent, legislative majorities would have more margins of maneuver and may 
not implement courts rulings. As a consequence, Constitutional Courts would be more 
likely to annul statutes or other legislative provisions when the likelihood of acting in a 
transparent environment is higher. The importance of public support for courts and the 
transparency of policy environment  as crucial elements for the enforcement of courts 66
rulings (since the implementation of courts decisions requires the cooperation of other 
actors, including the decision-makers whose acts have been annulled) is affirmed also in 
Vanberg (2005). 
 The author makes the example of the non- reaction of the German Bundestag to a decision of the 65
Constitutional Court, which stated the necessity to change the differential taxation of civil servant 
pensions and regular retirement benefits. A parliamentary commission studied possible revisions, but 
then tax code was not modified.
 These conditions are better specified by the author as: the presence of sufficient public support for the 66
court, in order to make the possibility of evasion by the legislators unattractive; in addition, citizens 
must be likely to be aware of the attempts of evasion by the legislators.
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CHAPTER V 
The strategic interaction between government and the Council of 
State of Italy. The determinants of the activation of Council of 
State as Advisor (1988-2014) 
5.1 The Council of State as a “policy” conserver court 
The Council of State has been described as a “self-serving” institution: as an actor 
interested in maximizing its role and the prerogatives of its members. Building on 
strategic theories of judicial behavior, and in particular on Ferejohn and Weingast 
(1992) and Steunenberg (1997) , I consider the Council of State as a single political 67
player that, in pursuing its goals, behaves as a “policy” conserver court. I argue that the 
Council of State tends to follow a procedurally based jurisprudence and that it prefers to 
preserve the status quo provided by the already existing administrative acts. Substantive 
policy preferences can also play a crucial role in Council of State’s behavior, but such 
preferences are usually against policy change. Arguments in support of this position 
concern: the rules of composition of the institution and the non- politicization of the 
judges; the low turnover of the judges; the fact that, in some policy sectors, the 
preservation of the status quo corresponds to the preservation of Council of State’s 
members prerogatives. 
  According to Ferejohn and Weingast (1992), courts that provide statutory interpretations might not 67
have specific policy preferences; they can behave as politically sophisticated honest agent that aim at 
providing interpretations as close as possible to the legislative intentions. For Steunenberg (1997) this 
types of courts behave as conservers: as courts that prefer to maintain the original legislation. On the 
contrary, constrained policy advocate courts try to impose their policy preferences. In both cases, 
courts that review statutory decisions try to strategically prevent legislative bodies from overriding 
their interpretations. However, in pursuing their ideal points, they are limited by the configuration of 
the incumbent legislative majority.
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Rules of composition and non-politicization of the judges 
The Council of State is organized into three legal and four judicial sections. The 
“consultative section for normative acts” is the section that provides mandatory 
opinions on government secondary legislation. Currently, 104 councilors rotate between 
the sections. The Council of Presidency of Administrative Justice, the self-governing 
body of administrative justice, each year decides their composition. Councilors are 
assigned to both, legal and judicial sections, during their career. Members of the 
Council of State appointed by the government are actually a minority: judges are 
recruited for the 50% among T.A.R. judges with at least four years experience; 25% are 
selected through a competitive examination among T.A.R. judges with at least one year 
experience, ordinary and military judges with at least four years experience, Court of 
Audit judges, state lawyers with at least one year experience, chamber of deputies 
officials with at least four years experience, state officials with a law degree; 25% are 
appointed by the government among university professors of law, lawyers admitted to 
specific Bars and with at least fifteen years experience, ministerial and other public 
administration's officials. Contrary to the civil judicial system, administrative justice 
national association is not organized into partisan factions . Council of State members 68
that hold extrajudicial offices do not present a long-term political affiliation. During the 
Italian “Second Republic” (1994-present), 88% of judges that held extrajudicial offices 
in more than one cabinet in the same policy sector was appointed by both, center left 
and center right governments .  69
Turnover of the judges 
Judges' turnover is particularly low: 94% of chairs of Council of State's sections in 1998 
 Trial courts' judges are organized in a national association whose factions reflect the traditional left-68
right conflict in the society (Guarnieri 1992). This association plays a relevant role in their Higher 
Council and in their judicial activity (Ceron and Mainenti 2015). Instead, the national association of 
administrative judges is not as relevant and it is not divided into partisan factions. 
 Data on extrajudicial offices in four policy sectors: economy, education, justice, interior, defense, 69
collected from the journal Consiglio di Stato: rassegna di giurisprudenza e dottrina, from Righettini 
(1998) and from the administrative justice website. 
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was already member of the institution 10 years before; 90% of chairs of Council of 
State's sections in 2015 was already member of the institution in 2004 . It is therefore 70
reasonable that councilors should prefer regulations they themselves approved and that 
they should prefer to follow a jurisprudence they themselves created.  
Preservation of the status quo in defense of councilors’ prerogatives 
Council of State tends to oppose policy change, if it implies the reduction of its 
competences. For instance, both Regional Administrative Tribunal of Lazio and the 
Council of State contested the legitimacy of the reform of 1993 on the privatization of 
public employment (Council of State General Assembly opinion n. 146, August 31th, 
1992; T.A.R. Lazio order n.1171, sec. III-bis, June 5th, 1996 and T.A.R. Lazio, order n. 
119 sec. I, July 5th, 1995). The reform deprived the administrative judges of the 
competence on disputes concerning  public sector's employment relationships  and it 71
attributed it to the ordinary judges. There are policy sectors in which Council of State's 
members have specific interests and in which they tend to oppose policy change. A 
striking example is given by the case of a councilor that appealed to the same Council 
of State for the annulment of the D.M. June 6th, 2002, which introduced new criteria for 
the appointment of tax commissions' members (commissioni tributarie). The councilor, 
already member of a tax commission in an Italian region, contested the legitimacy of the 
new criteria, that would have penalized his position . Another example concerns the 72
opposition of the Council of State to specific parts of a regulation, that aimed to 
introduce an “unwelcome” innovation. Most councilors belong to or have ties with the 
scientific community of jurists and legal scholars. This community has repeatedly 
 Data from: Consiglio di Stato: rassegna di giurisprudenza e dottrina; administrative justice website; 70
official document Ruolo di anzianità del personale del Consiglio di Stato e dei tribunali 
amministrativi regionali, 2007, provided by Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 
 with the exception of the categories of magistrates, diplomatic and prefectural personnel, university 71
professors, State barristers-at-law.





expressed criticism on impact factor based criteria for the evaluation of scientific 
publications . The Council of State expressed a negative opinion on the draft regulation 73
of the Ministry of Education which established the National Academic Qualification for 
university professors (D.P.R. n. 222, September 14th,, 2011). The regulation changed 
several aspects of the discipline of national academic qualification and it opened the 
way to the use of quantitative-impact factor based criteria for the evaluation of scientific 
publications. In its two interlocutory opinions, the consultative section for normative 
acts criticized, among other aspects, the online (and not in hard-copy) transmission of 
the candidates' publications to the evaluation committee. The councilors refer to 
scientific publications as “highly voluminous printed works”  that should be already 74
known in the scientific community. Administrative judges' opposition to the legitimacy 
of impact factor based evaluation emerges also in several T.A.R. Sentences .  75
5.2 The Council of State of Italy as a “guardian of the law” that limits ministerial 
discretion 
Since the Council of State acts as a policy conserver court, some members of the 
government might benefit from the activation of Council of State as Advisor in the 
process of implementation of primary laws. When it issues opinions on regulations, the 
Council of State verifies the technical-juridical accuracy of the acts, their coherence 
with the overall legal system, the eligibility of the minister or of the government to 
regulate the issue, the fact that the acts have received the agreement of all the parties 
 A law scholar's article, that argues the impossibility to adopt impact factor criteria to evaluate 73
scientific publications in legal disciplines, published on the website of the academic network ROARS 
(Return On Academic ReSearch). 
 http://www.roars.it/online/indicatori-bibliometrici-e-valutazione-della-ricerca-in-campo-giuridico-
qualche-spunto-per-un-dibattito-da-avviare/ 
 Affair n. 00670/2011, p. 7 74
 T.A.R. Lazio, sec. III, sentence n. 11630/2015; T.A.R. Lazio, sec. III, sentence n. 3884/2014; T.A.R. 75
Lazio, sec. III, order n. 3079/2014
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involved. Such process requires time and, as it has been shown, it often delays the 
adoption of regulations. However, providing such control, the Council of State is able to 
limit ministerial discretion. The ex ante control of the Council of State can become 
convenient for coalition parties, in case specific issues generate conflict. An issue that 
creates conflict among the ministerial structures is, for instance, veterinary legislation. 
On this issue, both Health and Agriculture Departments claim the competence to adopt 
regulations. Inter-ministerial regulations are usually chosen in this case, but even if an 
initial agreement between the ministers has been reached, the risk of ministerial drift  76
persists during drafting process. Council of State's intervention ensures that both 
departments are involved and that final regulation draft reflects the agreement between 
the ministries. When it issues opinions, the Council of State always verifies that final 
regulation draft is subscribed by all ministers, and not by permanent secretaries or by 
junior ministers only. Binding ministers to the respect of specific bureaucratic 
procedures, the Council of State reduces their discretion in the process of regulations' 
adoption. Therefore, similarly to other control devices employed at the executive level 
(Thies 2001, Martin and Vanberg 2005) , the control of the Council of State can be an 77
used as an instrument to manage the divergent preferences of the ministers. Also in 
virtue of its role of “guardian of the law” and given the interests of the coalition 
partners, it is possible to imagine a strategic interaction between the government and the 
Council of State.  
5.3 A model of Council of State activation 
I argue that political circumstances can influence the choice between different types of 
 each minister might use its discretion in drafting regulations to move the final policy in its direction, at 76
the detriment of the preferences of other coalition members.
  According to Thies (2001), coalition partners “keep tabs” on each other appointing junior ministers to 77
hostile ministers. For Martin and Vanberg (2005) coalition parties use legislative institutions to 
mitigate agency problems within the coalition.
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administrative acts. In other words, I expect that governments are more prone to adopt 
regulations, activating the ex ante control of the Council of State, under specific 
political conditions. In order to illustrate the logic of the interaction between parties at 
government and the Council of State, I use three simple spatial models.  
Imagine that two parties form a government in a unidimensional policy space, on a left-
right continuum. Parties' ideal points are located in L and R. Status quo is located in 
point SQ. Council of State's ideal point coincides with SQ. Status quo can be modified 
if the two parties find an agreement.  
Figure 5. Activation of the ex ante control of the Council of State in the 





In this model, the closer the status quo is to coalition range, the more risky the 
agreement is for party R. Even if the two parties find an initial agreement, during law 
implementation party L could move the final policy in a position closer to its ideal point 
and further from the initial status quo, penalizing party R (Case 2). The situation is 
different, if the status quo is considerably far from coalition range (Case 1). In Case 1, 
the activation of the Council of State as Advisor, since its ideal point coincides with the 
status quo, represents an obstacle to change. Therefore, its advise is not promoted by 
both parties. Vice versa, when government heterogeneity is higher, the activation of the 
ex ante control of the Council of State ensures that the initial agreement between parties 










I consider now the case in which alternation moves the status quo far from coalition 
parties' ideal points: in Gov 2, L and R parties' ideal points are considerably far from the 
status quo inherited by Gov 1 (Figure 6).  
Both L and R parties prefer a new status quo to the one inherited from Government 1. If 
a law of Government 2 introduces the possibility of a consistent policy change, each 
agreement between L and R is preferred to eventual shifts in the direction of the old 
status quo. 
Figure 6. Activation of the ex ante control of the Council of State in the 







Therefore, in the circumstances described in Figure 6, I expect coalition parties to be 
less prone to activate the ex ante control of the Council of State and to opt for 
implementation acts alternative to regulations. 
The following figure shows instead that, in presence of great levels of ideological 
heterogeneity, governments should be more prone to activate the ex ante control of the 
Council of State, in order to know its preferences as Court. In presence of high 
ideological heterogeneity, the status quo tends to be close to the ideal points of coalition 
partners, or it is placed inside the Pareto set. In these circumstances, a decision of the 
Council of State as Court can produce a policy output that cannot be modified by 
partners coalitions. It is useful to represent the Council of State not as a point, but as a 








Figure 7. Activation of the the ex ante control of the Council of State, in order to 






In Case 1, all Court's possible ideal points are located outside coalition range. For not 
being overruled, the Court can at most obtain R: it can shift the status quo to the ideal 
point of the most policy-conserver member of the coalition. In these circumstances, it is 
not necessary to activate the ex ante control of the Council of State to know its 
preferences as Court. The situation, in Case 2, is different. Government ideological 
heterogeneity is greater. Some of the possible courts' ideal points are located inside the 
Pareto set. If court's ideal point is located to the right of R party, the court can at most 
obtain R, as in Case 1. Vice versa, if its ideal point is located to the left of R party, the 
court could obtain its ideal point, with no possibility for L and R to change it. In these 
circumstances, coalition parties have a greater interest in knowing court's ideal point. 
They will tend to activate Council of State as Advisor, as its scrutiny can reflect Council 
of State’s preferences as Court. On the contrary, when alternation occurs, the 
anticipation of court's decision is not as relevant, for the same reasons explained with 
reference to Case 1. 
5.4 The strategic interaction between government and the Council of State  
The following representation synthesizes, according to a game theoretical framework, 
the interaction between parties L and R and the Council of State, when a primary law 








L-R and the Council of State in order to adopt administrative acts. Parties L and R are 
aware that the Council of State might judge the lawfulness of the acts as Court, and, 
even if this move is not represented in figure 8, the Council of State is aware that L-R 
coalition may overrule its decision with a new law.  
Figure 8. The strategic interaction between L-R coalition and the Council of State 
Different types of administrative acts (regulations and GAA) can be chosen. The 
decision on the type of act to be adopted, a regulation or a GAA, is taken in the 
legislative process and it is represented in the first stage, when L requires that a 
regulation (“r”) or a GAA (“GAA”) has to be included in the law. At second stage, party 
R can decide whether to proceed (“yes”), starting the procedure to adopt the act, or not 
(“no”), confirming the legislative status quo. If R decides to adopt a regulation (“r”, 
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“yes”) it takes the risk that the procedure to adopt the regulation can become definitely 
long. However, the ex ante control of the Council of State on regulation’s draft can 
prevent the risk of ministerial drift. Moreover, R could be interested in knowing the 
exact preferences of Council of State as Court. At the third stage, the Council of State 
can provide positive (“p.o.”) or interlocutory opinions (“i.o.”) on regulation draft. 
Positive opinions imply that Council of State essentially agrees with the content of the 
draft. On the contrary, interlocutory opinions include comments and remarks, and 
government is supposed to send a new, amended version of the draft to the Council. In 
the fourth stage, party L can adopt a regulation, complying with Council of State 
observations (“c(R)”); it can decide not to adopt any act (“n.a”); or it can decide not to 
comply with Council of State’s observations, evading (“ev”), at least partially, its 
remarks. In this last circumstance, the Council of State usually issues a further 
interlocutory opinion, requesting another updated version of the draft. At the fifth stage 
of the game, the Council of State, acting as Court, can declare regulations and GAAs 
legal or void. Table 4 shows the outcomes of the game. 
Table 4. Outcomes for parties R and L and the Council of State
Outcome Description
O1 The process of implementation of primary law does not start
O2 CoS as Court declares void a regulation that received a positive opinion
O3 CoS as Court declares legal a regulation that received a positive opinion
O4 After a positive opinion of the CoS as Advisor, the regulation is not adopted
O5 CoS as Court declares void a regulation that received a positive opinion, that L partially evaded
O6 CoS as Court declares legal a regulation that received a positive opinion, that L partially evaded
O7 CoS as Court declares void a regulation that received an interlocutory opinion, with which L complied
O8 CoS as Court declares legal a regulation that received an interlocutory opinion, with which L complied
O9 After an interlocutory opinion of the CoS as Advisor, the regulation is not adopted
O10 CoS as Court declares void a regulation that received an interlocutory opinion, that L partially evaded
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5.4.1 Hypotheses 
On the basis of the spatial models of Council of State activation and of the strategic 
interaction between the players, I derive three hypotheses. I expect governments to 
activate more the Council of State as Advisor, when they are more divided and policy 
change is limited. At least one coalition partner will benefit from the activation of 
Council of State as Advisor and coalitions members should be more interested in 
anticipating Council of State preferences as Court. Hypothesis 1 can be formulated as 
follows: 
H.1 I expect ideological division to have a positive impact on the number of regulations 
(on Council of State activation as Advisor) 
I expect that governments are less prone to activate the ex ante control of the Council of 
State when alternation occurred and all policy solutions inside the new governmental 
range are preferable to the old status quo. In this case, the activation of the Council of 
State as Advisor would represent an obstacle to change and Council of State should 
exercise a lower threat as Court. Therefore, I expect that, in such circumstances, 
government should prefer GAAs. Hypothesis 2 can be formulated as follows: 
H.2  I expect the presence of alternation to have a negative impact on the number of 
regulations (on the activation of Council of State as Advisor) 
Outcome Description
O11 CoS as Court declares legal a regulation that received an interlocutory opinion, that L partially evaded
O12 CoS as Court declares void a GAA
O13 CoS as Court declares legal a GAA
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I formulate a third hypothesis, which concerns the role of Councilors as “individual 
consultants” inside government departments. I expect governments to be more prone to 
recruit judges of the Council of State as legal experts through extra-judicial offices, 
when they do not activate the Council of State as Advisor: 
H.3 I expect the number of the councilors recruited in key positions inside the ministries 
to have a negative impact on the number of regulations (on Council of State activation 
as Advisor).  
5.5 Data and variables 
I collected original data on regulations and general administrative acts (GAA) adopted 
on the initiative of five ministries: economy, defense, interior, justice and education, 
between 1988 and 2014. These policy areas were not interested by the constitutional 
reform of 2001 (riforma del Titolo V della Costituzione), that re-distributed the 
competence to adopt regulations among central government and the Regions. Data are 
collected from 1988, since that year the law on the organization of the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers, Law August 23th 1988 No. 400, established that the ex ante 
control of the Council of State was mandatory on all types of regulations. All types of 
ministerial and governmental decrees are included: ministerial decrees (D.M.), 
President of the Council of the Ministers decrees (D.P.C.M.), President of the Republic 
Decrees (D.P.R.). All times it was possible, the primary law from which the decrees 
derive has been recorded. Data were collected from the juridical database Leggi d'Italia. 
I identified GAAs used as substitutes for regulations by referring to the indication “non 
regulatory decree” (“decreto non regolamentare”) when it was mentioned in primary 
law. In case the law did not specify the nature, regulatory or not regulatory, of the 
administrative act, I have followed the indications provided by law scholars to classify 
the acts. In particular, Moscarini (2008) provides a sort of vademecum to identify 
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general administrative acts used in place of regulations, based also on Council of State's 
jurisprudence. 
5.5.1 The dependent variable: the decision of triggering the ex ante control of the 
Council of State, adopting a regulation  
The dependent variable, “Council of State”, is operationalized as a dummy variable that 
points out if the decree adopted by the government is a regulation or a general 
administrative act (GAA). That is: if the decree has been submitted to the Council of 
State for its ex ante control, or not. The variable assumes values 1 if the decree is a 
regulation, 0 if the decree is a GAA. The distribution of the variable “Council of State” 
during the governments that occurred between 1988 and 2014 is shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9. Frequency distribution of regulations and GAA, per government  
Data: personal computations on information available on the juridical database Leggi d'Italia 
(1988-2014). Types of act: D.M., D.P.R., D.P.C.M., acts deriving from laws prior to 1988 
excluded. Total number of acts: 1.142 
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The use of GAAs in place of regulations seems to become a quite consistent 
phenomenon starting from the second Berlusconi cabinet. But in all governments, 
except for De Mita cabinet, in which the number of GAAs exceeds that of regulations 
(although on a restricted total number of acts), the number of regulations is much 
greater than that of GAAs. 
Figure 10 shows that the governments that, in proportion, seem to be more prone to 
activate the Council of State as Advisor, adopting regulations, are the center left 
governments of the XIII legislature, from Prodi I to Amato II. While the governments 
more prone to evade the ex ante control of the Council of State as Advisor are, in 
addition to De Mita, the first government Amato, Berlusconi IV, Monti and Letta. 
Figure 10. Percentage of regulations and GAAs, per government  
Data: personal computations on information available on the juridical database Leggi d'Italia 
(1988-2014). Types of act: D.M., D.P.R., D.P.C.M., acts deriving from laws prior to 1988 
excluded. Total number of acts: 1.142 
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5.5.2 The Independent variables: the determinants of the activation of Council of State's 
supervision 
The independent variables concern the circumstances that might affect the choice to 
make a regulation, activating the Council of State as Advisor, or to make a GAA, 
evading the ex ante control of the institution. According to my hypotheses, these 
variables capture government division, the presence of alternation (the desirability of 
policy change) and the internalization of Council of State's members inside the 
ministerial structures.  
Bureaucratic capacity 
The independent variable “Bureaucapacity” is calculated as the ratio of the total number 
of councilors recruited in each ministerial structure and the total number of acts adopted 
in the ministerial structures.  
The total number of acts adopted in the ministerial structures constitutes a proxy of the 
relevance of each policy sectors. Therefore, Bureaucapacity summarizes the presence of 
the councilors inside the ministries, weighted for a measure of the importance of the 
same ministries. The variable captures the potential will of the governments to 
anticipate Council of State's orientation when they do not activate its ex ante control on 
administrative acts. Therefore, I expect this variable to have a negative impact on the 
number of regulations adopted. 
As shown in Figure 11, the cabinets of the First Republic, from De Mita to Ciampi, and 
then the cabinets of the Second Republic Berlusconi I, Letta and Renzi, made the 
greatest investment in individual consultancy of Council of State's members in 
Education policy sector. All governments made some investment in Economy policy 
sector. The one with the greatest investment in this sector is the third Berlusconi 
government. 
!102
Figure 11. Distribution of “Bureaucapacity” variable, per government 
Data: personal computations on information available on the juridical database Leggi d'Italia 
(1988-2014), on the journal “Consiglio di Stato: rassegna di giurisprudenza e dottrina”, on 
Righettini (1998), on the Italian Administrative Justice website (www.giustizia-amministrativa.it) 
Governments started to recruit a consistent number of councilors in Defense policy 
sector starting from the first Prodi government until Monti government. The second 
government D'Alema had a consistent proportion of Council of State members in the 
policy sectors Defense and Interior. The investment in the individual consultancy of the 
councilors is residual in policy sector Justice. 
Government heterogeneity 
Two measures of the independent variable that captures government heterogeneity have 
been provided. One has been calculated according to spatial criteria, the other is based 
on the number of parties at government. The first version of the variable is 
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operationalized as the absolute value of the distance between the most extreme parties 
of the coalition. Parties' positions are drawn from expert surveys: Laver and Hunt 
(1992), Benoit and Laver (2006), Curini and Iacus (2008), Di Virgilio et al. (2015). I 
calculated the distance between the most extreme parties’ positions on four policy 
dimensions: increase services versus cut taxes, pro- versus anti permissive social policy, 
pro- versus anti decentralization of decision, environment over growth versus growth 
over environment, and then I made the mean of such distances.  The spatial variable that 
captures government heterogeneity is called “Range” and its distribution is represented 
in figure 12. 
Figure 12. Distribution of “Range” variable, per government 
Data: Laver and Hunt (1992), Benoit and Laver (2006), Curing and Iacus (2008), Di Virgilio et. al 
(2015) 
The variable assumes value zero in technical governments (governi tecnici) Dini and 
Monti, entirely composed of non-partisan ministers. Governments of the First Republic, 
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from De Mita to Ciampi, share the same level of government heterogeneity. The same 
applies to the last two governments of the Second Republic, Letta and Renzi. The most 
divided government is Prodi II, the less heterogeneous government is Berlusconi IV. 
My expectation is that government heterogeneity has a positive impact on the activation 
of the Council of State as Advisor and, therefore, on the number of regulations adopted.  
The non-spatial measure of government heterogeneity is given by the total number of 
parties at government, calculated as the sum of the parties at government. The variable 
Parties at government, abbreviated to “P_gov”, behaves rather similar to Range and it is 
distributed as follows: 
Figure 13. Distribution of Parties at government (“P_gov”) variable, per 
government 
   
Data: personal computations on information available on the official website of the Italian 
government (www.governo.it) 
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In the two technical governments Dini and Monti, the variable assumes value 1. The 
governments of the First Republic do not share the same level of heterogeneity, since 
De Mita and Andreotti VI governments include one more party, the PRI (Italian 
Republican Party), with respect to Andreotti VII, Amato I and Ciampi government. This 
party, in variable Range, is absorbed by the other parties, according to the rule 
elaborated by Tsebelis (2002). The governments with the highest number of parties are 
Amato II and Prodi II, while, except for Monti and Dini cabinet, the government with 
the lower level of heterogeneity is Berlusconi IV. As for Range variable, I expect that 
P_gov variable has a positive impact on the number of regulations adopted. 
Government alternation 
Two measures of government alternation are provided. One is calculated following 
spatial criteria, the other considering the turnover of parties at government. The first 
measure is conceptualized as the difference in ideological position between previous 
and current governments. Party positions on policy dimensions are drawn from expert 
surveys: Laver and Hunt (1992), Benoit and Laver (2006), Curini and Iacus (2008), Di 
Virgilio et al. (2015). The variable has been calculated by finding the mid-range 
position of each government on 4 policy dimensions: increase services vs cut taxes, pro 
permissive social policy vs anti, pro decentralization of decision vs anti, environment 
over growth vs growth over environment, then calculating the distance between the mid-
ranges of two successive governments and, finally, making the square root of the sum of 
each squared distance, according to Tsebelis and Chang (2004) . The distribution of the 78
variable, named “Alternation”, is shown in Figure 14: 
 The distance between two governments on four dimension is calculated as A1,2,3,4 = 78
(A21+A22+A23+A24 )^1/2 , where A1,2,3,4  are the alternations between two successive governments on 
each dimension. 
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Figure 14. Distribution of “Alternation” variable, per government 
Data: Laver and Hunt (1992), Benoit and Laver (2006), Curini and Iacus (2008), Di Virgilio et al. 
(2015) 
According to this measure, alternation appears for the first time after the end of the first 
Republic, with the first Berlusconi government. Then more consistent level of 
alternation takes place with the first cabinet of Prodi. The greatest level of alternation 
are registered with the succession of center-right and center-left government coalitions: 
with the II Berlusconi government, that followed the center-left governments of the XIII 
legislature (from Prodi I to Amato II); with the second cabinet of Prodi, that succeeded 
to the center-right governments of Berlusconi (II and III) of the XIV legislature. With 
the IV Berlusconi cabinet, that followed the second Prodi cabinet. The last government 
of the Second Republic, Renzi, registers no alternation with respect to Letta cabinet. My 
expectation is that this variable has a negative impact on government propensity to 
adopt regulations. Since the status quo inherited by the previous government is 
supposed to be far from coalition members' positions, if alternation occurred, incumbent 
government should be less interested in activating the Council of State as Advisor. 
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Therefore I expect that the higher the level of alternation, the lower the number of 
regulations.  
The non-spatial measure of government alternation has been calculated as the ratio 
between new parties at government and the total number of parties at government. This 
variable is called “New_Parties” and its distribution is represented in Figure 15. Also 
according to this measure, alternation occurs starting from the first Berlusconi cabinet 
and it is absent in Renzi cabinet. As for the spatial version of the variable, the highest 
levels of alternation are registered with the first Berlusconi government and then with 
the coalitions of center-right Berlusconi II, with the center-left coalition Prodi II and 
then again with the center-right coalition of Berlusconi IV. As for Alternation variable, I 
expect New_Parties to have a negative impact on the number of regulations adopted. 
Figure 15. Distribution of “New_Parties” variable, per government 
 
Data: personal computations on information available on the website of the Italian government 
www.governo.it  
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5.5.3 Control variables 
Amendments to existing regulations 
The choice between regulations and GAAs can be influenced by the presence of specific 
procedures that bind to the adoption of a specific type of act. The variable “Modify” 
points out if the decree is a modification of an existing regulation. An existing 
regulation should be modified only by the same type of act: by another regulation.  The 
distribution of the variable Modify, marked as “Regulations amendments” in Figure 16, 
shows that governments that adopted the highest number of regulations amending 
previous regulations are Berlusconi II and Berlusconi IV, followed by Prodi I. 
Figure 16. Distribution of “Modify” variable, per government 
Data: personal computations on information available on the juridical database Leggi d'Italia 
(1988-2014). Types of act: D.M., D.P.R., D.P.C.M., acts deriving from laws prior to 1988 
excluded. Total number of acts: 1.142 
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My expectation is that the control variable Modify has a positive impact on the 
dependent variable, since it should bind governments to  adopt further regulations.  
Measures of governments' “alterity” 
The last control variable captures the difference between the cabinet that approved the 
primary law and the cabinet that adopted the administrative act, regulation or GAA. The 
level of “alterity” between governments could affect the choice on the type of 
instrument to implement primary laws. In particular, I would expect that to higher level 
of alterity between governments could correspond a lower knowledge of primary laws 
and, therefore, a higher necessity to activate the Council of State as a guarantor of the 
legitimacy of the implementation. In the spatial version of the variable, the level of 
alterity is conceptualized as the distance between the mid-range of the government 
which passed the law and the midrange of the government that adopted the decree. Such 
distance have been measured on the 4 policy dimensions considered also for Range and 
Alternation. Then the variable, “Alter”, has been calculated, following Tsebelis and 
Chang (2004), as the square root of the sum of each squared distance. The distribution 
of the variable is shown in Figure 17. 
Alter is equal to zero among the governments of the First Republic, since there is no 
distance between the mid-ranges of these governments. In addition, the decrees deriving 
from laws previous to 1988 and to De Mita cabinet  have been excluded from the 79
dataset. The governments with the greatest values of alterity are the second and third 
Berlusconi cabinets. This means that, on average, these cabinets have adopted the 
decrees that derived from the more “distant” laws. This phenomenon, that occurred also 
in the first Prodi cabinet, tends to become less important in the second Prodi cabinet and 
in the fourth Berlusconi cabinet. 
 Also two decrees of 1988, but that derive from laws approved by the predecessor of De Mita 79
government, Goria government, have been excluded from the dataset. 
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Figure 17. Distribution of “Alter” variable, for government  
Data: personal computations on information available on the juridical database Leggi d'Italia 
(1988-2014). Types of act: D.M., D.P.R., D.P.C.M., acts deriving from laws prior to 1988 
excluded. Total number of acts: 1.140 
My expectation on the behavior of this control variable is that the greatest the alterity of 
the government which adopted the law, the highest should be the necessity to activate 
the formal consultation of the Council of State. 
The non-spatial version of “Alter”, the variable “Alter_NS”, is calculated as the ratio 
between the number of parties common to the government that adopted the decree and 
the government that passed the law and the number of parties that passed the law. This 
variable captures how “close” is the government that implements the decree to the 
government that approved the law. Alter_NS assumes value 1 if the governments that 
adopt the laws and the decrees coincide or when they share the same characteristics in 
terms of government composition. It is the case of the governments of the First 
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Republic. The variable assumes value 0 if no parties of the government that approved 
the law are present in the government that adopts the decree. My expectation is that the 
more similar the government that enacts the law and the government that adopts the 
decree, the lower is the necessity to activate the control of the Council of State to ensure 
that implementation adequately interprets the law. Figure 18 shows the distribution of 
the mean values of the variable, per government. The cabinets that, on average, 
implemented decrees from laws of the less similar governments are, by definition, the 
first Berlusconi government and Dini government. These governments, the first of the 
Second Republic, were composed indeed of new political parties.  
Figure 18. Distribution of “Alter_NS” variable, for government 
Data: personal computations on information available on the juridical database Leggi d'Italia 
(1988-2014). Types of act: D.M., D.P.R., D.P.C.M., acts deriving from laws prior to 1988 
excluded. Total number of acts: 1.140 
Except for these governments, the cabinets that implemented the laws of the less similar 
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governments are, as in the spatial version of the variable, the second Berlusconi cabinet 
and also Monti cabinet. 
5.5.4 Summary of the variables 
The following table synthesizes the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent 
and control variables presented before.  
Table 5. Descriptive statistics  
The variables Alter and Alter_NS has 1.140 observations, since their values for two 
decrees that derive from laws approved by the predecessor of De Mita government 
(Goria government) are classified as missing. 
Variables N Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
Council of State 1142 .8388792 .3678034 0 1
Independent variables
Range 1142 5.901708 2.632072 0 9.41
P_gov 1142 4.89317 2.160308 1 8
Alternation 1142 6.863092 5.503851 0 14.66092
New_Parties 1142 .4992776 .3965617 0 1
Bureaucapacity 1142 .0837858 .1051963 0 1.333333
Control variables 
Modify 1142 .1287215 .3350382 0 1
Alter 1140 26.02992 37.36826 0 155.2258
Alter_NS 1140 .6919158 .431735 0 1
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5.6 The determinants of Council of State's activation: an empirical analysis 
Since the decrees I collected are grouped by policy area and there might be different 
effects on them according to the policy area to which they belong, I use a mixed-effects 
logistic regression to test my hypotheses, with random intercepts for each level of 
policy area  (economy, defense, interior, justice and education). 
I ran the analyses in the entire dataset and then in a subset, in which the decrees that 
derive from laws of previous governments, the “inherited decrees”, are not included . 80
Model 1 and model 2 test, respectively, spatial and non-spatial variables on the entire 
dataset. Model 3 and model 4 test spatial and non-spatial variables on the subset. 
In Model 1 and 3, spatial variables are calculated on four policy dimensions (increase 
services versus cut taxes, pro- versus anti permissive social policy, pro- versus anti 
decentralization of decision, environment over growth versus growth over 
environment). In Appendix, I ran the analyses on the entire dataset and on the subset 
with spatial variables calculated only on the dimension “increase services versus cut 
taxes”.  
 In the subset are included all D.P.R.. D.P.R are the most concerted type of administrative act, since they 80
must be approved by the entire government. They often derive from combined provisions of different 
laws. Given their characteristics, have considered these type of acts as expression of the will of the 
incumbent governments.
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Table 6. Determinants of Council of State's activation  
In models 1 and 2 (analyses on the entire dataset) both spatial and non-spatial 
independent variables are statistically significant. The variables that capture government 
heterogeneity, “Range” in model 1 and “P_Gov” in model 2, are statistically significant, 
1 2 3 4




P_Gov - .19897*** (.0405652) -
.1704262*** 
(.0554691)
Alternation -.0753881*** (.0181156) -
-.0765409*** 
(.0256221) -

















Alter .0138604*** (.0031145) - - -








Observations 1140 1140 517 517
Group variable policy_num policy_num policy_num policy_num
Number of groups 5 5 5 5
Wald chi2 56.98 60.86 18.54 24.70
Log likelihood -459.26603 -458.09523 -237.75181 -234.53936
Dependent variable: decree submitted to the ex ante control of the Council of State. Mixed 
effects logistic regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p <0.1
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respectively, at 0.05 and at 0.01 level. They both have a positive impact on the 
probability of activating the Council of State as Advisor. More specifically, every unit 
increase in Range enhances the probability of activating the ex ante control of the 
Council of State of 7.64%. Every unit increase in P_Gov (each increase of one party in 
the total number of parties at government) enhances the probability of submitting a 
decree to ex ante control of the Council of State of the 22.01%.  
The variables that capture alternation in model 1 and 2, “Alternation” and “New 
Parties”, are statistically significant at 0.01 level in each model. They both have a 
negative impact on the probability of activating the ex ante control of the Council of 
State. In particular, for each unit increase of Alternation, the probability of adopting a 
regulation decreases of the 7.26%. When New Parties passes from 0 to 1, which means, 
when governments' composition passes from no new parties at government to only new 
parties at government, the probability of activating the Council of State as Advisor 
decreases of the 52.16%. 
The variable Burecapacity, which represents the importance of the “investment” in the 
individual expertise of Council of State members among government departments, is 
statistically significant at 0.01 level in models 1 and 2 and it has a negative impact on 
Council of State activation. In the first model, when the variable passes from 0 to 1, the 
probability of adopting a regulation decreases of 90.17%. In model 2, the probability 
decreases of the 87.41 %. 
The control variable Modify, which captures if an administrative act is an amendment of 
an existing regulation, is statistically significant at 0.01 in models 1 and 2 and it has a 
positive effect on the probability to adopt a regulation (it more than doubles the 
probability of adopting a regulation in model 1 and it triples the probability in model 2).  
The control variables that capture governments “alterity”, Alter and Alter_NS, are both 
statistically significant at 0.01 level in models 1 and 2 and they have, respectively 
positive and negative effects on the probability to activate the ex ante control of the 
Council of State. The substantial impact of the spatial version of the variable is modest: 
for each unit increase of Alter, the probability to activate the Council of State as Advisor 
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increases of 1.40%. When Alter_NS passes from 0 to 1 (when governments that adopted 
the laws coincide with governments that adopt the decrees), the probability to activate 
the Council of State as Advisor decreases of the 43.79%.  
In model 3 and 4 the analyses concern the subset of the non-inherited decrees. 
Therefore, control variables Alter and Alter_NS are no more included. 
In Model 3, the statistical significance of Range remains at a 0.05 level. On the subset 
of the non-inherited administrative acts, the impact of an increase of one unit of this 
variable on the probability to adopt a regulation is of the 8.55%. In model 4, the non-
spatial variable that captures government heterogeneity, P_Gov, remains statistically 
significant at 0.01. For each one more party at government the probability of adopting a 
regulation increases of the 18.58%. 
Both versions of the independent variable that captures alternation: the spatial variable 
Alternation in model 3 and the non-spatial variable New Parties in model 4 are 
statistically significant (respectively at 0.01 and at 0.05) and they have a negative 
impact on the probability of activating the Council of State. In particular, for one unit 
increase of the variable Alternation in model 3, the probability to adopt a regulation 
decreases of 7.37%, while, in model 4, New Parties variable, passing from 0 to 1, 
determines a decrease of the 55,21%. The independent variable Burecapacity has a 0.05 
level of statistical significance in model 3 and a 0.1 level in model 4. In both models it 
confirms its negative impact on the probability to adopt a regulation (when the ratio 
between the number of councilors and the number of acts adopted in a policy sector 
passes from 0 to 1, the probability to activate the Council of State decreases of the 
96.92% in model 3 and of 91.67% in model 4). The control variable Modify is 
statistically significant in both models at 0.05 level and it has a positive impact on the 
probability to adopt a regulation. Passing from 0 to 1, this variable doubles the 
probability to activate the Council of State in both models 3 and 4. 
!117
Appendix 
Table 7. Determinants of Council of State's activation 
 Parties’ positions derived from policy dimension “increase services versus cut taxes” 















Group variable policy_num policy_num
Number of groups 5 5
Wald chi2 56.54 16.03
Log likelihood -459.54713 -239.05773  
Dependent variable: decree submitted to the ex ante control of the Council of State.
Mixed effects logistic regression. Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1  
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In both models 5 (entire dataset) and 6 (subset) the variable Alternation is negative and 
statistically significant at level 0.01. In model 5, Alternation determines a decrease in 
the probability of activating the Council of State as Advisor of 12.44 %; in model 6 it 
determines a decrease of 12.95%. When the analysis is run on the entire dataset, Range 
is positive and statistically significant at level 0.1; it increases the probability of 
adopting a regulation of 5.95%. In the subset, Range confirms its positive sign, but it is 
no more statistically significant. The variable Bureaucapacity confirms its negative 
impact on the probability to activate the Council of State and it is statistically significant 
at level 0.01 in Model 5 and at level 0.05 in Model 6. It decreases the probability of 
activating the Council of State as Advisor of 91.51% in model 5 and of 97.53% in 
model 6. The variable Modify is positive and statistically significant in both models, at 
0.01 level and at 0.05 level and it almost triples the probability to adopt a regulation in 
model 5, and it doubles it in model 6. Variable “Alter” in model 5 confirms its positive 
effect on the probability to adopt a regulation (+19.91%) and it is statistically significant 
at 0.01 level. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 Conclusions.  
Implications of legislative-judicial interaction on the configuration 
of courts that review administrative acts in 15 EU countries 
6.1 Determinants and implications of the ex ante control on administrative acts  
Courts competent for reviewing administrative acts, as law scholars point out, check 
how public authorities exercise administrative discretion. Courts control if governments 
have chosen the most appropriate means and if their decisions do not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the goals established by legislation (“principle of proportionality”). 
In addition, courts check if individual rights have been respected in the exercise of 
public power and, as a sanction of their control, they can declare an administrative 
decision to be void . In the majority of countries of Continental Europe, the judicial 81
review of administrative acts is provided by courts organized in a separate system 
within the judiciary, parallel to that of civil and criminal tribunals. It is the case of 
countries as France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Greece, Portugal. In Northern Europe, also Finland and Sweden have a separate system 
of administrative courts. On the contrary, Spain attributes administrative litigation to 
specific sections of ordinary courts, on the model of a common-law country as the 
United Kingdom. A prerogative of administrative courts that has received much less 
attention concerns their role of advisors of governments. To an extent that varies from 
country to country, administrative courts can be consulted by the governments and they 
can issue opinions on the drafts of the most important administrative acts (decrees with 
a regulatory content). In the case of Italy, the ex ante control of the Council of State on 
 The protection against unlawful decisions can include also that courts allocate damages to be paid by 81
state or local budgets (Ziller 2012).
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regulations seems to be triggered by specific political conditions. In particular, in 
presence of high level of government heterogeneity, at least one partner coalition would 
benefit from the intervention of the Council of State as Advisor, in order to prevent 
ministerial drift. Moreover, when government coalitions are heterogeneous, coalition 
members would be interested in knowing Council of State preferences, in order to 
anticipate its actions as Court. For this purpose, they would activate its ex ante control 
on regulations. 
It is possible to imagine that the same political conditions can affect the necessity to 
provide a preventive legal control on administrative acts also in other countries and that 
such conditions can affect the characteristics of courts that review administrative acts as 
well. In particular, I would expect the activation of courts as advisory bodies to be 
limited in countries with low level of government heterogeneity and high level of 
alternation. As a consequence, in these countries I would expect to observe the presence 
of: 
- administrative courts that do not provide a legal ex ante control on administrative acts 
- Councils of State with a clear separation between consultative and judicial functions 
and in which the advisory role of the institution is more “policy oriented”, less 
connected with the role of the Council as a judicial body. 
On the contrary, in countries characterized by high level of government heterogeneity 
and low level of alternation I would expect to find: 
- administrative courts that are consulted also as advisors of governments on 
administrative acts 
- Councils of State with a clear continuity between consultative and judicial functions, 
in terms of personnel and of content of the opinions and of the decisions. In these 
countries, the opinions of the Councils of State are supposed to constitute a sort of 
anticipation of the eventual judicial decisions.  
In this conclusive section, I mapped the subjects responsible for the ex ante legal control 
on regulations in 15 European countries. Then I inferred the main questions that seem to 
qualify such control. Hence, I have focused on the characteristics of courts responsible 
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for the judicial review of administrative acts in the same countries and I have provided a 
classification of courts based on two dimensions: “organs responsible for the judicial 
review of administrative acts” and “separation between consultative and judicial 
functions”. Finally, I have associated courts' characteristics with political variables that 
capture alternation and government heterogeneity and I have verified the presence of 
correlations.  
6.1.1 The ex ante control on regulations in 15 European countries  
The legal control on administrative acts' drafting, in particular of regulations, is 
exercised by different organs in the European countries. Not necessarily such control is 
a prerogative of courts. There are countries in which this control is entirely exercised 
inside government departments. In some cases, an ex ante supervision is exercised also 
by committees of the legislative. In other countries, in addition to the control of legal 
units and of other bodies of the executive, a monitoring of administrative acts' drafting 
is attributed to third institutions, as the administrative courts. In the following table, 
using OECD data on regulatory capacity in the 15 original member states of the EU 
countries and information from official documents of the Association of the Councils of 
State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union (ACA-Europe), 
I have summarized the combinations of institutions and bodies that can supervise the 
lawfulness of regulations, highlighting if their control is internal or external to the 
executive in table 8:  
!122
Table 8. Ex ante control on regulations in 15 EU countries  
Source: Better Regulation in Europe – The EU 15 project, OECD and official documents of the 
Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European 
Union (ACA-Europe).  
Countries Institutions that supervise the legal drafting of regulations
Presence of a legal control 
external to the executive
Austria Constitutional Service of the Federal Chancellery (Verfassungsdienst)
No; Courts might be consulted 
on primary legislation's drafting
Belgium Legal department of the Prime Minister's Office; Council of State Yes, mandatory
Denmark Ministerial legal units; Supervision of the Ministry of Justice No
Finland
Ministry of Justice (Bureau of 
Legislative Inspection); Supreme 
Court and Supreme Administrative 
Court opinions are often asked in the 
preparation of new legislation 
Ye s , o n r e q u e s t o f t h e 
government 
France
G e n e r a l S e c r e t a r i a t o f t h e 
Government (legislative department); 
Council of State
Yes, mandatory
Germany Ministry of Justice No
Greece
Government General Secretariat 
(Office of Legislative Work); Central 
Law Making Committee; Council of 
State 
Yes, mandatory
Ireland Office of the Parliamentary Counsel to the government No
Italy DAGL; Council of State Yes, mandatory
The Netherlands Ministerial legal departments; Ministry of Justice; Council of State Yes, mandatory
Luxembourg Central Legislation Service; Council of State Yes, mandatory
Portugal
Legal services of the Ministries; Legal 
centre of the Ministry for Presidency 
(CEJUR)
No
Spain C o u n c i l o f S t a t e ; Te c h n i c a l Secretariats General of the Ministries
No (the control of the Council 
o f S t a t e o n s e c o n d a r y 
legislation is residual)
Sweden
Director General for Legal Affairs 
(DGLA) in each Ministry; Ministry of 
Justice;  Council on Legislation
Yes
United Kingdom
J o i n t c o m m i t t e e o f s t a t u t o r y 




In Germany, Austria, Portugal, Ireland and Denmark, the ex ante control on the 
lawfulness of regulations is provided only by institutions inside the executive. In 
Portugal, the Legal centre of the Ministry for Presidency (CEJUR) provide legal 
assistance to the ministries. In Germany the legal quality of the drafting is ensured by 
the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, that checks if drafts are consistent with the 
existing laws and if they comply with formal drafting rules. In addition, German top 
civil servants are traditionally trained as lawyers (Ziller, 2012) and they contribute to 
supervise the legal consistency of primary and secondary legislation. In Ireland, the 
legal quality of primary and, on request, of secondary legislation is ensured by a team of 
specialist lawyers that works at the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel to the 
government. This Office is part of the Office of the Attorney General, the highest legal 
advisory body of the government. In Denmark the legal quality of regulations is ensured 
by the legal units of the Ministries and by the supervision of the Ministry of Justice.  
The majority of countries has services competent for supervising the legality of 
regulations that belong to both, the government and to institutions external to the 
government. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the parliament plays an increasing 
role in the control of the new regulations. Several parliamentary committees participate 
to the supervision of regulations which derive from primary laws . Amongst these, the 82
Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments assesses the legal basis and drafting defects 
of regulations; the House of Commons Regulatory Reform Committee, the House of 
Lords Delegated Powers and the Regulatory Reform Committee examine if ministers 
made a proper use of the powers conferred by legislation.  
Other countries see the supervision of organs of the executive and of the administrative 
courts. In Sweden, in addition to the check of the Director General of legal affairs of the 
Prime Minister, a Council of Legislation (Lagrådet), composed of current and former 
judges of the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court, advises government 
 Most of these regulations are known as “statutory instruments”. Statutory instruments cannot be 82
modified by the parliament, but they tend to be subject to parliamentary approval. Therefore a 
specialized group of committees has developed in order to scrutinize their content.
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on the conformity of regulations drafts with the legal system. In Finland, where the 
Ministry of Justice, through the Bureau of Legislative inspection, checks the legal basis 
of the drafts and their consistency with other legislation, the government can ask, in 
addition, the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court.  
In France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, in addition to the 
supervision of central bodies of the executive (as the Government General Secretariat in 
France and Greece, the Department of Legislative Affairs of the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers in Italy the Central Legislation Service in Luxembourg...), the 
Councils of State provide an ex ante control on regulations.  
6.1.2 Questions qualifying the ex ante control on regulations 
The information collected allow to infer a series of questions that seems to characterize 
the logic of the ex ante control on regulations. In Figure 19, to the questions that qualify 
the supervision on regulations, I have associated the institutions and bodies that provide 
such supervision. When the control on regulations' drafting is provided by organs 
external to the executive, such organs can be committees of the legislative or courts. To 
the category of courts belong the administrative courts whose judges can be consulted 
as advisors on governments' secondary legislation and the Councils of State. Councils 
of State can be divided in: Councils of State in which consultative and judicial functions 
are provided separately; Councils of State in which the two functions overlap and 
advisory opinions and judicial reviews are issued by the same judges. Only in Councils 
of State in which consultative and judicial functions overlap, the court that advises 
government can be properly considered as the same subject that reviews administrative 
acts. The same cannot be affirmed, if there is a clear separation between the two 
functions and a sort of division of labor occurs among the councilors of consultative and 
judicial sections. In these cases, it is improper to consider the court that advises the 
government as the same subject that reviews administrative acts. Although the two 
functions are exercised within the bounds of a single institution, the logics and the 
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behaviors of the advisors and of the judges can be different. 











Since the intensity of the relation between advisory and judicial functions of courts 
varies among countries, I have deepened this aspect in a classification of courts that 
review administrative acts in the 15 original member states of the EU. Countries were 
selected on the basis of the quality of information available and of the availability of 
public documents written in English and French.  
!126
The control is provided also by institutions 
external to the executive
no yes
The control is issued by a courtLegal units of the Ministries, 
organs of the Presidency/
Chancellery, Ministry of 
Justice
yesno
The same court can provide a judicial 
review of the acts
C o m m i t t e e s o f t h e 
legislative
yesno
Administrative courts in which judges 
are consulted also as governments' 
advisors; Councils of State whose 
members par t ic ipate to both, 
advisory and judicial sections
Counci ls of State in 
wh i ch adv i so r y and 
judicial functions are 
separated
6.2 A classification of courts that review administrative acts 
In table 9, I have provided a classification of administrative courts that takes account of 
two dimensions. The first concerns courts' organization inside the judiciary: it registers 
if administrative courts are specialized sections of the ordinary judiciary, if they 
constitute a parallel system of courts, separate from that of the ordinary tribunals, if they 
follow the Councils of State- model. The second concerns the intensity of the relation 
between organs that advise the executive and organs that provide the judicial review of 
administrative acts. 
Table 9. A classification of courts that review administrative acts, based on their 
organization inside the judiciary and on the intensity of the relation between 
advisory and judicial organs 
Source: official documents of the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme 
Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union (ACA-Europe). http://www.aca-europe.eu/
index.php/en/tour-d-europe-en and information available on the official websites of the Councils 
of State 
Relation between organs that advise the executive and organs 
responsible for the judicial review of administrative acts
Organs responsible for the 
j u d i c i a l r e v i e w o f 
administrative acts
Separation of functions 
  (- -)                                                                                      (+ +)
Specialized sections of civil 
courts          
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
                    Spain 
                                    Denmark
Administrative courts
                 Finland 
                 Sweden 
                                 Austria 







Luxembourg (until 1996)                          
  France 
          Luxembourg (after 1996)
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Information on courts’ organization are drawn from official documents of the 
Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the 
European Union (ACA- Europe), from official websites of the administrative courts and 
of the Councils of State and from scholarly publications.  
In the United Kingdom, the judicial review of administrative acts is provided by a 
branch of the High Court and the same court does not advise government on secondary 
legislation (as reported in previous paragraph, in the U.K. an ex ante control on 
statutory instruments' is provided by specialized committee of the parliament, in 
addition to the supervision of legal units of the executive). In this country, advisory and 
judicial functions are provided by organs clearly separated and that act with different 
incentives. In Spain, the judicial review of administrative acts is provided by specialized 
sections of the ordinary courts, which have no advisory role. In Spain there is also a 
Council of State, but its activity is limited to a consultancy to the government on 
primary legislation and, to a very limited extent, on secondary legislation (only 
questions concerning the organization of the same Council of State ) with no judicial 83
prerogatives. Also in this case, there is no overlapping between organs that provide 
judicial and advisory functions. In Portugal and Germany, the Supreme Administrative 
Courts are independent from the executive and they do not supervise the process of 
regulations' adoption. In these countries, third institutions that scrutinize regulations in 
addition to organs of the executive are not present. In Austria, administrative judges are 
not allowed to carry out activities as legal consultant in the administrative field and they 
have no proper advisory functions. However, as well as the justices of Constitutional 
Court, they can be invited to express their opinions on draft laws . Administrative 84
justices of Finland and Sweden tend to have a closer interaction with the executive. In 
particular, in Finland, the Supreme Administrative Court can submit proposals to the 
government for legislative action and judges' opinions are often asked in the preparation 




of new legislation (Sarvilinna, 2007). In Sweden, justices of the Supreme Court and of 
the Supreme Administrative Court serve at the Lagrådet, a Council on Legislation 
which consists of two divisions composed of three members each and it is consulted by 
the government on legislation concerning freedom of expression, access to public 
documents, personal status of private individuals, obligations on citizens, administration 
of justice and fundamental principles of public administration. In the case of these two 
countries, a certain overlapping between advisory and judicial functions is present, the 
same judges of the administrative courts can be involved in the legislative process. 
Countries that adopt the model of the Council of State have one single institution 
responsible for advising the government and for providing the judicial review of 
administrative acts. However, the intensity of the relation between consultative and 
judicial functions in these institutions can vary. This fact is reflected by the organization 
of the personnel inside the sections of the Councils of State, by the presence of eventual 
regimes of incompatibility for the exercise the two functions and by the same 
requirements, in terms of expertise and background, necessary to become members of 
the institution. When advisory and judicial functions overlap, the consultative task of 
the Council of State tends to be “captured” by the justices: by their analytical tools, by 
the prevalence, in terms of numbers, of the judges in the advisory sections of the 
Councils of State. When the two functions are separated, the consultative function can 
present also a “political nature”: it can be provided also by councilors with a more 
general training, not exclusively legal, and it is more targeted on governments' policy 
objectives. In the majority of the cases considered, the functions of the Councils of State 
coincide and the judicial approach tends to prevail. Until 1996, the consultative and 
judicial functions of the Council of State of Luxembourg used to overlap. The members 
of the institution had a double role of judges and consultants: they used to rotate 
between the sections and they could be part of different sections simultaneously. After a 
sentence in which the European Court of Human Rights (the “Procola v. Luxembourg” 
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affair ) judged the organization of the Council of State incompatible with the principle 85
of impartiality and independence, the institution was reformed: the Council of State 
maintained only the advisory function and the judicial section was removed. In 1997, 
the administrative litigation was attributed to an administrative tribunal and to a new 
administrative court. In the Councils of State of Belgium, The Netherlands, Greece and 
Italy, judges rotate between the sections and, in a limited number of cases, they can be 
also simultaneous members of both sections. In the Council of State of Belgium , the 86
councilors must meet a series of requirements to be appointed, as a relevant professional 
experience of legal nature (at least of ten years) and the possession of a master's degree 
or doctorate in law. It is rather frequent that members of the judicial courts move to the 
Council of State and that members of the Council of State apply for the Constitutional 
Court. Although the councilors may be assigned exclusively to the advisory or to the 
judicial section, in practice, as reported by a Chamber President at the Council of State 
of Belgium , they can switch from one function to the other when the workload of the 87
institution makes this necessary. In particular, the councilors of the judicial section can 
be called to sit on the consultative section to replace a member prevented from 
attending or to constitute additional chambers when required; the members of the 
consultative section can be called to sit on the judicial section to form a bilingual 
chamber, to replace a member of the Dutch-speaking or of the French-speaking 
 In the “Procola” case, a company contested a regulation on the apportionment of milk quotas before 85
the judicial section of the Council of State of Luxembourg. However, four of the five councillors that 
heard the case had already examined the regulation when the government asked the Council to give 
advice on the draft. The European Court of Human Rights judged this fact incompatible with the 
principles of impartiality and independence. 
 In Belgium, the Council of State issues opinions on primary and on secondary legislation; it checks 86
the coherence of laws, decrees and ordinances with higher legal rules, including the constitution. 
Although its opinions are not binding, they tend to be followed by the government (Deschouwer, 
2012).
 The organization of the Council of State of Belgium was described by the Chamber President Marnix 87
Van Damme at the meeting of the members of the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme 
administrative jurisdictions of the European Union charged with acting in  an advisory capacity in 
matter of legislation, held in The Hague on 16 February 2004. A minute of the meeting was published 
in the Newsletter of the Association. 
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chamber prevented from attending, or to form additional chambers . These elements 88
seem to signal an overlap of advisory and judicial functions and a prevalence of the 
legal-judicial component of the consultancy. The same happens in the Council of State 
of the Netherlands. Recently the Dutch government, under the pressure of parliament, 
partially limited the possibility of simultaneous membership of the councilors to 
consultative and judicial divisions. This also as a consequence of a sentence of the 
European Court of Human Rights that, in “Kleyn v. the Netherlands” case (2003), 
questioned the capacity of the internal structure of the Dutch Council of State to ensure 
impartiality and independence in relation to the judicial proceedings (De Wet, 2008). 
But the intensity of the link between consultative and judicial functions is pointed out 
also by the same members of the Dutch Council of State. A Chamber President at the 
Council of State of the Netherlands  points out how councilors' ability in the scrutiny 89
of the drafts descend from their experience as judges and how the advisory function on 
secondary legislation greatly benefits from the judicial experience. In Greece there 
seems to be a complete overlapping between the two functions. Members of the Greek 
Council of State are graduates of the National School of Magistrature. The advisory 
function is issued by one section only, to which belong only magistrates responsible for 
both, judicial and consultative tasks. According to some observers, because of its high 
technical standards, the Greek Council of State is perceived as a tough guardian of 
legality. Sometimes ministers opt to prepare legislative amendment or ministerial 
decision in order to avoid the rigorous scrutiny of the Council of State (OECD, 2012, 
75).  In Italy, Council of State members are in large majority magistrates: the admission 
to the Italian Council of State is based on seniority in the Regional Administrative 
 The sections of Belgian Council of State are organized in French-speaking and Dutch-speaking 88
chambers. Information on Council of State of Belgium are drawn from the questionnaire on forms of 
administrative justice in 25 Member States of the European Union, compiled by Paul Lewalle, 
member of the institution: http://www.aca-europe.eu/index.php/en/tour-d-europe-en and from the 
official website of the Belgian Council of State.  
 Willem Konijnenbelt, former Chamber President at the Dutch Council of State. Meeting of the 89
Association of the Councils of State and Supreme administrative jurisdictions of the European Union 
(2004) held in The Hague on 16 February 2004 (cit. in note 9). 
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Tribunals (50%), on direct admission exam restricted to common law judges, public 
finance court judges, state lawyers and senior officials (25%), on government 
appointment (25%). Council of State members rotate between the consultative and 
judicial sections and the two functions are not considered as incompatible. The unitary 
character of consultative and judicial functions of the Italian Council of State is 
promoted and defended by the same members of the institution, from the time of the 
presidency of Santi Romano. On the contrary, the different recruitment of Council of 
State members in France seems to suggest that the advisory function is not entirely 
captured by the judicial tasks of the institution. About 2/3 of the members of the Conseil 
d'Etat (auditeurs) are recruited by competition via the Ecole National d'Administration. 
The Ecole National d'Administration provides a limited legal specialization, on behalf 
of a more general training for the high level civil service. About 1/3 of the members of 
the Conseil d'Etat (maitres des requetes e conseillers) is appointed through an “external 
round” (tour exterieur). Through the external round, government can appoint to the 
Conseil officials with professional experience in other civilian or military institutions 
(as diplomats, prefects, officers, engineers) as well as in legal affairs (lawyers, 
academics) and a limited number of judges of the administrative courts and of the 
administrative courts of appeal. Except for these appointments (one in four maitres des 
requetes, one in three conseiller d'Etat) judges of administrative courts and 
administrative courts of appeal do not access the Conseil d'Etat. Differently from 
Regional Administrative Tribunals of Italy, administrative courts, established in 1953, 
and administrative courts of appeal, instituted in 1987, constitute separate judicial 
bodies. They are responsible for the largest part of administrative litigation and they 
select their members through external and internal competitions . The job profiles of 90
the maitres des requetes en service extraordinaire at the Conseil d'Etat reflect how 
recruitment policies differ in the French Council of State compared with the other 
Councils. Maitres des requetes en service extraordinaire are members external to the 
 http://www.conseil-etat.fr/Tribunaux-Cours/Recrutement-Carriere 90
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institution, recruited through the detachment from other administrations. They can serve 
at the Conseil for no more than 4 years . Profiles as: “director of human resources of 91
the Senate”, “general director of the International council of museums”, “civil 
administrator at the general direction of the work unit of the Ministry of Labour”, “head 
of the resources management service of the City of Paris” serve in both, judicial and 
advisory sections of the Conseil d'Etat, with a training of 70 hours during the first 
months of service and the supervision of a “mentor” . The recruitment of personnel 92
with managerial skills, which is completely absent in the other Councils of State, 
suggests that French government requires to the Conseil d'Etat a different type of 
consultancy, not only legal. Moreover, the presence of a clear incompatibility regime 
between members of the Conseil that hear judicial cases and members that advised the 
government seems to suggest that the interlocution with government is not based on the 
potential threat of the institution in its capacity as judge. The separation of the 
consultative and judicial activities is guaranteed by an incompatibility regime 
established by the French code of administrative justice. Such regime does not allow 
Council of State's members to participate in appeals against acts on which they 
themselves advised the government. When the Council of State is informed of an appeal 
against an act on which it previously issued an opinion, the list of the councilors that 
took part in the deliberation of the opinion is communicated to the applicants. The 
members of the Council of State who participate to the trial cannot access the dossiers 
produced by the consultative sections on the act, nor they can know the content of 
opinions which have not been made public .  93




 The large majority of the opinions of the Conseil d'Etat is not made public. Information of the 93
incompatibility regime are drawn from the Code of administrative justice, Articles R122-21-1m R 
1 2 2 - 2 1 - 2 , R - 1 2 2 - 2 1 - 3 h t t p s : / / w w w . l e g i f r a n c e . g o u v . f r /




6.3 An explanation of courts' characteristics based on political variables 
My expectation is that the presence of specific political circumstances may affect the 
interaction between courts that review administrative acts and governments. In 
particular, I would expect that, in consequence of greater levels of government 
heterogeneity, governments should be more interested in activating courts as consultants 
and in anticipating courts' decisions. On the contrary, in countries characterized by 
higher level of alternation, I would expect governments to be less concerned with 
activating the ex ante control of administrative courts in order to prevent ministerial 
drift and to access courts’ preferences. In chapter V, I analyzed the interaction between 
government and the Council of State of Italy according to a game-theoretic perspective. 
The results of the strategic interaction suggests that the ex ante control of the Council of 
State tends to be triggered, the higher the level of government ideological heterogeneity. 
On the contrary, governments tend to prefer administrative acts that do not imply the ex 
ante control of the Council of State, for increasing levels of alternation. In presence of 
high government ideological heterogeneity, in fact, at least one party (R in figure 20, 
Case 2) can benefit from the the ex ante control of a policy conserver court in the 
process of regulations' adoption, in order to limit the risk of ministerial drift: 















be close to the ideal points of partners coalitions (or it is placed inside the Pareto set), 
the decision of a policy conserver court can produce a policy output that cannot be 
modified by the parties (Figure 21, Case 2): 







In Case 2, knowing court's ideal point through the ex ante control on regulations is 
crucial for partners’ coalition. While, in Case 1, all court's possible ideal points are 
located outside coalition range and, for not being overruled, the court can at most obtain 
R, in Case 2, the court can obtain its ideal point also with no possibility for L and R to 
change it (points to the left of party R). 
The Italian case can be useful for comparative analysis, since it presents great 
mutability in the political conditions considered as explanatory variables: the different 
political conditions of Italy might reflect the prevailing political conditions of other 
countries. I would expect, for instance, the less heterogeneous governments of U.K., 
France and Spain to have lesser necessity to anticipate courts' decisions, since their 
courts can at least choose the ideal point of a member of the coalition: otherwise they 
would be overruled (Figure 21, Case 1).  
I have used the classification of courts shown in the previous paragraph to attribute 
different scores to courts. Then I have associated courts of the different countries with 
different measures of the explanatory political variables. Scores attributed to courts 






judicial functions; score “5” means: absence of overlapping between consultative and 
judicial functions. The measures of the explanatory political variables: the size of 
alternation and the level of government ideological heterogeneity are drawn from 
Zucchini (2011). Variables are calculated through spatial measures and with other 
indirect measures. In order to infer party positions, the author employs expert survey 
data (Laver and Hunt 1992) on the issue “raising taxes to increase public 
services” (score 1) versus “cutting public services to cut taxes” (score 20). Government 
ideological heterogeneity (“government heterogeneity”) is measured as the ideological 
range of the government  and it is calculated as the distance between the most extreme 94
parties of the coalition. The size of alternation (“alternation”) is estimated as the 
difference between the midrange positions on the left-right dimension of two successive 
governments (Tsebelis 2002). Variables have been calculated also using an indirect 
operationalization, according to which government heterogeneity is estimated by 
considering the average number of parties at government (“parties at government”) and 
the level of alternation is captured considering the proportion of days spent by the 
government party that has been longer in office (“predominance”). For all variables, the 
author calculated the weighted average for the post-Second World War period through 
the end of the 1990s .  95
Figure 22 shows the bivariate correlation between countries' scores and the two groups 
of explanatory political variables. 
 Except when the parliamentary median party is outside this range. In this case, the variable is 94
measured as  the distance between the parliamentary median party and the government party on the 
opposite site.
 The period considered is shorter for France, including the Fifth Republic only, Portugal, Greece and 95
Spain (only the democratic age), and Italy (only the First Republic): see Zucchini (2011, 760). 
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Figure 22.  Bivariate correlation between countries' scores and explanatory 
political variables: “government heterogeneity” and “parties at government”, 
“alternation” and “predominance” 
Source: “Countries scores” based on personal computation on official documents of the 
Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European 
Union (ACA-Europe) and of the official websites of the Councils of State; Zucchini (2011) 
A negative correlation seems to characterize the first group of explanatory variables: 
that measures government ideological heterogeneity, and countries' scores. This means 
that, to an increase in government heterogeneity or in parties at government corresponds 
a decrease in regard with countries' scores . Low values of the variable countries' 96




 The correlation index between countries' scores and government heterogeneity is -0.60, excluding 96
Greece. It becomes -0.42, if Greece is included. The correlation index between countries' scores and 
parties at government is -0.71 if Greece is excluded. It becomes -0.52, if Greece is included. 
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to overlap. The higher government heterogeneity, the higher the necessity to activate the 
ex ante control of the courts. Greece constitutes the only exception, since it presents, at 
the same time, very low levels of government heterogeneity and a low country score: 
Greece has a Council of State with a complete overlap of consultative and judicial 
functions. Its behavior is not captured by the negative correlation. Conversely, a weak 
positive relation seems to characterize the spatial variable “alternation” and Countries' 
scores . Higher values of countries' scores include courts with no consultative 97
functions, or in which consultative and judicial functions are clearly separated. Also in 
this case, Greece represents an exception, since, in presence of high level of alternation, 
it presents a court with a low country score, which means: a court in which consultative 
and judicial functions tend to overlap. The behavior of the variable “predominance”, a 
non-spatial measure of the size of alternation, is specular to that of “alternation”, since it 
captures the absence of turnover among parties at government. Therefore, the sign of 
the correlation with countries' data is expected to be negative. The data confirm the 
presence of a negative correlation: the greater the absence of turnover of parties at 
government, the lower the necessity to activate courts as Advisors. As in the previous 
case, this correlation is not confirmed in the case of Greece, which presents low levels 
of predominance and also a low country score .  98
These results represent a first attempt to interpret administrative courts configuration on 
the light of the strategic interaction between legislatures and courts and on the light of 
the political conditions that characterize such interaction. Although caution is required, 
considering in particular the exception of the case of Greece, the data seem to suggest 
that the conclusions drawn for the Italian case might have some explanatory content 
also for the other countries. Countries whose governments present, on average, low 
level of ideological heterogeneity and higher level of alternation, would not need to 
 The correlation index between countries' scores and alternation is 0.43 not including Greece and it 97
becomes 0.26 if Greece is included. 
 The correlation index between predominance and countries' scores is -0.72, if Greece is not 98
considered and it becomes -0.45 if Greece is included. 
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activate courts as Advisors. Therefore, in these countries, the ex ante control on 
administrative acts would be provided mainly by institutions other than courts (by 
organs of the executive or of the legislative), or by courts in which consultative and 
judicial functions are separated and present different characteristics. It is the case, above 
all, of the United Kingdom, of Ireland and of Spain, in which the judicial review of 
administrative acts is provided by specialized sections of ordinary courts and there is no 
relation between these courts and organs that supervise regulations' drafting; of 
Germany and Portugal, in which administrative courts have no relation with the 
executive and the ex ante control on regulations is provided inside the executive. It is 
also the case of France, in which the Conseil d'Etat presents a clear distinction between 
consultative and judicial functions and whose role of Advisor is not captured by its role 
of Court. On the contrary, countries whose governments present, on average, greater 
level of ideological heterogeneity and low size of alternation, would be more prone to 
activate courts as Advisors. This fact would be reflected in courts' organization and, in 
particular, in the overlap of the consultative and judicial functions. It is the case of 
countries as Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, which present Councils of State in which 
consultative and judicial functions have a unitary character and, to a lower extent, of 
Sweden, Finland, in which administrative judges can be consulted as advisors on 
government legislation.  
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